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This study analyses and discusses the application and constitutionality of the general onus of proof provision (section 82 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 [the “Act”]), the presumption in favour of the State when criminal sanctions are applied to an offending taxpayer (section 104(2) of the Act) and the mechanics for imposing administrative sanctions in terms of section 76(1)(b) of the Act. The conclusion reached is that the reverse onus presumption, as provided for in terms of section 104(2) of the Act, is unconstitutional. It is penal in nature and offends against the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial (sections 35(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 108 of 1996 [the “Constitution”]). The section 36 limitation of rights clause of the Constitution does not save it. Section 76(1)(b) of the Act read in conjunction with the deeming provision of section 76(5) of the Act, is inextricably linked to the section 82 general reverse onus provision of the Act. Hence, when these three sections are applied together, they create a reverse onus that, prima facie, violates the right to just administrative action (section 33 of the Constitution). Regarding the general reverse onus burden as provided for in terms of section 82 of the Act, the conclusion reached is that it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society and can therefore be regarded as constitutional.

We investigate how different cognitive conceptualizations of reference point and tax withholdings jointly influence aggressive tax filing. We utilize a field study with responses captured from actual taxpayers immediately after filing their returns. Consistent with both prospect theory and mental accounting perspectives, we hypothesize and find evidence that more aggressive filing decisions depend on mental categorization of whether taxpayers expect a tax refund or owe additional taxes relative to their expected asset position (EAP). We find a joint and additive impact of EAP with a cognitive link made between taxes and the categorization of amounts owed. Our findings suggest that more aggressive filing behavior is found in taxpayers in a tax loss position relative to their EAP and in those that do not separately categorize taxes owing from their own resources. By highlighting the importance of EAP and the cognitive separation of taxes owed, we provide insight for revenue agencies to use cognitive framing strategies to mitigate aggressive taxpayer behavior. The cognitive framing of EAP may be influenced by the use of installment payments and tax withholdings, but also may be affected by communications that alter taxpayers' expectations of taxes owed.

In a supplemental analysis, Krawczyk and Sawyers (1995) (K&S) found evidence that variations in engagement letter language affect the likelihood that taxpayers hold CPAs “responsible” for additional tax assessments, a broad measure of risk. We extend the K&S analysis by examining the effect of engagement letters on a larger set of precisely-defined tax practice risks. Our factor analysis identifies two risk constructs relating to client loss and reimbursement. MANCOVA shows that engagement letters reduce the likelihood of incurring both categories of risks. Also, some evidence suggests that higher-income participants are greater tax practice risks, and subjects with external loci of control represent higher client loss and reimbursement risks. Finally, we find that engagement letters reduce the percentage of professional fees subjects request as reimbursements following an unfavorable IRS audit and that prior legal suits, gender, age, and income level also may affect the fee reimbursement requested.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent of corporate tax evasion and its implications on the protection of the shareholders and on the function of the capital market.

The extent of tax evasion of the Greek public companies is estimated on the basis of tax audit data. Unvariate tests are employed in order to assess the effect of the audit firm and to examine corporate tax behaviour.

The mean rate of tax evasion was estimated at about 16 per cent, showing that the incentive for tax evasion doesn't diminish when the companies are listed in the stock exchange. Specifically, the companies alter their tax behaviour (i.e. appear more tax compliant) only in the year of the IPO and the year before. It was also found out that the type of the audit firm is likely to affect the extent of tax evasion committed.

The present paper provides evidence that corporate tax evasion is widespread and calls for appropriate measures. Nowadays, this issue has become more crucial than ever, as Greece is in the middle of the financial crisis. Moreover, the findings regarding audit effectiveness in detecting tax evasion have significant implications, as the 2010 Greek tax bill grants the audit firms the right to issue certificates for tax purposes.

This paper contributes to the literature of fraudulent financial reporting by focusing on one specific form of fraud, which has been widely neglected – tax evasion.

The purpose of this paper is to examine current thinking and evidence on the extent to which taxation is, or should be, an influence upon dividend policy. To this end, the paper has been divided into two parts. The first reviews the range of normative stances and the empirical evidence in respect of each stance. Discussion mainly addresses large listed companies in the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK. The second part of the paper is based on more practical issues. This focuses attention on smaller, owner‐managed companies, for which there is less empirical evidence relating to dividend policy. This analysis of smaller companies is restricted to the UK taxation system only.

I examine patterns of making or deferring strategic repatriations that firms can use to either meet analysts' forecasts or defer to maintain future reported earnings flexibility. First, I examine the extent to which firms repatriate earnings from high foreign tax subsidiaries to decrease US tax expense, resulting in increased net income and lower cash taxes. Using federal tax return information, I find evidence that firms strategically repatriate these earnings to meet or beat current analysts' forecasts. Next, I find evidence that firms that are able to obtain current year tax reductions defer these repatriations in an attempt to build cookie-jar reserves. Lastly, I find that firms do not disclose high foreign tax repatriations (HTRs), even when required by SEC rules. This study contributes to the earnings management, tax avoidance, and disclosure literature by examining a discretionary tax planning strategy.

Many taxpayers rely on their advisors to look after their tax affairs. In spite of this reliance, taxpayers still find themselves in default for the purposes of section 76(1) of the Income Tax Act and additional tax (referred to as a “penalty” by the judiciary) is imposed. This article examines whether the reliance by a taxpayer on his advisor, be it his accountant, bookkeeper or even a member of staff, can constitute a complete or partial defence to the imposition of additional tax in terms of section 76(1) or be regarded as an “extenuating circumstance” for the purposes of remission of additional tax in terms of section 76(2)(a).

The additional tax (referred to as a “penalty” by the judiciary), which may be imposed in terms of section 76(1) of the Income Tax Act (“the Act”) when a taxpayer is in default, can be very harsh (Up to 200% of the tax correctly chargeable). The Commissioner may remit any penalty imposed as he sees fit. However, when there was intent on the part of the taxpayer to evade the payment of tax, the Commissioner may not remit the 200% penalty, unless he is of the opinion that there are “extenuating circumstances”. This article examines the general meaning, as interpreted by the courts, of the “extenuating circumstances” that may be taken into account for the purposes of remission of penalties in terms of section 76(2)(a) of the Act.

I reexamine the conflicting results in Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) and Lennox, Lisowsky, and Pittman (2013). Frank et al. (2009) conclude that firms can manage book income upward and taxable income downward in the same period, implying a positive relation between aggressive book and tax reporting. Lennox et al. (2013) conclude the relation is negative and aggressive book reporting informs users that aggressive tax reporting is less likely. I identify four key differences in the research designs across the two studies, including measures of aggressive book reporting, measures of aggressive tax reporting, sample time periods, and empirical models. I systematically examine whether each of these differences is responsible for the conflicting results by altering the key difference while holding other factors as constant as possible. I find the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting is driven by the measure of aggressive book reporting, as the relation is positive for some subsets of firms and negative for others. Firms accused of financial statement fraud have a negative relation while nonfraud firms exhibit a positive relation. Using discretionary accruals, I also look for, but do not find a “pivot point” in the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting. I provide a better understanding of the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting by identifying research design choices that are responsible for prior results. I show that measures of both discretionary accruals and financial statement fraud are necessary to gain a more complete picture of the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting.

The tax advantage of debt is considered an important motivation for highly leveraged transactions. The German government limited the tax deductibility of interest expenses to 30.0 percent of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (the interest barrier rule) in 2008 to reduce the tax incentives for debt financing. This study aims to evaluate the impact of the introduction of the interest barrier rule.

The paper analyzes the changes in the value of the tax shield for German leveraged buyouts as a result of the promulgation of an interest barrier rule. Tax shields are computed to quantify the wealth transfer from taxpayers to corporations.

Prior to the 2008 tax reform, tax shields contributed 8.4 percent to the transaction price, thereby raising the equity value by 33.0 percent on average. With the introduction of the interest barrier rule, the value of tax shields is reduced by 35.1 percent. Affecting more than 75 percent of buyouts, the rule significantly lessens the tax incentive for high levels of debt. The reduction of the corporate tax rate from 31.7 percent to 26.3 percent further lowers the value creation potential. The limited interest deductibility may therefore reduce the number of leveraged buyouts and hence economic growth, unless other non‐debt forms of financing can fulfill the need for capital.

As the first continental European study, this research concentrates on the impact of the German interest barrier rule on value creation in highly leveraged transactions. Conclusions can be drawn in a broader European context.