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The purpose of this paper is to provide an exploration on how important are “other block-holders” in explaining the performance of family-controlled corporations in Malaysia. Three important groups of block-holders are identified for the purpose, namely the “foreign institutional investors”, the “domestic institutional investors” and the “government”.

The sample was drawn based on the companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia. All the relevant block-holders’ ownership data are hand-collected from the annual reports published by the listed corporations and descriptive statistics together with regression analysis are employed.

Overall it is found that the presence of a second block-holder in family-controlled corporations leads to better performance compared to the corporations where the controlling families act as the sole block-holder. Moreover, this study finds that the identity of the block-holders with the extent of their ownership is important in explaining the performance. Specifically, “foreign institutional investors” and “government” are found to be significant in terms of the extent of their equity holdings and the performance of these corporations, respectively. Conversely, no such relationship is found in the equity holdings of “domestic institutional investors” and the corporation performance. Such finding may imply the possible limited ability and constraints faced by the “domestic institutional investors” in Malaysia to exert effective monitoring and pressure on the management for enhanced corporation performance.

Many studies researched the influence of family ownership on the performance of family-controlled corporations but there are limited studies conducted on the influence of “other block-holders” in affecting the performance of these corporations. This paper is an attempt to provide an initial exploration on how important are these “other block-holders” in explaining the performance of these corporations in the context of a small emerging economy, Malaysia.

This paper seeks to examine whether or not divident policy is influenced by the firm's corporate control structure, investigating the relationship between the dynamics of earnings payout and the voting power enjoyed by different types of shareholders. This allows one to test a set of hypotheses derived from agency and pecking order theories.

A large panel of UK firms for the 1990s and is analyzed that the payout policy is significantly related to control concentration. The problem of control measurement is addressed and the use of Banzhaf indices advocated as a relevant measure of voting power in the analysis of corporate policy choices. The traditional framework proposed by Linter is extended and an econometrically sound approach to modeling the dynamics of the total payout suggested. Where most – even recent – studies on payout policy show some methodological flaws, state‐of‐the‐art dynamic panel data estimation procedures are applied.

Expectedly, profitability is a crucial determinant of payout decisions, but the presence of strong block holders or block holder coalitions weakens the relationship between the corporate earnings and the payout dynamics. Block holders appear to realize that an overly generous payout may render the company liquidity constrained, and, consequently, result in suboptimal investment policy.

The results challenge some of the implications of the agency theories of payout, and favor a pecking‐order explanation for the observed patterns. The analysis of payout dynamics reveals also that companies adjust payout policies to changes in earnings only gradually, which is consistent with “dividend smoothing”. In fact, the results suggest a presence of a more general phenomenon of the “total payout smoothing”.

According to one's bet knowledge, this is the first study employing those game theory‐based concepts in the context of corporate payout policies.

This article aims to quantify the emerging transfer market for internet protocol (IPv4) numbers and provides an initial assessment of factors and policies impacting those transactions.

The research draws on Regional Internet Registry records and conducts basic analysis of stocks, flows and proportions to assess the nature of this emerging market for IP number blocks and explore some of its implications for internet governance.

There is a thriving and growing market for IPv4 number blocks. The market is improving the efficiency of IPv4 address allocation by moving numbers from unused or under-utilized holders to organizations that need them more. Buyers willingly pay for number blocks they could get for free in order to benefit from more liberal needs assessments and stronger property rights.

Information about prices is not available and some transfers may take place through leasing arrangements, which are not covered by this paper. Future research should continue to investigate the transfer market, including activity skirting or occurring outside the current RIR policy environment.

RIRs should liberalize needs assessments and remove other sources of friction to the transfer market.

No known prior assessment of the transfer market has been conducted. The research has value for policymakers and industry decision makers.

While advantageous, the role of family control is under‐explored in finance. Family ownership can help guarantee stability of business and long‐term planning. The purpose of this study is to examine whether block‐holder ownership differentially affects the long‐term performance of initial public offerings (IPOs), and verifies whether this effect differs between family and non‐family IPOs.

Using a sample of 163 French IPOs from 1996 to 2000, this paper examines the links between family control and the first‐year market performance. It focuses on IPOs where both families and Venture Capitalists (VCs) are engaged to lock‐in their shareholdings for a period of one year following the IPO date, and are thus expected, at least in the case of families, to provide an effective monitoring during this period.

The main findings bring support to the entrenchment hypothesis and show a negative, but weak, relationship between block‐holder ownership and the first year market performance (p=10 per cent). Moreover, there is cubic relationship between family ownership and post‐listing market performance where the first‐year buy‐and‐hold first decreases, then increases, and finally reverts to decline.

While most of prior research focuses on the association between ownership and governance effects on firms’ performances in publicly‐owned firms, this study demonstrates links between family control and performance in issuing firms operating in France, where family‐controlled IPOs are a common model of corporate governance.

We examine the relationship between value, ownership, and governance structures for a set of acquisitions by Australian companies over the period of 1994–2001. We find that the propensity to diversify increases with the equity ownership of firms' directors, whereas the composition of the board, the presence of block holders and their ownership does not materially affect the decision to diversify. Board size has a positive but weak impact on the tendency to diversify. We also find no significant negative wealth effects for the shareholders of diversifying firms, although in comparison the shareholders of non‐diversifying acquirers experience significantly positive upward revisions of firm values. Although method of payment influences acquirer returns, ownership and governance do not have any impact on announcement period returns. Our results support the notion that capital markets may consider the ownership and governance structures as exerting enough influence to overcome any costs imposed by diversification strategies, hence limiting value loss to the shareholders.

This study aims to collect new empirical evidence to determine how different forms of ownership structure responded to the recent COVID-19 crisis. In light of this tragedy, it explores the relationship between ownership structure forms (i.e. block-holders, foreign, institutional and family ownerships) and audit quality (proxied by audit fees).

In total, 3,200 firm-year observations for Jordanian enterprises covering the years 2005 through 2020 are used in an ordinary least squares regression with firm-clustered standard error to assess the hypotheses.

The regression results showed that COVID-19 strengthens the association between each type of ownership (i.e. block-holders, foreign, institutional ownership forms) and audit quality. This result reflects the need for high-quality audit services during the pandemic by such owners to improve their business decisions and limit agency-conflict issues. However, the analysis failed to find any effect of COVID-19 when it comes to family ownership. Family-controlled firms may react faster in crisis situations, and correspondingly, they do not bear high audit costs. The extended analysis covering the years 2005–2022 came to the same results.

The results aid authorities in their control and management of the auditing business. The findings have important consequences for policymakers, lawmakers, regulators and the audit profession as they assess the growing issues in an uncertain economic environment. Evidence is provided that may be used to reassure investors and aid authorities as they devise appropriate remedies to the pandemic-triggered economic crisis. The findings may aid in the improvement of legislation that governs Jordan’s auditing industry. Furthermore, the results can be generalized to other Middle Eastern countries.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to empirically evaluate how different types of ownership affect audit quality in response to a dramatic shift in auditors’ working conditions brought on by the global health calamity. In emerging economies like Jordan, this type of analysis allows for preliminary assumptions to be established about ownership status during the COVID-19 outbreak. It adds to the body of auditing knowledge by shedding light on how various kinds of ownership affect responses to adverse events. This assessment is intended to serve as the definitive testimony in the field of accounting regarding the effects of the coronavirus across various corporations’ portfolios.

The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management practice for a sample of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Islamic banks (IBs) using a new model of earnings management.

First, the authors estimate discretionary accruals based on loan loss provisions discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) using the procedure derived from Jones’ (1991) original model. Second, the authors run a multivariate regression model to check the linkage between corporate governance characteristics and discretionary loan loss provision. Finally, the authors use an additional sensitivity check analysis to assess whether the results are robust to the estimation procedure and to other exogenous factors.

Using as sample of 26 IBs pertaining to the GCC region with a total of 223 firm-year observations and a nine-year period (2004-2012), the results are conclusive and show that first, IBs with large Shariah Board size manage less DLLP. Secondly, Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions membership positively impacts earnings management through DLLP in IBs. Third, there is a negative relationship between boards of director’s independence the extent to which IBs manage DLLP. Fourth, the existence of block holders positively affects earnings management by IBs. Fifth, there is a negative relationship between audit committee meetings and DLLP. Finally, institutional ownership and bank size have no effect on earnings management through DLLPs.

In this research, the authors do not take into account all governance factors that are supposed to impact earnings management in IBs. Future research should explore the impact of additional IBs governance structures including chief executive officer bonus, experience, gender and the extent to which IBs use real earnings management with Murabaha, Mudaraba and Musharaka transactions.

The paper is a very useful source of information that may provide relevant guidelines in helping the future development of corporate governance of IBs. In addition, the findings could prove to be useful for regulators because they are responsible for the acceptable level of corporate governance standards. Thus, they must consider strengthening governance mechanisms either through new legislation or stronger enforcement where earnings management is of such magnitude to that serious impedes information transparency and financial reporting quality of IBs.

This study associates the corporate governance characteristics with earnings management by IBs. The study contributes to the growing body of literature on earnings management and corporate governance in IBs. It should be useful to researchers, regulators, investors, analysts and creditors as well as other players in the capital markets, as it presents a new and important aspect that needs to be accounted for when assessing the quality of IBs’ accounting information in GCC countries.

This paper aims to provide a twofold empirical comparison: first, a comparison between the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs proxies and firm performance measures, and second, this comparison was used before and after the 2008 financial crisis, capturing two different economic states.

Panel regression methods were applied to two data sets of non-financial firms incorporated in the FTSE ALL-Share index over the period 2005-2011.

The results provide evidence that not all mechanisms lead to lower agency conflicts and/or higher firm performance. Ownership identity has a significant impact and the role of the governance mechanisms changes with the changes in the economic conditions surrounding the firm.

The results lend support to the notion that forcing a certain code of practice on firms to follow could compel them to move away from conflict reduction governance structures.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to provide a comparison of empirical evidence for the impact of board characteristics and ownership identity on agency costs and firm performance by using a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms. This comparison challenges the prior studies that use performance as an indirect proxy for lower agency costs. Additionally, it compares the impact of the governance mechanisms during two different economic conditions.

The current study dealt with the ownership structure effect as a potential determinant of the environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance disclosure in the Jordanian context.

Using the content analysis technique, data were collected and analyzed from a final sample of 51 annual reports of Jordanian industrial companies listed for 2012–2019.

The results show that foreign ownership and state ownership play a critical role in disclosing the ESG performance. Also, the board's independence plays an influential role in improving disclosure quality, enhancing family ownership in disclosure. It also limits the negative role of block holder ownership and managerial ownership on the ESG disclosure.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that deals with the role of ownership structure on the ESG disclosure level separately and collectively through the moderating role of board independence.

The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of corporate governance proxies by ownership structure on financial constraints for a sample of 215 non-financial Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) listed firms between 2010 and 2018.

The dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is used to determine the influence of ownership structure on financial constraints. The ownership structure of sample enterprises is measured using seven variables: managerial, family, institutional, foreign, associated, presence of block holder, and concentrated ownership, while financial limitations are determined using the KZ Index. The WW Index is used to assess the robustness of the results. In addition, for robustness, we also used OLS and FE.

Based on the system GMM results, it was discovered that firm ownership structure has a significant impact on the likelihood of financial constraints. In the case of Pakistan, the results show that institutional ownership, foreign ownership, and the presence of a block holder in the ownership structure have a significant negative impact on financial constraints, whereas family ownership and ownership concentration have a significant positive impact. This finding remains true when financial constraints are measured using the WW Index.

The findings of the study provide business managers and investors with more information regarding the relationship between corporate governance quality and the degree of financial constraint in Pakistani firms. Furthermore, this study contributes new information from emerging nations like Pakistan to the existing literature, which will help regulatory bodies and policymakers build long-term corporate governance solutions to manage financial constraints. It is well established that improving the quality of corporate governance practices improves capital market efficiency and lowers the likelihood of financial constraints.

The study adds to the body of existing work on corporate governance and the possibility of financial constraints, with a focus on Pakistan. The findings show that when projecting company financial constraints, regulators should pay special attention to the quality of corporate governance, specifically ownership structure.