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The purpose of this paper is to examine how investors’ valuation of cash holdings is related to firm-level investment.

As prior studies note that holding excess cash serve as a driver to would be over-investing, and that over-investment imposes substantial agency costs on shareholders, the authors focus on the value implications of holding cash in the presence of over-investment from the perspective of shareholders.

By examining the publicly traded companies on Taiwan stock market, the authors uncover that cash is valued less in firms with over-investment than in those with under-investment and the magnitude of over-investment is negatively related to the marginal value of cash holdings (MVCH). It reveals that investment activities impact the value that shareholders place on cash holdings. Moreover, further tests indicate that higher block holdings and the presence of independent directors on boards can effectively mitigate the negative impact of over-investment on the MVCH.

This paper enhances the understanding of the valuation implications of cash reserves held by firms with over-investment and the effectiveness of governance structures in containing the detrimental effect of investment-related agency costs on the value of holding cash.

This paper provides pioneering evidence that outside investors discount cash assets in over-investing firms to reflect their expectations that they will not receive the full benefit of these assets; and this paper extends the literature on corporate governance by assessing the role of governance mechanisms in reversing the negative relation between over-investment and the MVCH.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an exploration on how important are “other block-holders” in explaining the performance of family-controlled corporations in Malaysia. Three important groups of block-holders are identified for the purpose, namely the “foreign institutional investors”, the “domestic institutional investors” and the “government”.

The sample was drawn based on the companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia. All the relevant block-holders’ ownership data are hand-collected from the annual reports published by the listed corporations and descriptive statistics together with regression analysis are employed.

Overall it is found that the presence of a second block-holder in family-controlled corporations leads to better performance compared to the corporations where the controlling families act as the sole block-holder. Moreover, this study finds that the identity of the block-holders with the extent of their ownership is important in explaining the performance. Specifically, “foreign institutional investors” and “government” are found to be significant in terms of the extent of their equity holdings and the performance of these corporations, respectively. Conversely, no such relationship is found in the equity holdings of “domestic institutional investors” and the corporation performance. Such finding may imply the possible limited ability and constraints faced by the “domestic institutional investors” in Malaysia to exert effective monitoring and pressure on the management for enhanced corporation performance.

Many studies researched the influence of family ownership on the performance of family-controlled corporations but there are limited studies conducted on the influence of “other block-holders” in affecting the performance of these corporations. This paper is an attempt to provide an initial exploration on how important are these “other block-holders” in explaining the performance of these corporations in the context of a small emerging economy, Malaysia.

This paper aims to provide a twofold empirical comparison: first, a comparison between the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs proxies and firm performance measures, and second, this comparison was used before and after the 2008 financial crisis, capturing two different economic states.

Panel regression methods were applied to two data sets of non-financial firms incorporated in the FTSE ALL-Share index over the period 2005-2011.

The results provide evidence that not all mechanisms lead to lower agency conflicts and/or higher firm performance. Ownership identity has a significant impact and the role of the governance mechanisms changes with the changes in the economic conditions surrounding the firm.

The results lend support to the notion that forcing a certain code of practice on firms to follow could compel them to move away from conflict reduction governance structures.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to provide a comparison of empirical evidence for the impact of board characteristics and ownership identity on agency costs and firm performance by using a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms. This comparison challenges the prior studies that use performance as an indirect proxy for lower agency costs. Additionally, it compares the impact of the governance mechanisms during two different economic conditions.

This study seeks to explore developments in corporate creditworthiness before and after ownership events.

The paper uses the Blockholders database of Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick, and three credit quantities, and deploys a standard event study methodology to examine the relation to corporate creditworthiness.

The paper discovers that ownership‐construction is generally associated with prior‐ and post‐improvement in creditworthiness, while a block‐destruction is typically surrounded by deterioration in corporate creditworthiness. The paper also finds proper evidence for a relation between the construction or destruction of managerial block and future developments in corporate creditworthiness. The paper further realizes that outside shareholders exhibit higher impact than inside block‐holders on later variations in credit risk.

The paper is unable to conduct further robustness checks with structural credit methodologies due to the reduced number of valid observations.

Market participants can utilize the conclusions to better predict future trends in corporate creditworthiness.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of institutional investors on the cost of bank loans using US bank loan data from 1995 to 2012.

The cost of bank loans is analyzed with regard to loan spreads, collateral requirements, and the number of prepayment covenants.

This paper finds that, first, holding institutional ownership constant, institutional control is positively related to the cost of bank loans, implying that strong institutional control intensifies conflicts between large shareholders and lenders. Second, institutional holdings are negatively related to the cost of bank loans. These results indicate that institutional monitoring reduces the agency problem between shareholders and managers.

This paper suggests that the trade-off between institutional monitoring and institutional control jointly determines the effect of institutional investors on the cost of bank loans. Moreover, lenders should consider large shareholders and their influence when making lending decisions.

This paper aims to examine risk-taking in Islamic banks by exploring moral hazard and owner/manager agency problems simultaneously.

The authors propose to estimate a model of bank risk-taking that includes both franchise value and ownership structure as explanatory factors of bank risk.

The results show that franchise value is an important determinant of Islamic bank risk-taking. Banks with high franchise values are less likely to take risks than banks with low franchise value. In contrast, outside block holders have, at best, limited influences on bank risk-taking.

This paper conducts the first empirical examination of the relationship between managerial risk preferences and Islamic banks ownership. The authors examine simultaneously the effect of franchise value and owner/manager problem on Islamic bank risk taking behavior. They consider separately the impact on total risk, systematic risk and bank specific risk.

This study investigates whether block acquisitions lead to changes in board and CEO compensation characteristics and finds that block purchasers do not play a significant role in improving the firm’s governance practices. However, the majority of professional investors have sold their block within a year, suggesting that they do not own their stock long enough to alter governance policies nor to benefit from such changes. For the smaller number of firms where a new blockholder maintains their investment for more than a year, the use of equity based CEO compensation increases while the use of cash based compensation decreases.

Combining ownership and management might lead concentrated shareholders, such as families, to wealth expropriation. The lack of external monitors and disciplinary agents potentially permits them to pursue this path. Thus, monitoring activity is one of the major drawbacks in family controlled firms. The purpose of this paper is to provide an integrated analysis of the governance roles of various block‐holders, institutional investors and corporate boards in firm performance in the context of publicly‐listed family‐controlled firms.

Using a multi‐industry data set of 208 firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange (MSE), this study employs the generalized method of moments (GMM) to address the issue of endogeneity on panel data over the period 200‐2006.

The results show that family firms have better accounting performance than non‐family firms. So, active family involvement in management positions seems to reduce managerial opportunism. However, higher accounting performance does not translate into an increase in valuation levels, and thus might not accrue to minority shareholders. Additionally, the results also show an alignment incentive between a coalition of large shareholders (two families) and firm value.

This study provides empirical evidence consistent with a block‐holder coalition framework that sustains an incentive alignment effect of the coalition of large shareholders (two families) and the firm value. Additionally, the results also support evidence that board dominance is another channel through which families can extract private benefits.

This study contributes to understanding that the family firm performance depends on the efficiency of various governance mechanisms. Thus, it offers insights to policy makers to verify board appointment mechanisms used by family firms. Since external board members might be vetted and approved by the family or other dominant block‐holders, what is the extent of their independence from the dominant owners?

This article aims to quantify the emerging transfer market for internet protocol (IPv4) numbers and provides an initial assessment of factors and policies impacting those transactions.

The research draws on Regional Internet Registry records and conducts basic analysis of stocks, flows and proportions to assess the nature of this emerging market for IP number blocks and explore some of its implications for internet governance.

There is a thriving and growing market for IPv4 number blocks. The market is improving the efficiency of IPv4 address allocation by moving numbers from unused or under-utilized holders to organizations that need them more. Buyers willingly pay for number blocks they could get for free in order to benefit from more liberal needs assessments and stronger property rights.

Information about prices is not available and some transfers may take place through leasing arrangements, which are not covered by this paper. Future research should continue to investigate the transfer market, including activity skirting or occurring outside the current RIR policy environment.

RIRs should liberalize needs assessments and remove other sources of friction to the transfer market.

No known prior assessment of the transfer market has been conducted. The research has value for policymakers and industry decision makers.

We examine the influence of ownership structure on a blockholder’s power in a firm. We first describe the presence and ownership stakes of blockholders in a comprehensive sample of US firms. We develop a measure of the influence of the ownership structure on a blockholder’s power and show that an average blockholder loses 12% of her potential power due to the presence and size of the ownership stakes of other blockholders. Further, the influence of ownership structure varies systematically with a blockholder’s rank and identity, with the second and nonfamily manager blockholders experiencing the largest loss of power.