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The game of cricket that originated in Britain thrives on passion and the following it generates in India and other South Asian countries is tremendous. The Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) is the apex governing body that controls all cricketing events in the India. Being the richest such body, BCCI is the most powerful national body among similar organizations across countries where cricket is played. The world of cricket saw a sea change with the introduction of the Indian Premier League (IPL) due to its unprecedented commercial success. The case describes the betting scandal that hit IPL, BCCI and its promoter in the middle of 2013. The scandal involved the son-in-law of the President of BCCI. The events following the scandal saw the Supreme Court of India, the highest judicial body in the country, to indict BCCI and its President of serious misgovernance. Set in this backdrop, the case highlights governance issues in the functioning of not for profit organizations such as BCCI. The case provides an opportunity to reflect on and discuss as to how such quasi-public bodies ought to be governed.

This case is intended to illustrate to readers the challenges faced in 2011–2013 by Amazon's CEO, Jeff Bezos, as he guided his company into the exploding tablet market. Faced with the tough decision between focusing on the e-reader market—which Amazon had come to dominate with its Kindle product line—and making a foray into tablets—for which it had no expertise—Bezos chose the latter. Amazon sought to combine platform assets to create an end-to-end experience that would let users find a “sweet spot” in the mix of features and services. This strategy involved critical decisions such as selecting a customer segment to target and a positioning for the new product, dubbed the Kindle Fire, as the tablet market rapidly evolved. The Kindle Fire was designed to put the full Amazon experience right into the laps of customers, and Bezos was betting that his customers would see the Kindle Fire as the physical manifestation of all things Amazon. To achieve this, Amazon was willing to heavily subsidize the Kindle Fire hardware device. The key assumption was that the superior end-to-end experience Amazon had carefully created would lead to incremental purchases of content as well as physical products and services, and the margins thus gained would outweigh the hardware subsidy.

• Position and define target segments for a new product relative to competition as well as to a company's own products

• Articulate a competitor's strategy and how to compete against an incumbent with a disruptive business model and a differentiated position

• Discuss selling an experience (as opposed to a product or device) and how to create a differentiated service experience

• Determine pricing, analyze business model, and calculate revenue/profit for a technology product

Position and define target segments for a new product relative to competition as well as to a company's own products

Articulate a competitor's strategy and how to compete against an incumbent with a disruptive business model and a differentiated position

Discuss selling an experience (as opposed to a product or device) and how to create a differentiated service experience

Determine pricing, analyze business model, and calculate revenue/profit for a technology product

In October 2008, in the midst of a financial crisis, Anthony Keating, investment manager at the Boston private bank Billingsley, Blaylock, and Montgomery, was searching for an investment strategy to recommend to his high-net-worth clients. Traditional investments in the equity markets were being decimated, and Keating’s clients would be looking to him for ideas. Inspired by the success of Paulson and Co., Keating began to explore the possibility of entering a trade that would profit as homeowners defaulted on their mortgages. The more Keating learned about the trade, the more he realized that he needed to know about mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps. The case provides instructors with a chance to introduce these financial instruments, while at the same time providing lessons applicable to students interested in value investing or real estate finance.

After reading and analyzing the case, students will be able to:

• Explain how home mortgages are securitized into financial instruments that are traded in public markets

• Describe how credit default swaps can be used to speculate on the value of an underlying financial instrument

• Identify potential mispricing across related financial instruments

• Understand the potential risks and rewards of various financial investment strategies that look to capitalize on defaults on subprime mortgages

Explain how home mortgages are securitized into financial instruments that are traded in public markets

Describe how credit default swaps can be used to speculate on the value of an underlying financial instrument

Identify potential mispricing across related financial instruments

Understand the potential risks and rewards of various financial investment strategies that look to capitalize on defaults on subprime mortgages

The case puts students in the shoes of Todd Davis, founder and CEO of a boutique brownfield redevelopment firm, Hemisphere Development, in 2010. Davis is wrestling with decisions and processes surrounding the potential acquisition and redevelopment of the former Delphi Automotive plant in Columbus, Ohio. When making the investment decision, Davis (and students) must consider various factors: What is Hemisphere's implicit investment strategy, and what are the firm's core competencies? How should the firm finance this transaction to achieve an acceptable return?

• Practice creatively structuring and financing unique transactions

• Describe the importance of baseline analysis in dealing with contaminated or potentially contaminated properties, and understand that the timing of baseline analysis can be crucial in determining the viability of a transaction

• State the importance of each type of constituent in public-private transactions

• Recognize the benefits of specialized/niche expertise in deal-makin

Practice creatively structuring and financing unique transactions

Describe the importance of baseline analysis in dealing with contaminated or potentially contaminated properties, and understand that the timing of baseline analysis can be crucial in determining the viability of a transaction

State the importance of each type of constituent in public-private transactions

Recognize the benefits of specialized/niche expertise in deal-makin

Marketing.

Post Graduate.

Rajiv Bapna and Pradeep Bapna co-founded Allied Electronics & Magnetics Limited (widely known as Amkette) in the year 1985 for the production of floppy diskettes in India. By the year 1995, Amkette was the largest selling floppy diskette brand in India. With the advent of new technology in storage media sale of floppy diskette observed a constant decline. By the end of year 2004, floppy diskettes completely vanished from the market. Amkette anticipated the changes in the computer peripherals market and introduced a wide range of products in storage media, wireless and wired peripherals, accessories and digital lifestyle products. After the launch of Evo TV on June 2012, Amkette was hopeful for a major success in digital lifestyle segment. Evo TV, a connected TV device, allowed consumers to use smart apps on their television sets and was a cost-effective substitute to Smart TVs. Amkette was betting very high on Evo TV for revenue generation and market development.

Following are the learning outcomes: to review the product life cycle of technology products, to understand evolving customers’ expectations and behavior, to assess the adoption process of innovative products and to explore the challenges associated with innovative products for market development.

Teaching notes are available for educators only. Please contact your library to gain login details or email support@emeraldinsight.com to request teaching notes.

CSS 8: Marketing.

Hedge fund Magnetar Capital had returned 25 percent in 2007 with a strategy that posed significantly lower risk to investors than the S&P 500. Magnetar had made more than $1 billion in profit by noticing that the equity tranche of CDOs and CDO-derivative instruments were relatively mispriced. It took advantage of this anomaly by purchasing CDO equity and buying credit default swap (CDS) protection on tranches that were considered less risky. Now it was the job of Alec Litowitz, chairman and chief investment officer, to provide guidance to his team as they planned next year's strategy, evaluate and prioritize their ideas, and generate new ideas of his own. An ocean away, Ron Beller was contemplating some very different issues. Beller's firm, Peloton Partners LLP, had been one of the top-performing hedge funds in 2007, returning in excess of 80 percent. In late January 2008 Beller accepted two prestigious awards at a black-tie EuroHedge ceremony. A month later, his firm was bankrupt. Beller shorted the U.S. housing market before the subprime crisis hit, and was paid handsomely for his bet. After the crisis began, however, he believed that prices for highly rated mortgage securities were being unfairly punished, so he decided to go long AAA-rated securities backed by Alt-A mortgage loans (between prime and subprime), levered 9x. The trade moved against Peloton in a big way on February 14, 2008, causing $17 billion in losses and closure of the firm.

This case analyzes the strategies of the two hedge funds, focusing on how money can be made and lost during a financial crisis. The role of investment banks as lenders to hedge funds such as Peloton is explored, as well as characteristics of the CDO market and an array of both mortgage-related and credit protection-related instruments that were actively used (for better or worse) by hedge funds during the credit crisis of 2007 and 2008.

Family members knew something was very wrong when Adolf Merckle, who had guided the family holding company, VEM Vermogensverwaltung GmbH, through dozens of successful investments, left the house one afternoon in January 2009 and failed to return. That night their fears were confirmed when a German railway worker located Merckle's body near a commuter train line near his hometown of Blaubeuren, about a hundred miles west of Munich. It was no secret that the recent financial crisis had taken a toll on Merckle's investments. He was known in Germany as a savvy investor, but had lost hundreds of millions of Euros after being caught on the wrong side of a short squeeze of epic proportions involving Volkswagen stock. This was not the only large bet against that company's stock. A number of hedge funds, including Greenlight Capital, SAC Capital, Glenview Capital, Tiger Asia, and Perry Capital, lost billions of Euros in a few hours based on their large short positions in Volkswagen's stock following the news on October 26, 2008, that Porsche AG had obtained a large long synthetic position in Volkswagen stock through cash-settled options. In the next two days, this short squeeze produced a fivefold increase in Volkswagen's share price, as demand for shares from hedge funds exceeded the supply of borrowable shares.

This case focuses on the massive equity derivative positions entered into by Porsche in relation to Volkswagen stock and by TCI and 3G in relation to CSX stock. Students will learn how equity exposure can be created without buying stock and without prior disclosure. The role of regulators, courts, and investment banks that facilitate these transactions is also explored.

Identify the advantages and disadvantages of being first-to-market with a new product in a new environment. Explain the differences between business-to-business (B2B) and B2C markets, how they are interconnected in the speciality consumer good category and the challenges of developing a balanced strategy for both. Assess the competitive positions of different market players within both B2B and B2C. Analyse the role of brand in a niche market and how brand perception influences consumer behaviour. Identify and assess the different strategies for growth in an evolving niche market.

Origin Coffee is an artisan coffee roaster in South Africa grappling with rising competition, evolving consumer tastes and brand management concerns. As an early entrant, Origin largely created the niche market for speciality coffee across the country as both a retail coffee shop and a wholesale supplier to independent shops and businesses. This case follows founder Joel Singer 15 years later, in August 2020, as he contemplates how to scale the business, which has cultivated a brand synonymous with quality and excellence. Repeated efforts to expand the Origin footprint have met with disappointment and the business is still operating exclusively from its original roastery-café in Cape Town. Yet, the customer perception is that Origin is an industry giant – an established player that has outgrown its plucky upstart status. Origin also faces an increasingly crowded competitive landscape of local artisan roasters and larger chains. The case showcases the power of entrepreneurial innovation to cultivate a new niche market, as well as the risks of playing in a market that is very narrow and immature. Students are left to determine what Origin’s place in the future of South African coffee can and should be.

This case is appropriate for students enrolled in postgraduate programmes such as Master of Business Administration and Executive Education programmes. Although the case learnings are transferrable, this case will be particularly useful to students with interests in entrepreneurship, B2B and B2C market strategies and niche market strategy.

Teaching Notes are available for educators only.

CSS 11: Strategy.

Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.

A hedge-fund strategist had two decisions to make. First, what was the path of core euro zone long-term interest rates likely to be over the next year? Was the dramatic decline in German long rates over the past few years an aberration that would soon be reversed, or was it part of the “new normal” that would persist for some time? Second, how would periphery long rates evolve relative to core rates? That is—the spread between long rates in the likes of Greece, Spain, and Ireland and those in Germany—how would they evolve over the next year? Was the dramatic divergence in euro zone long rates likely to persist, or would the coming year see a continuation of the modest reconvergence that has occurred since mid–2012? He knew many factors influenced long-term interest rates; he would have to use his entire toolkit to address this issue. The evidence was in no way clear-cut. Some factors pointed toward lower German rates, some toward higher, some toward a widening of euro zone spreads (even a dissolution of the euro zone as we know it?), and some toward reconvergence.