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The chapter investigates three channels through which private benefits are hypothesized to be extracted in dual class companies: excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditures and excess cash holdings.

With a propensity score matched sample of S&P 1500 dual class and single class companies with concentrated control, the chapter analyzes the relationship between the valuation discount of dual class companies and measures of excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditure and excess cash holdings.

Executives in dual class firms earn greater compensation relative to their counterparts in single class firms. This excess compensation is more pronounced when the executive is a family member. The value of dual class shares is discounted most when cash holdings and executive compensation of dual class are excessive. Excess compensation is highest for executives who are family members of dual class companies. The dual class discount is not related to excess capital expenditures.

The research shows that the discount in the value of dual class shares in relation to the value of closely controlled single class company shares is directly related to the channels through which controlling shareholder-managers can extract private benefits.

Criticizes previous research on price/earnings ratios (PER) for neglecting their historical links with interest rates and analyses the causal links between interest ratres and the PERs of the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Index (TSE300) and of seven major Canadian industries 1965‐1997. Explains the methodology and identifies three “distinct PER regimes”: 1965‐1974 (average PER 17.17), 1975‐1982 (average PER 8.92) and 1983‐1997 (average PER 17.2 with a higher standard deviation). Looks at the economic conditions for each period and suggests that current PERs “may not be too high”. Finds a negative correlation between PERs and treasury bill rates, differing between industries; and that the bill rate explains 95 per cent of PER variation for the TSE300, although it is not significant for the gold and silver industry. Adds that divided payout ratios and lower investor risk aversion are positively related to PERs, but that growth rate has a more variable influence. Summarizes the findings and their implications for PER forecasters.

The purpose of this paper is to critically review the relevant literature from the perspective of dual-class firms and to provide suggestions for future research on dual-class firms, and on methodological issues that should be addressed in such research.

The research design consists of three parts: an introduction to dual-class firms (motivations for; firm life cycle effects) in Part 1; concerns with firms with such share class structures (valuation; governance; accounting and corporate policy issues) in Part 2; and some solutions or ways to accommodate the trade-offs involved with such share class structures (retention arguments; index/exchange exclusions; contractual provisions; external monitoring) in Part 3. Throughout the paper, the authors provide some critiques of existing studies, particularly from a methodological perspective, the authors’ opinion on the state of the literature and suggestions for future areas of research.

While motivations for the use of dual-class voting structures include flexibility so that the idiosyncratic vision of their entrepreneurs/founders can be pursued in a less encumbered fashion, greater innovation and long-term managerial orientation, there are many possible costs (e.g. underinvestment and managerial entrenchment) to this ownership structure. Nevertheless, the authors believe that such firms should have provisions in place that facilitate a reversion to a single-class structure longer term when such firms have become more mature, less dependent on the idiosyncratic vision of the entrepreneurs/founders at IPO and have attracted more managerial talent.

The literature arrives at no consensus on the benefits/drawbacks of this type of share ownership structure which means that many topics of research require further academic examination. The authors provide suggested directions for such future enquiries.

The authors’ examination of corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores in dual-class firms provides a window on firms’ CSR performance when insulated from external pressure. Dual-class ownership confers greater voting rights on a superior class of shares held by insiders; consequently, managers of dual-class firms are insulated from external pressure from inferior class shareholders and, potentially, from society. The authors compare CSR scores in dual- and single-class firms and investigate the association between CSR scores and cash flow rights in dual-class firms. This analysis reveals that dual-class firms have lower CSR scores than their single-class counterparts and that CSR scores in dual-class firms are positively related to the relative cost of CSR borne by the superior class of shares. The findings suggest that external accountability encourages CSR performance, and CSR performance is higher when the superior class bears a smaller portion of the cost of CSR activities. It follows that the analysis suggests the importance of governance structures for encouraging CSR, and the dampening impact of cost to CSR performance.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is a differential effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk in Canadian companies cross-listed on US markets and Canadian companies not cross-listed (Canadian only companies).

Using a sample comprised of all Canadian companies included in the S&P/TSX Composite Index for the period 2009–2014, this study applies OLS and fixed effect regressions to investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk. Interaction variables between governance mechanisms and the cross-listing status are used to examine if this effect is different for cross-listed firms.

Results indicate that the effect of board characteristics such as size, independence and proportion of female directors remains the same in both cross-listed and not cross-listed firms. CEO duality and insider equity ownership impact firm risk only in cross-listed companies, while institutional shareholdings, environmental, social and governance disclosure and family control affect firm risk in Canadian only firms. Overall, the empirical results indicate that some governance mechanisms impact firm risk only in firms that cross-list, while others are well-suited for Canadian only firms.

This study suggests that some of the differences between Canadian companies that cross-list and the Canadian companies that do not cross-list in US stock markets may change the impact of governance mechanisms on firm risk. Therefore, these findings have important implications for the design of governance mechanisms in Canadian firms. Since some of these differences are common to other economies, the conclusions can be extended to companies in other countries with similar governance structures.

Although previous studies have investigated the effect of governance mechanism on firm risk, this is the first paper that studies the differential effect for companies that cross-list in US markets. Specifically, differences in the ownership structure, firm control and in the regulatory and institutional environment, may explain this differential effect. Unlike most of the previous studies that focus on the effect of individual governance mechanisms, this study uses several mechanisms and their interactions at the same time.

Considering the continuous rise in the public debt stock of developing countries (particularly Ghana) with the unstable economic growth rate for the past decades and the recent borrowing because of the impact of COVID 19, this paper aims to examine the causal relationships between public debt and economic growth over time.

The paper uses a dynamic multivariate autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL)-based Granger-causality model to test the causal relationships between public debt and economic growth [gross domestic product (GDP)]. Annual time-series data that spanned 1978–2018 were sourced from the World Bank Development Indicator database and the IMF fiscal Affairs Department Database and WEO.

The results reveal that public debt has no causal relationship with GDP in the short-run but there is unidirectional Granger causality running from public debt to GDP in the long run. Again, investment spending has a negative bi-directional causal relationship with GDP in the short-run but they have a positive bi-directional causal relationship in the long run. Conversely, no short-run causal relationship exists between government consumption expenditure and GDP but long-run Granger causality runs from government consumption expenditure to GDP. Finally, public debt has a positive impact on the inflation rate in the short run.

The findings imply that government(s) must ensure high fiscal discipline to serve as a precursor for the effective and efficient use of recent borrowing, that is, the loans should be used for highly prioritized projects (preferably investment spending) that are well evaluated and self-sustained to add positively to the GDP.

This paper provides contemporary findings to augment extant literature on public debt and economic growth by using variables and empirical models, which prior studies could not sufficiently cover in a developing country perspective and affirms that public debt contributes to GDP only in the long run.

The purpose of this paper is to test if relative asset purchase values (RAPVs) differ between single- and dual-class purchasers (not) differentiated by family ownership for Canadian firms.

The paper uses multivariate regressions and 2SLS estimations of simultaneous equations models with both continuous and dichotomous endogenous variables. Data on share structures and family involvements are hand collected.

RAPVs for dual-class purchasers are significantly different (larger) than their single-class counterparts only for family-controlled samples. Larger RAPVs for dual-class purchases are associated with higher degrees of dual-class structures, higher family ownerships and with boards with no more than one family member.

RAPV is important because of its common use as a primary determinant of the wealth effects of M&As, its use as an exchange-rate proxy in two-stage regressions used to determine the amount of abnormal returns attributable to short selling activity around M&A announcements, and its use as a channel for conveying information about deal complexity, seller’s bargaining power, additional monitoring benefits from purchase and/or greater challenges in incorporating a purchase into existing assets. Larger sample size would facilitate more differentiated examinations.

Findings imply that dual-class share structures assist family shareholders in elevating their control over corporate decisions involving asset purchases.

This paper furthers the authors’ knowledge about the effects of agency issues on corporate decisions.

It provides an extension and robustness test of the US evidence for asset purchases by providing evidence for Canada given its greater preponderance of families as the ultimate controlling shareholders, restricted or subordinated voting shares issued and pyramidal structures.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between ownership structure (ownership concentration and ownership composition) and firm performance in Kuwaiti non-financial firms. To this end, it examines the relationship between firm performance and ownership concentration to determine whether the impact of this relationship is conditional on the nature of the large shareholders.

First, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance was tested using ordinary least squares regressions on 618 observations (103 listed firms) from 2005 to 2010; next, the ownership compositions were classified as institutional, government and individuals (families) and their impact on firm performance examined.

The overall concentration ownership by large shareholders showed no impact on firm performance. However, when the type of shareholders was introduced, only the government and individuals (families) ownership categories influenced firm performance. Therefore, certain types of shareholders are better at monitoring, and not all concentration by large shareholders is beneficial to Kuwaiti firms.

This study examined only one important aspect of the corporate governance mechanisms, namely, ownership concentration. Thus, further study may include other mechanisms such as board variables, role of debt and shareholders rights in examining the firm performance. This study is limited to the Kuwaiti environment, and thus, next step can be very useful in case of comparing ownership concentration in the Gulf Cooperation Council (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) or across different Arab countries.

The results of this study have important implications for the regulators in Kuwait in their efforts to increase the efficiency of the rapidly developing capital markets and in protecting investors and keeping confidence in the economy. They may mandate a corporate governance code to protect minority shareholders. Investors may use the findings to understand Kuwaiti companies. Such findings may assist them to diversify their investment portfolios.

This paper extends literature review by investigating the role of large shareholders in the context of a developing country that is characterized by high level of ownership concentration and weak legal protection for investors as well as the absence of code that organized the corporate governance practices.