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This research aims to examine the effect of ownership structure on dividend policy using the Indonesian context. The most common ownership structure is concentrated in the hand of family owners except in the UK and USA (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000). Family owners hold more than half of the companies in Indonesia (Carney & Child, 2013; Claessens et al., 2000). Family firms play an important role in Indonesia. Another important characteristic that emerges is the rise of government- and foreign-controlled firms in Indonesia. Thus, this research also divides ownership concentration into family firms, government-controlled and foreign-controlled firms.

Samples of this research consist of dividend announcements during 2006-2012 in Indonesian Stock Exchange. This research excluded financial data because these have characteristics that are different non-financial sectors’ characteristics. The final sample of this research consists of a 710 firm-year observation.

The result of this research shows that ownerships have a positive effect on dividend payout. This research divides the sample into family-controlled firms, government-controlled firms (GOEs) and foreign-controlled firms. This research shows that government- and foreign-controlled firms have a positive impact on dividend payout. However, family firms have a negative effect on the dividend payout. Family firms pay lower dividends because they prefer to control it themselves. Family firms earn benefit from those resources, but at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, family firms engage in expropriation to minority shareholders.

This study focuses on ownership structure of Indonesian listed firm. This study does not analyze the impact of other corporate governance mechanism such as board structure on dividend decisions. The owner of the companies (family, government and foreign firm) has an opportunity to put their member as part of board members. However, this study does not analyze the impact of board structure on dividend decisions.

This study provides evidence that ownership concentration positively affects dividend payout. However, there is a different effect of ownership structure (family-controlled firms, GOEs and foreign-controlled firm). Government- and foreign-controlled have a positive effect; however, family-controlled firm have a negative effect on dividend payout. Therefore, this study provides evidence of the importance of ownership structure on dividend decision.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the existing, yet limited, literature on the influence of ownership concentration and family control on the demands for high-quality audits. This study focusses on an emerging market, namely, Indonesia, where ownership concentration and family control are relatively higher than those in developed markets.

The sample consists of 787 firm-year observations of public firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Following prior studies, a firm is considered using a higher quality audit when its external auditor is one of the Big 4 audit firms. Logistic regressions are employed to test research hypotheses.

Empirical evidence obtained reveals that firms with higher ownership concentration are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor. Hence, in such firms, high-quality audits are employed to mitigate agency issues. However, when the controlling shareholder is a family, the association between ownership concentration and the demands for high-quality auditors turns negative, implying that family-controlled firms tend to sustain opaqueness gains by hiring lower quality auditors.

Previous empirical studies examining the influence of ownership concentration and family control on auditor choice are relatively limited in the literature and are heavily focussed on developed economies. In addition, the present study is one of the first to investigate the association between family control and auditor choice in the context of a developing economy.

The purpose of this paper is to explain how family firm ownership and management control affect corporate capital structure strategy after controlling for other significant variables. The authors argue that, although family ownership has a positive effect on a firm’s leverage, family control through the CEO position and equity performance moderate its impact.

Using a stratified random sample of 200 US public firms in the S & P Small-Cap 600 index from 1999 to 2007, this study uses random effect panel regressions to test the impact of family ownership on market value and book value debt ratios and the moderating effects of family control and equity performance after controlling for firm, industry, and macroeconomic variables.

The initial panel regression suggests that family ownership is not related to debt ratios. However, further examination with controls for family CEO and equity performance shows that family ownership is positively related to market and book value debt ratios, but its effect is offset by family control through the CEO position and equity performance.

This study’s methodology can be extended to examine how family firm governance factors affect other firm behaviors such as investment, risk management, and CEO compensation.

Practitioners should consider family ownership and management control factors when establishing financing strategy. The Small Business Administration and other government agencies should make similar considerations when setting policies.

This paper separates ownership and management control factors to explain why family firms use more or less leverage. This study, thus, reconciles the mixed results of prior studies, which do not differentiate between these two governance factors.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how family ownership enhances or damages firm value.

The paper studies a sample of Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) between 1999 and 2007 and apply multivariate regression with firm value as a dependent variable. The paper measures firm value as Tobin ' s Q and ROA based either on net income or EBITDA. The independent variables include family firm dummy and ownership percentage.

It is found that control-enhancing mechanisms which are often employed by family companies add value to companies. Furthermore, it is found that agency conflicts between ownership and management are less costly than those between majority and minority shareholders, suggesting that family ownership helps resolve the agency conflicts between ownership and management and in turn enhances firm value. Finally, it is found that family companies with founders as CEOs outperform those with descendants as CEOs.

The paper studies Canadian family firms; as such, the sample size is not relatively large. Nonetheless, the results should be generalized as Canada is one of the largest markets in the world and have high integration with the rest of the world.

The results suggest investors should invest in family ownership firms.

The paper shows whether firm ownership increases firm value and the determinant of family firm value.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how the sense of control, psychological ownership and motivation of both family owners and non-family managers in family firms are interrelated. This paper analyzes the limits set by family owners when delegating control to their non-family managers and the resulting potential for conflict and demotivation of the non-family managers.

Building on the existing literature, first, an overview of the literature on psychological ownership and control is presented. Second, the paper analyzes the insights gained from interviews with 15 family owners and non-family managers in five family firms.

This study finds that motivating non-family managers is not merely a matter of promoting a sense of psychological ownership throughout the company. A strong sense of psychological ownership may facilitate but also hinder the cooperation between family and non-family. Family owners are often only willing to delegate operational control, while non-family managers also feel entitled to participate in strategic decision making. This leads to the proposition that non-family managers’ psychological ownership in family firms’ conflicts with family owners’ desire to maintain control.

This study answers the calls to seek additional insight in how non-family managers function within family firms. By shedding light on the complex relationship between control, psychological ownership and motivation in family firms, the study responds to the calls for more empirical validation of the psychological ownership framework and for more research into the potential negative effects of psychological ownership in the family business.

Most countries often have public companies with large controlling owners, typically a family. This empirical evidence aims to contrast with the classical view of the largest dispersed firm presented by Berle and Means and challenge the findings by Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, who predict that the shares held by families will decrease if an efficient financial market is put in place. Therefore, family firms represent an important group in the stock market today. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of the family as a controlling owner on firms' performance, valuation and capital structure.

The paper reviews the current literature related to how family (taking into account specific governance characteristics such as family ownership, family control and family management) affects firms' performance and value.

The literature review showed that founder family control and professional (outside) management increase performance, whereas excess control via control enhancing mechanisms (such as dual class shares and pyramidal structures) and descendent management produce both lower valuation and performance. This evidence suggests that families have the incentives and the power to systematically expropriate wealth from minority shareholders.

Previous research shows that family firms on average perform better than non‐family firms. But this is a non‐linear relation due the fact that the relationship between family ownership and performance cannot be identified without distinguishing between control and cash‐flow rights. Thus, the literature review as a whole emphasizes that the incentives for the controlling shareholder to engage in expropriation are a function of the institutional framework in which the firm operates. So, for further research, it is important to investigate how family firms perform in different corporate governance systems. A policy implication is the necessity to improve minority shareholders' protection from the risk of expropriation by large shareholders.

The main purpose of the study is to examine the influence of family directors on the firm performance of public listed companies (PLCs) in Malaysia. This study provides empirical evidence on the agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority interests in the concentrated ownership setting.

Samples of the study are 112 PLCs in year 2006. Two measures of firm performance are used: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. Managerial ownership refers to the percentage shareholdings of executive directors with direct and indirect holdings. It was further categorized into family ownership and non-family ownership.

In relation to ROA, managerial ownership is found positively significant. The results also show that the positive relationship between managerial ownership is contributed by the managerial-non-family ownership. In relation to Tobin’s Q, the results show a U-shape with turning point at 31.38% for managerial ownership and 28.29% for the managerial-family ownership. The results found significant and positive relationships between managerial ownership and both measures of firm performance which indicates that managerial ownership and family ownership yield greater efficiency.

The study highlights the effects of corporate governance on ROA and Tobin’s Q are somewhat different. It provides some evidence on the need to use appropriate measure of firm performance. The significant relationship supports the argument of Chami (1999), Fama and Jensen (1983), and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and empirical evidence of Lee (2004) that family ownership enhances monitoring activities.

Differentiating the types of managerial ownership into family and non-family categories enriches our knowledge about who actually contributes to the improved performance.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of the largest shareholder's voting stake on the firm's capital structure decision.

To empirically analyze the influence of the voting stake on leverage, a large sample of 814 exchange-listed firms is applied. The baseline regression analysis is complemented by several robustness tests and a difference-in-difference regression analysis to mitigate endogeneity concerns.

The authors find a negative relationship between the voting stake of the largest shareholder and leverage, consistent with the notion that large, undiversified shareholders have the incentive to reduce risk. Additionally, results reveal that family control has a positive moderating effect, indicating that the negative relationship is less pronounced for family controlled firms.

The authors contribute to the research by suggesting ownership concentration as another determinant of capital structure. Further, the authors add to the literature by showing how the association between ownership concentration and leverage is moderated by family control and that the identity of the largest shareholder is of great importance.

The paper provides important insights to the current debate on the proposal of the European Commission to reintroduce shares with multiple votes as part of the Listing Act. The authors expect the regulation to exacerbate the concentration of voting rights, which results in lower leverage and thus limits corporate growth.

The authors differentiate from previous studies by focusing the largest shareholders' voting stake, instead of using the ownership stake, to assess the impact of ownership concentration on leverage.

This paper aims to examine the association of corporate social responsibility (CSR), family ownership and earnings management.

The authors specifically examine mining companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2012-2014. Total observations are 105 firm-years. Research data are collected from sustainability reports, annual reports and annual financial statements. Data are analysed using panel data regression.

The evidence suggests a negative association between corporate social responsibility disclosures (CSRDs) and earnings management. The authors also examine the direct and moderating role of family ownership. The authors find a positive association between family ownership and earnings management. In addition, family ownership strengthens the negative association between CSR and earnings management.

This research only examines mining companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange, which limit the generalisation of the results.

The results should useful for: investors wishing to use the level of CSRD as an indicator of firm ethics, especially in relation to family-owned firms; capital-market regulators wishing to improve market transparency by introducing requirements to encourage more CSRD; and other users of financial statements, especially financial analysts to consider ownership structure, specifically family ownership.

Previous studies have mainly focussed on companies in the USA. This paper adds to the body of knowledge regarding whether the positive relationship between family ownership and CSR is also present outside the USA, especially in emerging countries. Further, this study examines the effect of family ownership on the association of CSR and earnings management, which rarely examined in previous studies.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure on dividend policy of listed firms in Turkey. Particularly, it attempts to uncover the effects of family involvement (through ownership and board representation), non-family blockholders (foreign investors, domestic financial institutions and the state) and minority shareholders on dividend decisions in the post-2003 period as it witnesses the major economic and structural reforms.

The paper uses alternative dividend policy measures (the probability of paying dividends, dividend payout ratio and dividend yield) and uses appropriate regression techniques (logit and tobit models) to test the research hypotheses, by focusing on a recent large panel dataset of 264 Istanbul Stock Exchange-listed firms (non-financial and non-utility) over a 10-year period 2003-2012.

The empirical results show that foreign and state ownership are associated with a less likelihood of paying dividends, while other ownership variables (family involvement, domestic financial institutions and minority shareholders) are insignificant in affecting the probability of paying dividends. However, all the ownership variables have a significantly negative impact on dividend payout ratio and dividend yield. Hence, the paper presents consistent evidence that increasing ownership of foreign investors and the state in general reduces the need for paying dividends in the Turkish market.

Because of the absence of empirical research on how ownership structure may affect dividend policy and the data unavailability for earlier periods in Turkey, the paper cannot make comparison between the pre-and post-2003 periods. Nevertheless, this paper can be a valuable benchmark for further research.

The paper reveals that cash dividends are not used as a monitoring mechanism by investors in Turkey and the expropriation argument through dividends for Turkish families is relatively weak. Accordingly, the findings of this paper may benefit policymakers, investors and fellow researchers, who seek useful guidance from relevant literature.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the link between ownership structure and dividend policy in Turkey after the implementation of major reforms in 2003.