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The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of managerial short-termism on green innovation of firms and the moderating role of digital transformation of enterprises in the association between managerial short-termism and green innovation.

This study uses data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2021 and employ panel fixed model and moderating effect model to examine the impact of managerial short-termism on green innovation of firms and the moderating role of digital transformation of enterprises in the association between managerial short-termism and green innovation.

The findings of this study reveal that managerial short-termism exerts negative influence on green innovation. Digital transformation enables firms to reduce the adverse effect of managerial short-termism on green innovation because digital transformation enhances information processing ability and then improves internal corporate governance and analyst coverage. Moreover, the moderating role of digital transformation is more prominent for firms with lower internal corporate governance, for firms with less analyst coverage and for non-state-owned enterprises.

This paper intends to address the following two questions: what is the impact of managerial short-termism on green innovation and what is the role of digital transformation in the two variables’ association? By using data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2021 and developing two individual indexes to measure managerial short-termism and digital transformation, the authors empirically test these above two questions. The results of this study indicate that: First, drawn on time-oriented theory and upper echelon theory, managerial short-termism has an adverse effect on firms’ green innovation. Second, digital transformation enables firms to reduce the negative effect of managerial short-termism on green innovation. Furthermore, the moderating mechanism tests show that the corporate governance effects of digital transformation play a supervisory role that impels managers to reduce short-term investments and promote firms’ green R&D investments, which helps to reduce the negative effect of managerial short-termism on green innovation. Additionally, the heterogeneity checks show that the moderating role of digital transformation in the relation between managerial short-termism and green innovation is more prominent for firms with lower internal corporate governance, with less analyst coverage and for non-state-owned enterprises.

The temporality of performance measurement systems has been claimed to affect actors’ time orientation, such as that of listed company managers. The purpose of this paper is to explore this view.

The study uses constructivist data gathered from executives in one listed and one non-listed company.

The study shows that the research on performance measurement is based on a linear-quantitative view on time that assumes that humans orient towards the future from one point, the present; this view excludes other time-related constructs, particularly the past, and highlights a choice between the short term and the long term, idealising the long term. It is shown that the performance measurement of non-listed company executives is constructed through past-based, present-based and future-based rationalities: executives acknowledge the past as a basis for present and future performance, present actions as shaping future performance and future plans and performance targets as bases for present actions. Listed company executives’ performance measurement is constructed predominantly through the present-based time rationality.

“The orientation from the present” and the “short” and “long terms” could be enhanced with time rationalities.

The evaluation periods within performance measurement systems do not determine the time orientations of the actors subjected to those systems; time rationalities could be considered when designing such systems.

The paper provides a novel view on performance measurement and time.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse five biases in the valuation of financial investments using a mental time travel framework involving thought investments – with no objective time passing.

An investment’s initial value, together with any periodic funding cash-flows, are mentally projected forward (at an expected rate of return) to give the value at the investment horizon; and this projected value is mentally discounted back to the present. If there is a difference between the initial and present values, then this can imply a bias in valuation.

The study identifies (and gives examples of) five real-world valuation biases: biased funding cash-flow estimates (e.g., mega infrastructure projects); biased rate of return projections (e.g., market crises, tech stock carve-outs); biased discount rate estimates (e.g., dual-listed shares, dual-class shares, short-termism, time-risk misperception, and long-termism); time-duration misestimation or perception bias when projecting (e.g., time-contracted projections which lead to short-termism); and time-duration misestimation or perception bias when discounting (e.g., time-extended discounting which also leads to short-termism). More than one bias can be operating at the same time and we give an example of low levels of retirement savings being the result of the biased discounting of biased projections. Finally, we consider the effects of the different biases of different agents operating simultaneously.

The paper examines key systematic misestimation and psychological biases underlying financial investment valuation pricing anomalies.

The 2008 Crash (the Crash) has been attributed to the dominance of financialized corporate governance, particularly an increased shareholder value rhetoric. Following the Crash, this extreme narrative is understood to have become less financialized through increasingly favouring stakeholders. The purpose of this research is to investigate this often-accepted view using field theory, wherein managers' biases in the value-creating process result from an interconnected, dynamic, multi-actor discourse.

Various domains across the UK’s corporate governance environment, from the perspective of field theory, generate the complex discourse: corporate and regulatory domains, stakeholder organizations such as the press and think tanks. Domain-specific corpora, representative of this multi-actor field, were constructed, with financialization analysed by assessing managers’ altering biases concerning the relative importance of shareholders and stakeholders (amongst other factors like time horizon) to value creation.

Highlights of the multiple findings include the following: corporate narrative about value creation became less financialized following the Crash, yet favouring shareholders, while the multi-actor discourse for the UK economy as a whole became slightly more financialized.

Analysing a multi-actor discourse is complex. And this, to the best of the author’s knowledge, is the first study of its kind, and only made possible with the original methodology of narrative staining. The approach, while having particular relevance to field theory, is applicable to many other narrative-based research scenarios.

This paper aims to look at the three areas of corporate governance, intellectual capital and strategic business valuation from the perspective of a long‐term value investor.

The paper begins by briefly laying out the investment tenets of a long‐term value investor and then proceeds to align long‐term value investing with long‐term stewardship of economic resources. The paper is a transcript of a keynote presentation delivered at the 1st McMaster World Congress on Strategic Business Valuation.

In the area of intellectual capital the paper points out that the concept of intellectual capital falls far short of the fuller and more necessary view on intellectual knowledge which should be replaced or at least augmented with the notion of wisdom.

Any notion of strategic valuation or pricing of assets based on their economic value will be significantly impacted by one's investment principles and time horizon. The paper mentions two examples of inefficiencies in the market due to divergent time horizons. The two examples discussed are income trusts and principal protected notes.

One's investment philosophy or principles which largely determine time horizon will have a significant impact on how one approaches the important areas of corporate governance, intellectual capital and strategic business valuation. The concern of the paper is to the extent that we have become more short‐term in our investment principles; this will have serious long‐term negative impacts on the capital markets.

This paper aims at analyzing salient cultural transformations and their implications for business and management.

First, the interpretative approach is explained, and its adoption is justified. Then, seven major cultural transformations associated with globalization are identified and analyzed. Finally, business and management implications are discussed.

The cultural trends/transformations caused by or associated with globalization include convergence, divergence, hybridization, the clash of cultures/civilizations, diversity, multiculturalism, time-space compression, temporal acceleration, short-termism, risk, insecurity and uncertainty.

This study, like any other interpretative study, is limited in its internal validity. Furthermore, some scholars may have different perspectives on cultural transformations, such as clash of cultures, diversity, multiculturalism and risk society.

At the methodological level, this paper adopts an interpretative research design and takes into consideration historical, contextual and social components of culture. While the culture in management is often conceptualized as bipolar and mutually exclusive dimensions, this study offers a more versatile conceptualization of culture.

This paper investigates stakeholders' perspectives of share buybacks in the context of time-horizons of investment decisions and strategy.

We use in-depth interviews with stakeholders from eight listed UK firms as well as examine their publicly available data.

Findings suggest that share buybacks involve a wide range of stakeholders' rational interests and long-term management perspectives as they enable firms to strategise operational plans towards their long-term corporate goals.

The findings are based on interviews with a small number of share buyback firms and the findings, therefore, may not be generalised to all firms.

The results show that share buybacks may be part of the long-term interests of firms and not necessarily used as part of short-term EPS increases as suggested in the extant literature.

The findings contribute to the literature on corporate pay-out policies in the context of short-term financial objectives vs long-term strategic objectives of stakeholders. They show that share buybacks can be an important part of firms' long-term strategic considerations.

The over 125-year-old economic miracle called the Corporation is suddenly shaken in its foundations. The corporate business world is rapidly changing not only in the USA, but also across the globe. The front covers of business magazines and dailies, once dominated by names and faces of “Corporate Giants,” are now being replaced with success stories of great startups and small business entrepreneurs. The reasons for these radical changes progressively reveal the imperfections existing in the current corporation and the business boardroom paradigm. For over a century, huge corporate entities spawned by capitalism have established and entrenched themselves in their respective industry arenas and have since been ruling the world, dominating money, capital, cash, and market opportunity. Once they provided solutions to people’s employment and career needs, they have made a fortune for themselves thereby. In the course of their evolution, the businesses have transformed into corporations, seeking people’s money for doing business and, in turn, giving a share of proportionate ownership to the investor people in the form of dividends and capital gains. Such a brilliant method of raising capital has empowered the corporations to grow and expand beyond physical and political boundaries. Today, however, the corporations are run by the BOD, most of whom are representing gigantic promoter-investor institutions. That is, the main administrative role is now replaced by private equity firms and hedge funds that provide the required capital but who also exert undue pressures on CEOs to focus on short-term strategies that have massive profitability potential, thus defying the usual business management model and paradigm the CEOs were trained for in B-schools. The massive CEO exodus that has migrated from the traditional corporations to newly created startups and smaller business entrepreneurial ventures has also made the corporation an endangered species. In such a market turbulence, how do we redefine, redesign, and reinvent the morally embattled corporation? This chapter explores solutions.