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The paper aims to build the connections between game theory and the resource allocation problem with general uncertainty. It proposes modeling the distributed resource allocation problem by Bayesian game. During this paper, three basic kinds of uncertainties are discussed. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to build the connections between game theory and the resource allocation problem with general uncertainty.

In this paper, the Bayesian game is proposed for modeling the resource allocation problem with uncertainty. The basic game theoretical model contains three parts: agents, utility function, and decision-making process. Therefore, the probabilistic weighted Shapley value (WSV) is applied to design the utility function of the agents. For achieving the Bayesian Nash equilibrium point, the rational learning method is introduced for optimizing the decision-making process of the agents.

The paper provides empirical insights about how the game theoretical model deals with the resource allocation problem uncertainty. A probabilistic WSV function was proposed to design the utility function of agents. Moreover, the rational learning was used to optimize the decision-making process of agents for achieving Bayesian Nash equilibrium point. By comparing with the models with full information, the simulation results illustrated the effectiveness of the Bayesian game theoretical methods for the resource allocation problem under uncertainty.

This paper designs a Bayesian theoretical model for the resource allocation problem under uncertainty. The relationships between the Bayesian game and the resource allocation problem are discussed.

A hypothesis developed in this paper models the relationship between the borrower and the bank as a dynamic game based on incomplete information (business game) and seeks an equilibrium point at which the facilitated applicant can act according to the terms of the loan agreement once the contract is signed and meet the requirements of the contract.

The primary assumption in the formation of the Islamic bank in Islamic society is that the members of the society are Muslims and act according to religious orders. However, the non-fulfillment of divine principles and orders is always possible. In partnership agreements, the risk of infringement is reduced and corrupt contracts are prevented in some circumstances. Our basic model was constructed using the Beer-Quiche classic game, which has been modified dynamically along with a generalization of complexity terms. The information asymmetry led us to use a heterogeneous belief system to evaluate the probability of the customer transmitting a low credit risk signal to the bank and the probability of the customer transmitting a high credit risk signal to the bank. There are several assumptions of the basic model that are released in the extended model by the presence of a social inspector, by exploring credit risk signals in the generalized model and by considering various commitment levels in the comprehensive model.

As a result, it is observed that there is no Nash equilibrium in cases where the customer applies separation strategies. But if the pulling strategies are applied, the Nash equilibrium can be achieved under certain conditions, including inspection bodies in the banking system, the creation of necessary transparency and the proper treatment of criminals by government and regulatory bodies. So, by using alternative belief systems, applying different filters and paying attention to all sectors of the economy, new Nash equilibrium points can be achieved. Moreover, multi-stage facilities payment reduces the risk of corrupt contracts.

This paper sets out to analyze Nash Equilibrium and its possible encounter in Islamic Banking for the first time, utilizing a Bayesian Game-Theoretic framework. A major aspect of the research is the contribution to a better understanding of the role of transparency and government oversight in the implementation of Islamic banking regulatory standards.

The purpose of this study is to explore potential reasons that might explain why locally owned tourism firms cheat the use of backward economic linkages that (when used) might otherwise maximize the economic benefits of the tourism industry for locals.

For this exploratory qualitative case study research design, 25 face-to-face interviews were conducted with various tourism business owners and managers in Puntarenas, Costa Rica.

The findings indicate that while the participants felt that tourism business' economies of scale could be improved if all locally owned businesses purchased within the tourism supply chain they themselves were purchasing outside of the supply chain. This behavior was characterized as a result of a non-cooperative market.

The major implication from the study is a trend that emerged from the data that seems to detect a tragedy of the commons scenario that is rooted in game theory. This scenario provides insight into a problem where tourism business owners and managers indicate an understanding of the value of using local network linkages, but instead cheat the system. A limitation of the study is that case studies may only be generalized to theoretical propositions and not to similar contextual situations.

Mainstream tourism literature has provided quantitative assessments that determine the direct, indirect, induced, and multiplier effects of local links between industries, sectors, and different producers that are used in the tourism supply chain. Findings from these studies indicate that local areas economically benefit when these links are actively used. However, not extensively addressed is identification of why (when most individuals know they may all benefit from the use of said linkages) cheat the system.

This paper examines binding multi-round commitments (MRCs) to the group account in a repeated voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) game. Before each five-round interval, subjects in a four-person group are given the option to commit a portion of their endowments to the group account for each of the next five rounds. Decision rounds proceed, with each subject's commitment acting as the binding minimum of his group-account allocation for each round. The opportunity to make MRCs does not increase mean allocations to the group account relative to a control treatment. However, commitments do have implications for reciprocal behavior within groups, leading to higher outcome variances across groups in the MRCs treatment.

An apparel supply chain primarily consists of geographically distant suppliers, manufacturers and retailers. The coordination among the members of the supply chain becomes difficult when we consider the triple bottom line of sustainability in it. Moreover, the complexity increases with the change in dominance power of the respective members. However, the task of managing the channel further becomes complicated after incorporating sustainability and dominance power simultaneously into the supply chain. To fill this gap, this paper focuses on designing of mechanism and demonstration of three-echelon model to coordinate sustainable supply chain.

In this paper, the noncooperative game theoretic method has been applied for the exploration of models. The various structures of the centralized and decentralized supply chain are considered on the basis of a player's dominance power. The model uses simultaneous and sequential move games to analyze optimal profit of supply chain agents, total channel profit, green innovation level and corporate social innovation level.

Analytical results show that simultaneous game performs better than the sequential game. The consumer sensitivity toward green and social innovations increases total channel profit. We also proposed a linear two-part tariff contract model. The proposed model enhances the sustainability level and leads to perfect channel coordination. Using a numerical example, we present the effectiveness of multiple game structures under centralized and decentralized settings. The results reveal that channel efficiency is the highest in the two-part tariff contract followed by a simultaneous move game structure and lower in the cases of sequential move game.

In this research, model setting are deterministic and there is no any information asymmetry. Therefore researchers are encouraged to study multiechelon sustainable supply chain coordination models under stochastic and information asymmetry settings.

The paper includes implications for the development of sustainable supply chain coordination model to tackle the problems of dominance power, sustainability issues and lower channel efficiency of supply chain.

This study proposes game-theory-based three-echelon sustainable supply chain for the channel coordination.

The three volumes before us comprise the second title in the “Elgar Reference Collection” of Critical Ideas in Economics, a new series which, we learn from the book cover, aims to provide “an essential reference source for students, researchers and lecturers in economics.” Each volume in the series will bring together a collection of previously-published articles and book-chapters which “focuses on [a] concept widely used in economics,” and will thereby “improve access to important areas of literature which will not be available in the archives of many of the newer libraries.” No one can deny that Professor Walker’s topic is ideally suited to this stated intent; is there a concept more “widely used in economics” than that of equilibrium? A collection of previously-published items cannot, of course, be appraised in terms of the originality of its content. Such a work offers a different sort of contribution. In addition to the publisher’s stated aim of an improved access to those key articles which, either because of their age or the location of their publication, are not widely available, a work such as this can perform a function not unlike that which Weintraub (1991, pp. 129–130) ascribes to the survey article. The act of selection (and, hence, of exclusion) serves to delineate the field for the non-specialist, and the ordering of the items in the collection can reveal instructive lines of intellectual development – a “filiation of scientific ideas” to adopt Schumpeter’s (1954, p. 6) felicitous phrase – that otherwise might be obscured.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a game-theoretical model for commercial bank foreign direct investment strategy, government policy and domestic banking industry interactions in emerging market economies and demonstrate the application of this strategy to the banking system. Government policy and domestic banking industry interactions in emerging market economies and demonstrate the application of this strategy to the banking system.

The paper develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the optimality of the limiting entry strategy followed by a given domestic institutional sector when considering the entry applications of foreign banks in the domestic financial system. The model analyzes the strategic options available to an emerging market country with a relatively underdeveloped banking system when deciding whether or not and to what extent allow for the entrance of better reputed and more technologically advanced foreign banks in its domestic financial system.

The paper shows that the progressive liberalization of entry restrictions would define the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the subsequent set of continuation games and the respective payoffs derived from this liberalization as the domestic economy integrates and competes within the global financial system.

Banks operating in the international financial market have incentives to invest directly in emerging market economies and governments have incentives in allowing foreign banks entry to their market. As banking systems in these economies are generally underdeveloped, opening the financial system to foreign competitors could lead to a decrease in the market share of local banks. Eventually foreign banks could control the banking system and could de facto control the money supply.

In forecasting unknown quantities, risk and finance decision makers often rely on one or more biased experts, statistical specialists representing parties with an interest in the decision maker's final forecast. This problem arises in a variety of contexts, and the decision maker may represent a corporate enterprise, rating agency, government regulator, etc. The purpose of the paper is to assist decision makers, experts, and others to have a better understanding of the dynamics of the problem, and to adopt strategies and practices that enhance efficiency.

The problem is formulated as a two‐person, non‐cooperative Bayesian game with the decision maker and one expert as players, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium solutions are identified. Then the analysis is extended to variations of the game in which the expert's loss function is not common knowledge, and in which there are multiple experts.

In the struggle for information between the decision maker and the experts, the experts generally benefit from greater uncertainty about the parameters of the model. Thus, in attempting to elicit as much information as possible from the experts, the decision maker must strive to minimize all sources of uncertainty.

As in most Bayesian games, the analysis requires that a variety of process assumptions and model parameters be common knowledge. These conditions may be difficult to satisfy in real‐world applications.

The principal finding of the study is that there is truly a struggle for information between the decision maker and the experts. This generally encourages the experts to inject as much uncertainty as possible into the process. To counter this effect, the decision maker might: provide incentives for the experts to increase their sampling information; try to mitigate specific uncertainties regarding the model parameters; and try to increase the number of experts.

This is the first paper to apply the framework of signaling games to the problem of eliciting information from biased experts. It is of value to decision makers, experts, and economic researchers.

As agent‐based systems are increasingly used to model real‐life applications such as the internet, electronic markets or disaster management scenarios, it is important to study the computational complexity of such usually combinatorial systems with respect to some desirable properties. The purpose of this paper is to consider two computational models: graphical games encoding the interactions between rational and selfish agents; and weighted directed acyclic graphs (DAG) for evaluating derivatives of numerical functions. The author studies the complexity of a certain number of search problems in both models.

The author's approach is essentially theoretical, studying the problem of verifying game‐theoretic properties for graphical games representing interactions between self‐motivated and rational agents, as well as the problem of searching for an optimal elimination ordering in a weighted DAG for evaluating derivatives of functions represented by computer programs.

A certain class of games has been identified for which Nash or Bayesian Nash equilibria can be verified in polynomial time; then, it has been shown that verifying a dominant strategy equilibrium is non‐deterministic polynomial (NP)‐complete even for normal form games. Finally, it has been shown that the optimal vertex elimination ordering for weighted DAGs is NP‐complete.

This paper presents a general framework for graphical games. The presented results are novel and illustrate how modeling real‐life scenarios involving intelligent agents can lead to computationally hard problems while showing interesting cases that are tractable.

Project-driven supply chain risks pose a significant threat to the success of complex development projects, in terms of achieving key performances such as quality, time and efficiency. The purpose of this paper is to adopt a supply chain quality perspective in order to explore and better understand the unique attributes of risks associated with project-driven supply chains for continuously improving the quality of both processes and products.

Theoretically grounded in the framework of Bayesian Belief Networks and Game theory, this paper develops a structured process for assessing and managing risks in project-driven supply chains. The application of the proposed approach is demonstrated through a simulation case study conducted on the development project of Boeing 787 aircraft.

The conflicting incentives amongst stakeholders in a supply chain can jeopardise the success of a project and therefore, assessment of this category of risks classified as “Game theoretic risks” needs special consideration. Project-driven supply chain risks pose a significant threat to the success of complex projects. The results of the study clearly revealed that without mitigating the game theoretic risks, the main objective of timely completion of the Boeing 787 project was not materialised. Further, the lack of management expertise was the major factor contributing to the overall project costs including cost of quality.

The proposed process and analyses present a significant and original insight in terms of capturing the key determinants of both product and service quality such as product performance, convenience and reliability of service, timeliness, ease of maintenance, flexibility, and customer satisfaction and comfort. Propositions are developed for ascertaining the significance of information sharing in a project-driven supply chain, and a fair sharing partnership is introduced to help supply chain managers in managing game theoretic risks in order to achieve the goals of quality, time and efficiency.