This paper examines binding multi-round commitments (MRCs) to the group account in a repeated voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) game. Before each five-round interval, subjects in a four-person group are given the option to commit a portion of their endowments to the group account for each of the next five rounds. Decision rounds proceed, with each subject's commitment acting as the binding minimum of his group-account allocation for each round. The opportunity to make MRCs does not increase mean allocations to the group account relative to a control treatment. However, commitments do have implications for reciprocal behavior within groups, leading to higher outcome variances across groups in the MRCs treatment.
Halloran, M., Walker, J. and Williams, A. (2006), "The voluntary provision of a public good with binding multi-round commitments", Isaac, R. and Davis, D. (Ed.) Experiments Investigating Fundraising and Charitable Contributors (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 11), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 225-246. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-2306(06)11009-1Download as .RIS
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