This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and agency costs of family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia. It presents a longitudinal study of the 290 publicly listed companies in the Main Board of the Bursa Malaysia over the period 1999–2005.The study applies the governance mechanisms such as board size, independent director and duality as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. There is strong evidence that larger board size has a significant effect as a device in mitigating agency costs. The study supports that independent directors and duality are viewed differently by family and non-family ownership. The evidence shows that an independent director in family ownership does not influence agency costs. But non-family ownership needs more independent directors to counsel and monitor the company and thus reducing the agency conflict with shareholders. The study also finds that family ownership experiences less agency conflicts when duality role exists. Contrary, non family ownership experiences high agency costs when duality exists on board.
Ibrahim, H. and Abdul Samad, F. (2011), "Corporate Governance and Agency Costs", John, K. and Makhija, A. (Ed.) International Corporate Governance (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 14), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 109-130. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3732(2011)0000014008Download as .RIS
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