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The paper aims to highlight the relationship between money laundering and banking confidentiality in offshore financial centres – particularly following the recent publicity and BBC expose surrounding the criminal use of offshore financial centres. It proposes that there has long been concern over the illegitimate uses of offshore financial centres and that the continuing exploitation of them by criminals is, in part, attributed to the West's use of these financial hotspots. The paper outlines the previous attempts by global regulatory bodies to curb money laundering in offshore financial centres and explores some of the reasons for the continuation of money laundering in offshore financial centres.

The paper was compiled by accessing and analysing primary and secondary data which is publicly available. The analysed data were complemented by the author's new theory of the West's collusion with offshore financial centres as a possible reason for the superficial commitment to anti‐money laundering laws and guidelines.

The findings in the paper conclude that even though there have been global efforts to combat money laundering in offshore financial centres, there is little commitment from the offshore financial centres themselves, and the West, to effectively implement anti‐money laundering regulations.

This paper fulfils a gap in the literature by exploring the relationship between the West and offshore financial centres – more specifically the West's continued use of these centres acts as an incentive to avoid relaxing tight banking confidentiality laws. Further research in this area is needed to assess the full impact of the West's relationship with offshore financial centres.

The Isle of Man, a British Isles offshore jurisdiction located in the middle of the Irish Sea, has experienced three separate bank collapses during a relatively brief 26 year period. These collapses have affected in excess of 20,000 depositors and inflicted significant damage on investor confidence in the Isle of Man as an offshore finance centre. The purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of deposit protection during this time frame, teasing out the delicate balance required in small offshore jurisdictions between rigorous standards of investor protection on the one hand and the vital importance of remaining competitive with rival offshore finance centres on the other. It critically evaluates the recently enacted Isle of Man deposit compensation scheme (DCS) by reference to this organising principle.

The paper outlines the nature of the Manx jurisdiction and its offshore development. Focussing on the period 1982‐2010, it discusses the three separate bank collapses and insular regulatory and legislative responses. The focal point of the paper is a critical evaluation of the new Isle of Man DCS including comparisons where appropriate with deposit protection schemes in the Channel Islands offshore jurisdictions of Jersey and Guernsey and discussion of the extent to which the new Isle of Man DCS complies with specific features of recently formulated international best practice standards.

The paper reports that insular regulatory and government responses to bank collapses have tended to be distinctly short‐term and reactive. Despite being the first small offshore jurisdiction in the world to embrace the principle of deposit protection in 1991, there has been a conspicuous failure in the Isle of Man to develop related financial safety net policies, and the overriding motive for the introduction and indeed continuation of deposit protection has been to repair enduring reputational damage inflicted on its offshore finance centre by successive bank failures. The new Isle of Man DCS conforms to this model, reflecting insular anxieties regarding risks of lost banking business to rival offshore jurisdictions as opposed to rigorous standards of investor protection.

Analysis contained in this paper sheds light on the problem of effective deposit protection in small offshore jurisdictions, including tensions in policy terms between principled investor protection and finance centre reputational and competitiveness concerns. It also highlights, more broadly, the endemic problem of delivering optimum investor protection at (small) jurisdictional level in the context of international banking groups operating on a multi‐jurisdictional basis and deploying entrenched business models which operationalise offshore banking arms as essentially vehicles for the onward transmission of liquid funds to treasury functions located in parent groups' home jurisdictions.

To stimulate the financial sector further, the Malaysian government has established an International Offshore Financial Centre (IOFC) on the island of Labuan. The setting‐up of the IOFC provides new challenges for the enforcement community. Recent financial scandals involving offshore financial centres have highlighted the need to protect the IOFC from crimes and financial abuses and at the same time to ensure confidentiality is adhered to. In the paper, the Malaysian Offshore Banking Act 1990 is examined. The Offshore Banking Act, under certain conditions, allows a public officer to gain access to banking information. Stringent entry requirements are applied to banks and businesses but the bottom line is that bankers are expected to exercise responsible banking and a high standard of prudence.

The purpose of this paper is to detail the findings of a study to determine the viability of Islamic banking as a niche for the Labuan International Offshore Financial Center (IOFC). Labuan was declared an IOFC by the Malaysian Government in 1990, with the goal of developing it as a financial “supermarket” offering a wide range of offshore financial products specializing in Islamic finance.

The paper employs the mail survey method to ensure the anonymity of the respondents and the whole population of banks are used, which enables the researchers to ignore the problems of bias in the sampling. Data collected from the survey are analyzed using descriptive statistics, mean, standard deviation, and frequency counts.

The results of the survey indicate that Labuan offshore bankers do not have a clear notion of Islamic banking principles and practices. The results also show that most of the offshore banks do not have officers and staff who are conversant with Islamic banking. Nevertheless, conventional offshore banks are willing to train their officers in Islamic banking skills and participate in future Islamic deals. The findings also indicate that Islamic banking is a viable niche for the Labuan IOFC. However, the results also show that Labuan does not have competitive advantages over Bahrain and London, currently the leading Islamic finance centers in the world.

There are three major limitations of this paper. These limitations are further explained in the conclusion's part.

There are three major implications of these findings. First, the authorities ought to enhance the knowledge and expertise of the conventional offshore bankers by facilitating training in Islamic banking skills. Acquisition of such knowledge and skills would encourage them to participate in future Islamic banking deals. Second, the industry and the authorities responsible for the IOFC have to be both innovative and creative. In order to convince conventional offshore bankers that Islamic banking is a viable alternative to conventional banking the products and services offered must be seen as value added. A creative tax regime should have a substantial impact in terms of increased profit margin or reduced cost on the part of the offshore banks. Third, improving the physical infrastructure and overcoming the geographical location disadvantage of Labuan should become the priority of the authorities overseeing the development of Labuan as an IOFC.

The paper provides fresh results on the viability of Islamic banking operations in Labuan IOFC.

An offshore sector makes reference to financial services and non‐financial services frameworks in a country/territory. Clientele who make use of these services are non‐residents of the given jurisdiction. In these service frameworks assets can be diverted to, and business/financial affairs conducted in, an environment where a package of favourable regulatory incentives are in place to benefit clients who would ordinarily not be privy to such regulatory regimes in onshore jurisdictions. These regulatory incentives typically comprise incorporation mechanisms as regards commercial holding companies or overseas subsidiaries in client‐friendly fiscal and exchange control environments.

The purpose of this paper is to increase insights into the withdrawal of correspondent banks (CBs) from developing markets.

A case study of a small offshore bank in Belize was conducted using information collected from the bank’s CEO and compliance officer through semi-structured interviews. The interview data were triangulated with data from relevant laws in Belize and literature review.

Compliance with international standards is onerous on small banks, but necessary to level the playing field and protect the global system. Practices within small banks effectively combat money laundering, but remain unsung because size and geographic location of banks influence perceptions about the banks. The approach to de-risking was overreaching and unfair.

The findings are specific to one offshore bank, but create awareness of Belize banking practices to mitigate money laundering risks. The results could influence regulators, international organizations and CBs to pierce through to the bank level to assess risks and determine CB relationships.

This is the first study providing firsthand accounts of efforts by a small Belize bank to comply with international standards and remain connected to the global financial system. The study highlights a critical weakness in employing a risk-based approach to rate banks.

The principle of offshore financial confidentiality is a controversial issue in offshore law. On the one hand, offshore jurisdictions view confidentiality in financial matters as an essential ingredient in the offshore industry which deserves to be protected. On the other, onshore states are increasingly hostile to confidentiality and have been willing to take drastic measures to undermine it.

The article reviews the development of the international (offshore) banking sector in Cyprus and focuses on the effects of the transitional corporate tax regime, introduced for this sector, since the country’s admission into the European Union. The consolidated performance of international banks and data collected through semi‐structured questionnaires are examined to provide important insights into how management perceives of the new tax regime and of its impact upon the country’s attractiveness as an international banking center.

The global financial turmoil of 2008 spilled over into the British Isles offshore jurisdictions of Guernsey and the Isle of Man resulting in the collapse of two local subsidiaries of major Icelandic banking groups and consequent depositors' losses. The purpose of this paper is to contrast the sharply differing reactions of the insular authorities and critically evaluate Guernsey's recently enacted deposit protection scheme.

The paper outlines the nature of the Guernsey jurisdiction, its offshore development and policy issues in deposit protection. Legislation establishing Guernsey's deposit protection scheme is described and critically evaluated.

Guernsey's scheme is a rushed legislative reaction dominated by finance centre reputational concerns. The legislation is clear and comprehensive but the long‐term robustness of its funding model is unclear.

The analysis contained in this paper highlights the ramifications of international bank instability in small offshore jurisdictions and the regulatory problems this poses. Discussion of the legislative basis of the deposit protection scheme clarifies its nature and limitations as an investor protection technique, which is timely given the status of deposit protection as a key theme in the UK Government's initiated Foot Review of nine offshore jurisdictions.

In addition to contributing to the supply side of corruption in Africa, the West has historically played a major role in laundering the proceeds. The Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) are characterised as jurisdictions that attract a high level of non‐resident financial activity. The purpose of this paper is to examine how senior political figures, their relatives and close associates have used OFCs in moving funds that may be a product of foreign corruption into Western countries.

The paper locates the role of OFCs within the political economy theory of globalisation to argue that mobility of capital has been promoted by a number of advanced countries and micro‐states that use their sovereignty and law‐making powers to create an environment conducive to anti‐social practices by the major corporations and the political elite. The paper uses publicly available evidence to illuminate the role played by offshore financial centres in facilitating elite money laundering practices.

The evidence shows that, in pursuit of organisational and personal interest, the offshore financial centres create enabling structures that support illicit activities of the political and economic elite from developing countries. The paper concludes that the establishment of money laundering laws and the creation of anti‐money laundering agencies had not brought about ethical conduct within the global banking systems.

It is impossible to quantify the volume of money laundered, but it has been estimated that money laundering may account for as much as 5 per cent of the world economy.

Substantial amounts of illicit money undoubtedly flow out of developing countries. Combating money laundering is a key goal in all democracies, due to its corrosive efforts on the rule of law, economic development, democratic principles, and its serious consequences for people everywhere.

The paper examines predatory practices of the international financial industry in money laundering activities.