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The effects of ownership concentration on firm performance usually considers two conflicting perspectives: monitoring and expropriation hypotheses. Past studies have produced mix findings. This study aims to shed light on this relationship by focusing on a specific measure of firm performance, firm growth. The moderating effect of industry growth in the aforementioned relationship is also considered, which advances knowledge on the role of moderators.

This study resorts to data from a sample of 21,476 Portuguese firms, which is examined using hierarchical linear modelling. This approach is adequate because the data has a hierarchical structure: the firms are nested within industries.

The results show that equity ownership concentration has a positive effect on firms’ growth and that industry growth amplifies this relationship. Ownership concentration can spur effective monitoring, thereby alleviating principal–agent conflicts of interest and speeding up decision-making, enabling timely competitive actions that promote growth.

The research conceives ownership structure in two groups. However, equity ownership concentration often acquires more complex shapes. In addition, the data used is from a single country.

The results show that firms pursuing growing strategies and operating in growing industries benefit from equity concentration.

Different from past studies, this study focuses on firm growth performance and considers the moderating effect of industry growth.

The purpose of the study is to examine how operating efficiencies from incentive alignment compensate for rent extraction in family firms. The author asks whether ownership (1) improves operating efficiencies to increase firm value, (2) positively affects related-party transactions (RPTs), or (3) destroys firm value. Finally, the author assesses whether the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect.

This study employs a panel of 333 listed family firms (and 185 nonfamily firms) and handles endogeneity using a dynamic panel system GMM and panel VAR.

Ownership decreases discretionary expenses and increases asset utilization to add firm value. The efficiency gains generate more value in family firms, especially majority-held ones, than in nonmajority ones. However, ownership is also related to increased RPTs (especially dubious loans/guarantees), reducing firm value. RPTs destroy value more severely in the family (or group) firms than in nonfamily (nongroup) firms. It could be why ownership's positive impact on value is lower in family firms than in nonfamily firms. Overall, the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect and is robust to controlling private benefits of control in the dynamic ownership-value model.

(1) A family firm's ownership may not be optimal. (2) The firm's long-term commitment as a dynasty limits the scale of expropriation yet sustains impetus for long-term value creation. The paradox partly explains why large family holdings and firm-specific investments endure over generations. (3) This way, large ownership substitutes weak investor protection in India despite tunneling as skin in the game provides necessary investor confidence. (4) Future studies can examine whether extraction varies with family generations and how family characteristics affect the incentive effects.

(1) Concentrated ownership may not be a wrong policy choice in emerging markets to draw firm-specific investments. (2) Investors, auditors, or creditors must pay closer attention to loans/guarantees. (3) More vigorous enforcement, auditor scrutiny, and board oversight are needed.

Family firms are not necessarily a bad organization type that destroys investor wealth. They can be valuably efficient due to their ownership and wealth concentration, and frugality. They matter in the economic growth of a developing market like India.

(1) Extends ownership-performance research to family firms and shows that although ownership facilitates tunneling, the incentive effect dominates; (2) family ownership is not impacted by firm value; (3) family ownership levels reduce discretionary expenses and increase asset utilization to create added value, especially in majority-held family firms; (4) RPTs and loans/guarantees increase with ownership; (5) value erosion from RPTs is higher in family (group) firms than in other firms.

This paper has a dual purpose: to produce a clear panorama of microfactors behind the implementation of environmental, social and governance (ESG) in emergent economies, and to identify long-term versus short-term implications of ESG and its impacts on sustainable transformation. In particular, the paper investigates the moderating role of ownership concentration on ESG performance and firm value relationship in Southeast Asia during 2010–2022 and COVID-19 period 2020–2022.

By adopting stakeholder and agency theory lenses, this study analyzes 591 nonfinancial listed companies in Southeast Asia from 2010 to 2022 with 2,673 firm-year observations. Data has been collected from Refinitiv and companies' annual reports. Ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimators are main strategies.

During 2010–2022, the links between ESG performances and firm value are negative. Ownership concentration negatively moderates the nexus between governance pillar and firm value in both short and long run. In COVID-19, ownership concentration also plays an antagonistic moderating role in ESG combined score-firm value association. The results show a crucial role of blockholders in Southeast Asian firms and their strong support to ESG in conquering crisis period, suggesting that managers develop balancing mechanisms in making ESG-related decisions; policymakers and regulators improve effective control instruments with strong legal systems and enhanced law enforcement to protect minority shareholders.

This is the first study to test the connection between ESG performance, ownership concentration and firm value in Southeast Asia that has: (1) utilized different proxies of firm value and ownership concentration in robustness tests, (2) controlled heteroskedasticity defects, (3) eliminated companies in the Banking and Finance sector from the sample to avoid distorting the conclusions and (4) empirically verified the driven role of governance pillar in ESG performance and ownership concentration reversely moderated the impact of governance pillar on firm value.

The authors empirically investigate the association between acquisition, ownership structure and accrual earnings management (AEM) on real earnings management (REM) using Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-listed firms' context.

The authors' sample consists of 1,892 firm-year observations for the period from 2007–2017, and the authors adopt a panel data approach in investigating the interrelationships in this study. The authors employ different econometrics approach to test the authors' hypotheses.

The findings reveal that acquiring companies engage more in AEM if compared to REM. In terms of ownership structure, institutional ownership and state ownership mitigate the engagement in REM, whereas foreign ownership is found to be an ineffective mechanism in reducing engagement in REM. The authors report similar findings on ownership structure for AEM. The authors also find that the GCC firms engage more in REM when the firms engage in AEM, suggesting a complementary relation between these two earnings management techniques. These findings are robust after controlling for different aspects including any endogeneity issue in the authors' models.

The authors' research highlights the importance of understanding REM and AEM dynamics in GCC context. Also, the authors' findings on ownership structure suggest that GCC-listed firms can gain from institutional and state ownership which restricts earnings management, improving firm transparency and subsequently impacting firm performance.

This paper aims to examine the effect of audit firm governance on audit quality. Audit firm governance is broken down into two categories, namely, board ownership and engagement partner ownership.

Audit firms from Borsa Istanbul and their clients who are quoted there as well were used to test the hypotheses. The final sample covers 1,291 observations at the client level between 2013 and 2019. Ordinary least square was conducted to test the hypotheses. Heckman selection model and instrument variable regression with two-stage least square (IVREG with 2SLS) were also used to control the self-selection and endogeneity problems, respectively. To enhance the validity of the main results, alternative audit quality measures were used.

The empirical findings show that board ownership and engagement partner ownership have an impact on audit quality. The results indicate that engagement partners with high shares enhance audit quality only in Big4 audit firms. The positive effect of higher board ownership on audit quality is more prominent in non-Big4 firms. The Heckman two-stage procedure and IVREG with 2SLS were conducted, both of which were consistent with the main results. The results regarding alternative audit quality measures are in accordance with the main estimation results.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study examining the impact of audit firm board ownership on audit quality. In addition, this paper further advances the literature by investigating the effects of ownership at engagement partner levels on audit quality in the context of an emerging market, Turkey.

The present study aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance proxies by ownership structure and firm-specific characteristics, i.e. firm size, leverage, growth opportunities, previous year dividend, firm risk, profitability, and liquidity on dividend behavior of the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) listed firms.

Final sample of the study consists of 140 PSX-listed firms. The study covers a period of six years, starting from 2015 to 2020. Dividend payout dummy, dividend payout ratio, and dividend yield were used to assess the dividend behavior of the sample firms. The appropriate regression procedures (logistic, probit, ordinary least square (OLS), and fixed effect regression) are used to test the study hypothesis. To check the robustness of the result, a system GMM estimation technique is also used in the present study.

The study reveals that institutional ownership, foreign ownership, and individual ownership have a significant positive whereas managerial ownership has a significant negative impact on the dividend decision of sample firms. Among firm-specific characteristics, it was found that liquidity, profitability, and the previous year's dividend were significantly positive, while growth opportunities were significantly inversely associated with dividend payout decisions of PSX-listed firms.

This study sheds light on the relationship between dividend policy, ownership structure, and firm-specific factors in the context of an emerging market like Pakistan. The study's findings have important implications for managers, minority shareholders, lawmakers, and investors looking for guidance on the dividend policy of publicly-traded non-financial firms.

The literature lacks studies that together analyze the ownership characteristics and firm-specific variables on dividend decisions, particularly in the context of developing economies. The current study aims to fill this gap.

The purpose of this paper is to study how CEO power impact corporate tax avoidance. In particular, this paper aims to empirically examine the moderating impact of institutional ownership on the relationship between CEO power and corporate tax avoidance.

The multivariate regression model is used for hypothesis testing using a sample of 308 firm-year observations of Tunisian listed companies during the 2013-2019 period.

The results show that CEO power is negatively associated with corporate tax avoidance and that institutional ownership significantly accentuates the CEO power’s effect on corporate tax avoidance. This implies that CEOs, when monitored by institutional investors, behave less opportunistically resulting in less tax avoidance.

Our findings have significant implications for managers, legislators, tax authorities and shareholders. They showed that CEO duality, tenure and ownership can mitigate the corporate tax avoidance in Tunisian companies. These findings can, hence, guide the development of future regulations and policies. Moreover, our results provide evidence that owning of shares by institutional investors is beneficial for reducing corporate tax avoidance. Thus, policymakers and regulatory bodies should consider adding regulations to the structure of corporate ownership to promote institutional ownership and consequently control corporate tax avoidance in Tunisian companies.

This study differs from prior studies in several ways. First, it addressed the emerging market, namely the Tunisian one. Knowing the notable differences in institutional setting and corporate governance structure between developed and emerging markets, this study will shed additional light in this area. Second, it proposes the establishment of a moderated relationship between CEO power and corporate tax avoidance around institutional ownership. Unlike prior studies that only examined the simple relationship between CEO power and corporate tax avoidance, this study went further to investigate how institutional ownership potentially moderates this relationship.

Using imbalanced panel data of nonfinancial Vietnamese listed firms from 2005 to 2021, this paper explores the potential effect of ownership on firms' cash levels.

Two hypotheses are tested using different methods, including pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and system-generalized method of moments (GMM), to investigate the ownership–cash holding relationship for various firm scenarios. Both book and market measures of the cash ratio are examined.

Results show that foreign and state ownership encourages firms to increase their cash reserves. The positive relationship between ownership and cash holding is, especially, pronounced for firms in the financial deficit.

This research suggests that in this emerging market, outside ownership substantially accelerates cash to hedge against the unexpected issues caused by poor investor protection, low political accountability and information asymmetry.

The study contributes to the existing understanding of the relationship between ownership and corporate cash holdings in the context of a typical emerging market. Besides, it expands the existing knowledge to the extent of such relations in the event of a financial shortage.

The study analyzes the influence of corporate governance and ownership concentration levels on the cost of equity. Further, the authors extend the literature by investigating the moderating effect of ownership concentration levels (i.e. at 5%, 10% and 20%) on the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of equity.

The study applies several robust panel regression techniques to a sample of 114 active non-financial companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2016. Corporate governance was measured through a unique index comprising 30 governance attributes. The cost of equity was measured through the capital asset pricing model. Further, the authors construct three variables for ownership concentration levels, i.e. at 5%, 10% and 20%. To address the endogeneity problem, the one-lagged variable model and GMM approaches were also applied.

The results indicate that better corporate governance reduces the cost of equity, while ownership concentration at high thresholds would increase the cost of equity. Further, the authors find that ownership concentration at the 20% threshold moderates the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of equity. Thus, the authors argue that firms can minimize the risk faced by shareholders by implementing substantive corporate governance mechanisms. In addition, effective corporate governance mechanisms at high ownership concentration levels are imperative for managing the cost of equity.

The study reports novel evidence that ownership concentration at a high threshold moderates the effect of corporate governance on the cost of equity.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, the author conducts the first detailed review on the impact of ownership variables on corporate tax avoidance, based on 69 archival studies over the two last decades.

Referring to an agency-theoretical framework, the author differentiates between six categories of ownership (institutional, state, family, foreign, managerial and cross-ownership/ownership concentration). The author also includes research on ownership proxies as moderators of other determinants of tax avoidance.

The review indicates that most research refers to institutional, state and family ownership. Moreover, except for state ownership, no clear tendencies on the impact of included ownership types can be found in line with the author’s agency-theoretical framework.

Regarding research recommendations, among others, the author stresses the urgent need for recognizing heterogeneity within and interactions between ownership proxies. Researchers should also properly address endogeneity concerns by advanced econometric models (e.g. by the difference-in-difference approach).

As international standard setters have implemented massive reform initiatives on both tax avoidance and corporate governance, this literature review underlines the huge interaction between those topics. Firms should carefully analyze their ownership structure and change their tax planning due to owners' individual tax preferences.

This analysis makes useful contributions to prior research by focusing on six categories of ownership and their impact on tax avoidance in (multinational) firms and moderating effects. The author provides a detailed overview about current archival research and likes to guide researchers to focus on ownership heterogeneity and endogeneity concerns.