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Applying resource dependence theory (RDT), this research paper aims to examine the effect of imbalanced trade dependence (ITD) on entry mode choices and how state ownership and marketization each can moderate this effect.

Using data on 1,404 foreign projects made by 493 Chinese listed firms during the 2009–2015 period of time, this study applies logit regression to do the statistical analysis.

It finds that ITD positively affects the choice of wholly-owned subsidiaries. State ownership and marketization each can moderate this influence.

It develops the concept of ITD, applies it to examine entry mode choices and lets us better understand the substitutive or complementary relationship between governments and foreign firms as two sources of resources. It helps us better understand some competitive advantages of emerging market firms (EMFs) and the impacts of the state on EMFs’ outward FDI. It contributes to entry mode research by applying RDT to explain how ITD influences entry mode choices and how state ownership and marketization each can moderate this relationship.

We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state.

We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets.

Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform.

Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives.

As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands for the society at large or the collective private citizens).

As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question.

Chinese executive compensation stimulates not only the maximization of shareholder value but also the preservation of the state’s interests.

This paper investigates how the global financial crisis changes the effects of state ownership and foreign ownership on corporate cash holdings in an emerging market.

We employ an interactive term between state ownership (foreign ownership) and a crisis dummy to analyze how the global financial crisis determines the effect of state ownership (foreign ownership) on corporate cash holdings.

With a research sample including 5,493 observations from 621 listed firms over the period 2007–2017, we find that state ownership (foreign ownership) is negatively (positively) related to corporate cash holdings and the effect of state ownership (foreign ownership) is stronger (weaker) during the crisis period. Moreover, the increase in the effect of state ownership is larger in financially unconstrained firms.

Prior research shows that the effects of state ownership and foreign ownership on corporate cash holdings in emerging markets are still debatable. This paper extends this line of research by investigating how the global financial crisis – an exogenous shock – changes these effects.

The purpose of this study is to examine efficiency differences among petroleum firms based on their ownership status, with the aim of helping these firms understand how specific levels of state-ownership affects efficiency and to bring new perspective to the ownership-performance literature.

The study uses ten-year data (2001-2010) of 32 global petroleum firms categorized into four groups based on ownership types. The metafrontier analysis is used with the dynamic slack-based measure to estimate dynamic efficiency differences among the groups while respectively, accounting for carryover variables such as oil and gas reserves.

Fully state-owned firms outperformed private, majority and minority state-owned firms, indicating that not all types of state-owned petroleum firms are outperformed by private firms. Additionally, firms with shared ownership between state and private are seen to have a lesser comparative advantage in the industry than those with full private or state ownership.

Jointly owned petroleum firms should consider converting ownership to either full private or full state control. Conflict management measures should be used to handle possible conflicts between different shareholding groups.

This is among the first studies to sub-group state ownership into various levels to comprehensively examine specific levels of state ownership that is detrimental to the performance of petroleum firms. It is also the premier oil efficiency study to use the metafrontier framework to cater for group heterogeneity. The study treats oil and gas reserves as interconnecting variables that are not consumed only in the period for which they are discovered to ensure fair assessment.

State ownership has been common especially in industries with restricted competition. In Russia, state-controlled firms represent around 41 percent of the market value of all listed firms (Deloitte, 2015). Yet, there is a significant gap in the literature regarding the effects of various forms of government control in listed firms. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by exploring the impact of the complexity of state ownership and competition on the performance of Russian listed firms.

The sample consists of data for 72 firms (360 firm-years) in the Russian MOEX broad market index during 2011–2015. The complexity of state ownership is captured by studying forms of state control including majority/minority, direct/indirect, federal/regional, mixed structures and golden shares.

The authors find significant differences in performance relating to different forms of state ownership. State control is negatively related to firm valuation and the sales/employees ratio. Performance is weakest when state ownership takes the form minority, regional or direct ownership. State control through golden shares typically outperforms other state-controlled firms. The authors find indications of employment prioritization beyond the economical optimum. In addition, the relation between state ownership and profitability becomes positive in sectors where state firms appear to enjoy lower competition.

While the effects of state ownership have been studied on many markets, there is a lack of studies on the effects of different forms, or the complexity, of state ownership beyond direct and indirect ownership. The authors contribute to the literature on the performance effects of state ownership by studying a multitude of forms of governmental ownership as well as the role of competition in Russia. Especially the profitability of state-controlled firms is significantly affected by industry characteristics. Implications of the results are discussed both from firm and policy maker perspectives.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the endogeneity effect of state ownership on firm value in Indonesia.

Using a sample of 139 Indonesian non-financial listed companies from 2009 to 2013, this study uses two-stage least square (2SLS) methods.

The results of 2SLS show that state ownership as “continuous measure, dummy variable and after adjusting the outliers” are negatively and significantly influenced firm value, implying that state ownership tends to lower firm value. Moreover, the results also show that U-shaped effect of state ownership with firm value, implying that the size of shareholders by state increases, firm value initially decreases and then increases.

The study intends to provide the shareholders, managers and investors with clear guidance before their investment decisions.

This paper provides evidence that the agency costs may increase in firms with state ownership share.

This is the first paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by investigating the endogeneity effect between state ownership and firm value using 2SLS method in Indonesia.

The purpose of this paper is to link literature on China’s real estate sector and the impact of governance, ownership and political connectedness on firm financial performance. Whether these factors impact listed real estate firms differently to firms in other industry sectors is identified.

The paper uses pooled 2008-2013 data on A-share firms. Tobin’s Q captures firm financial performance. Explanatory variables include corporate governance, ownership, local government political connectedness, accounting data and ultimate control. Two-way interactions are estimated between real estate and ownership, governance, political connectedness and other variables. Three-way interactions are estimated between real estate, ownership, control and political connectedness. Year and industry fixed effects are absorbed.

Industry concentration and proportion of state ownership appear to positively impact performance. Firm size, gearing and greater foreign ownership appear to negatively impact performance. However, differences are identified for real estate firms, in which state control and gearing positively impact performance. Greater state and foreign ownership as well as supervisory board size negatively impact performance. Finally, state control in the presence of local government connections negatively impacts performance, while greater state ownership in the presence of local government connections positively impacts performance.

A lack of empirical evidence on the impact of corporate governance, ownership structures and political connectedness on firm performance in China’s real estate sector is addressed. Importantly, relationships among these factors and the financial performance of China’s listed real estate firms differ to those of firms in other industries.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between state ownership and firm profitability in developing countries by considering the endogenous nature of state ownership and firm profitability.

A simultaneous equation analysis is applied to study 232 Tunisian firms over the 2001-2013 period. This analysis is compared with OLS estimates to show its power in terms of an endogenous setting and its potential to improve estimation.

Unlike the OLS estimates that show a non-significant relationship between state ownership and firm profitability, the simultaneous equation analysis reveals a non-symmetrical concave relationship. Specifically, state ownership affects positively firm profitability when it is relatively small and negatively when state ownership dominates. Specification test indicates that both state ownership and firm profitability are endogenous. Furthermore, the simultaneous model’s explanatory power exceeds that of OLS estimates and proves to be a suitable estimation technique.

Taking into account public firms’ categorization, the authors implicitly examine the effect of privatization and corporatization on firm profitability. The findings imply that privatization is not the only solution to the operational problems of public firms, but an internal governance system restructuring can also be favorable for these firms.

In addition to focusing on a new database of developing countries, the case of Tunisian firms, the main empirical analysis is conducted by considering the endogeneity issue. Thus, the findings improve understanding of the role played by state ownership and suggest that a partial state control appears to be beneficial to firm profitability.

In the context of China’s efforts to build world-class enterprises through mixed-ownership reform, this study aims to build an agency theory framework to analyze the differential relation between ownership structure and firm performance in majority versus minority state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It also evaluates the differential influence that political connectedness has on firm performance in the two types of SOEs.

Using a panel data set of Chinese state-controlled mixed-ownership enterprises covering the period 2010–2019, this paper uses ordinary least squares, random-effects, fixed-effects and three stage least squares regression analysis to study the differential impact of ownership structure and political connectedness on firm performance in majority versus minority SOEs.

In minority SOEs, firm performance is positively related to the ownership share of the largest private shareholder and state ownership positively moderates this relation. Furthermore, minority SOEs with a politically connected chairman perform worse than those with a politically connected chairman. In majority SOEs, there is no relation between the ownership share of the largest private shareholder and firm performance. In addition, majority SOEs with a politically connected chairman perform similar to those without a politically connected chairman.

The theoretical framework demonstrates that agency problems are substantially different in minority versus majority SOEs and that this influences how changes in ownership structure and in the type of chairman that is assigned affect firm performance. The empirical analysis confirms these predictions.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and performance for a comprehensive sample of Chinese listed firms for the years 2000‐2004. In particular, the paper seeks to explore the effect of the dominance of state and private blockholders and control on firm performance. It aims to use a more differentiated approach than previous research on the subject, which has mainly focused on the effects of the pervasive state ownership on firm values. Accordingly, the main theme of the paper intends to relate to the analysis of the effects of private blockholders on firm value.

The paper tests the ownership‐performance relationship for the state and for sub‐samples with predominantly private shareholders. The paper uses both an ordinary least squares and a two‐stage least squares analysis, which treats ownership concentration as endogenous.

The paper finds evidence that large private blockholdings are to the benefit of firm value for the full sample. Conversely, for smaller samples of companies without or with very low shareholdings by the various state players, there is some evidence that large private block shareholdings might be to the detriment of firm value.

The study contributes to the literature by presenting a more comprehensive treatment of the ownership‐performance relationship of listed firms in China. The main theme of the paper relates to ownership concentration and the effects of private blockholders on the performance of firms, in addition to the endogeneity of ownership. It also contributes by utilising the alternative ownership classification system developed by the National University of Singapore.