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With the growing concern of various sectors of society regarding environmental issues and the promotion of sustainable development, green technology innovation is generally considered to be conducive to the long-term development of enterprises. However, because of the existence of agency problems, managers may have shortsighted behaviors. Then how will managers' shortsighted behaviors affect enterprises' green technology innovation?

This paper uses machine learning-based text analysis methods to construct a manager myopia index based on the data from A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2015 to 2020. We examine the impact of manager myopia on green technology innovation in companies.

Our study finds that manager myopia significantly inhibits green technology innovation in companies. However, when multiple large shareholders coexist and the proportion of institutional investors' holdings is high, it can alleviate the inhibitory effect of manager myopia on green innovation. Heterogeneity tests show that the impact of manager myopia on green technology innovation is relatively significant in non-state-owned and manufacturing companies, as well as in the electricity industry. Robustness tests demonstrate that our conclusions remain valid after using propensity score matching to eliminate endogeneity problems.

From the perspective of corporate governance, this paper incorporates managers' shortsightedness, multiple large shareholders and institutional investors' shareholding ratios into the same logical framework, analyzes their internal mechanisms, helps improve corporate governance, enhances green innovation capabilities and has strong implications for the implementation of national innovation-driven development strategies and the achievement of “carbon peak” and “carbon neutrality” targets.

This study aims to examine the influence of managerial myopia on the excessive financialization behavior of listed firms on Bursa Malaysia.

Through a sample of 313 firms from 2015 to 2021, the author examine whether managerial myopia promotes or inhibits corporate financialization. The author uses ordinary least squares and Logit as the baseline models and addresses potential endogeneity through the dynamic-panel generalized method of moments. The results are also robust to alternative measures of financialization and managerial myopia.

The results show a significant positive effect of managerial myopia on the excessive financialization of enterprises. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the impact of managerial myopia on the over-financialization of enterprises is more prominent in periods of low economic policy uncertainty. However, the relationship between excessive financialization and managerial myopia is weakened in the presence of female chief executive officers.

The empirical results have useful policy implications. First, firms should establish scientific managerial assessment and supervision systems to avoid excessive financial investment behavior by myopic managers caused by assessments that place too much emphasis on short-term performance. Second, regulators and policymakers should encourage firms to appoint women to top management positions, which may inhibit short-sighted financialization behavior. Finally, the regulatory authorities should undertake the necessary measures driving companies to disclose the investment direction of the funds so that shareholders and investors can understand the use direction of the funds in a timely manner, which can effectively prevent the economy “from the real to the virtual” and promote the development of the real economy.

This paper expands the existing research on corporate financialization behavior and provides a new theoretical basis for the underlying factors of excessive financialization. It studies the influence of corporate financialization from the perspective of short-run managerial actions and deepens the understanding of managerial myopia and companies’ financialization levels.

This study investigates the relationship between management's psychological characteristics (managers' narcissism, overconfidence and managers' myopia) and earnings management in the pre-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and post-ISIS eras.

A multivariate regression model was used to test the hypotheses. The research hypotheses were tested using a sample of all companies listed on the Iraqi Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2020.

Findings indicate a positive and significant relationship between managers' narcissism, overconfidence and myopia with accrual and real earnings management. According to the results, the ISIS weakens the relationship between managers' narcissism, managers' overconfidence and managers' myopia with accrual and real earnings management.

Because no study has addressed this issue in Iraq so far, the results of this research can provide helpful information for its users and improve the knowledge and science in this area.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) might be among the primary factors ensuring any organization’s survival, and disclosing its related information is very important. This research initially investigates the effect of managers’ behavior characteristics, including overconfidence, myopia and narcissism and corporate political ties on the disclosure of CSR. This study also aims to assess the mediating impact of political connections on the association between managerial personality traits and CSR.

The research sample included 129 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2020. Behavioral managerers charecteristics. A multivariate regression method with combined data (firm-year) was used to test the research hypotheses.

The results show that overconfidence and managerial myopia cause the disclosure of CSR to decrease. Managers’ overconfidence and short-term attitudes lead to a decrease in the level of CSR activities of the companies and their disclosure, respectively, 0.021 and 0.025. However, the existence of narcissism in managers and having political ties by companies may lead to an increase in the disclosure of the CSR, respectively, around 0.089 and 0.02. Further findings also indicate that political connections may motivate narcissistic managers to increase CSR disclosure near 0.037. However, the results document no significant impact of political ties on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and myopia with CSR involvement.

According to the findings, the authors recommend to stockholders that employing narcissistic managers and improving political connections might be two effective strategies to enhance the level of CSR engagement. One of the critical limitations of the current paper might be its generalizability. As Iran is an emerging and fossil fuel seller country, its institutional settings may significantly differ from those of developed and industrial nations. Thus, the readers of these nations must consider such an important issue.

For the first time, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this research has investigated the moderating effect of political ties on the association between management behavioral characteristics and the level of fulfilling CSR by listed companies.

This study proposes a novel measure for management’s horizon (short-termism or myopia vs long-termism or hyperopia) derived from easily obtainable firm-level accounting and stock market performance data. The authors use the measure to explore the impact of managements’ horizon on firms’ investment efficiency.

The authors rely on two commonly used but uncorrelated measures of management performance: accounting performance (return on capital employed, ROCE) and stock market performance (average abnormal return, AAR). The authors combine these measures to develop a multidimensional framework for performance, which classifies firms into four groups: efficient (high accounting and high market performance), poor (low accounting and low market performance), myopic (high accounting and low market performance) and hyperopic (low accounting and high market performance). The authors validate this framework and deploy it to explore the relationship between horizon and firms’ investment efficiency.

In validation tests, the authors show that management myopia (hyperopia) explains firms’ decision to cut (grow) research and development investments. Further, as expected, myopic (hyperopic) firms are associated with significantly more (less) accrual and real earnings management. The empirical tests on the link between horizon and investment efficiency suggest that myopic managers cut new investments while their hyperopic counterparts grow the same. Ultimately, the authors find that myopia (hyperopia) exacerbates(mitigates) the over-investment of free cash flow problem.

The authors introduce a framework for assessing management’s horizon using easily obtainable measures of performance. The framework explains inconsistencies in prior empirical research using different measures of performance (accounting versus market). The authors demonstrate its utility by showing that the measure explains decisions around research and development investment, earnings management and firm investments.

Exploiting a novel measure of hostile takeover exposure primarily based on the staggered adoption of state legislations, we explore a crucial, albeit largely overlooked, aspect of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In particular, we investigate CSR inequality, which is the inequality across different CSR categories. Higher inequality suggests a less balanced, more lopsided, CSR policy.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, we perform several robustness checks including propensity score matching, entropy balancing and an instrumental-variable analysis.

Our results show that more takeover exposure exacerbates CSR inequality. Specifically, a rise in takeover vulnerability by one standard deviation results in an increase in CSR inequality by 4.53–5.40%. The findings support the managerial myopia hypothesis, where myopic managers promote some CSR activities that are useful to them in the short run more than others, leading to higher CSR inequality.

Our study is the first to exploit a unique measure of takeover vulnerability to investigate the impact of takeover threats on CSR inequality, which is an important aspect of CSR that is largely overlooked in the literature. We aptly fill this void in the literature.

Taking advantage of a unique measure of corporate culture obtained from advanced machine learning algorithms, this study aims to explore how corporate culture strength is influenced by board independence, which is one of the most crucial aspects of the board of directors. Because of their independence from the corporation, outside independent directors are more likely to be unbiased. As a result, board independence is commonly used as a proxy for board quality.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, the authors execute a variety of additional tests, i.e. propensity score matching, an instrumental variable analysis, Lewbel’s (2012) heteroscedastic identification and Oster’s (2019) testing for coefficient stability.

The results show that stronger board independence, measured by a higher proportion of independent directors, is significantly associated with corporate culture. In particular, a rise in board independence by one standard deviation results in an improvement in corporate culture by 32.8%.

Conducting empirical research on corporate culture is incredibly difficult due to the inherent difficulties in recognizing and assessing corporate culture, resulting in a lack of empirical research on corporate culture in the literature. The authors fill this important void in the literature. Exploiting a novel measure of corporate culture based on textual analysis, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to link corporate culture to corporate governance with a specific focus on board independence.

Digital transformation is essential for commercial banks to maintain long-term competitiveness in the digital economy era. This study aims to investigate the relationship between inside debt and the bank's digital transformation.

This study set up a quasi-natural experiment based on implementing the executive compensation deferral system in the Chinese banking industry. Using the annual panel data of 180 commercial banks in China from 2007 to 2021, this study employed the difference-in-differences (DID) method to conduct an empirical analysis.

This study confirms a significant statistical relationship between inside debt and the bank's digital transformation, and managerial myopia is the transmission channel of inside debt affecting the bank's digital transformation. Furthermore, the development of Internet finance and the enhancement of bankers' confidence will improve the contributions of inside debt to the bank's digital transformation.

This study contributes to the literature on inside debt and the bank's digital transformation. It has specific policy value for the scientific design of the banking compensation mechanism and accelerating banks' digital transformation.

Exploiting a unique measure of hostile takeover exposure principally based on the staggered adoption of state legislations, the authors investigate how external audit quality is influenced by the discipline of the takeover market. External auditors and the takeover market both function as important instruments of external corporate governance.

The authors execute a standard regression analysis and run a variety of robustness checks to minimize endogeneity, namely, propensity score matching (PSM), entropy balancing, an instrumental-variable analysis, Generalized method of moment (GMM) dynamic panel data analysis and Lewbel's (2012) heteroscedastic identification.

The authors’ immense sample spans half a century, encompassing nearly 180,000 observations and 17 takeover-related state legislations, one of the largest samples in the literature in this area. The authors’ results suggest that firms with more takeover exposure are significantly less likely to use Big N auditors. Therefore, a more active takeover market results in poorer external audit quality, corroborating the substitution hypothesis. The discipline of the takeover market substitutes for the necessity for a high-quality external auditor. Specifically, a rise in takeover susceptibility by one standard deviation lowers the probability of using a Big N auditor by 4.29%.

The authors’ study is the first to examine the effect of the takeover over market on audit quality using a novel measure of hostile takeover susceptibility mainly based on the staggered implementation of state legislation. Because the enactment of state legislation is beyond the control of any firm individually, it is plausibly exogenous. The authors’ results therefore probably reflect a causal influence rather than merely a correlation.

There has been a lot of research on how to set marketing budgets, but the overlooked aspect was how allocating funds influences business performance in a multi-goal context. This study aims to examine the relationship between business performance, the process of allocating funds to multiple goals and the interaction among the goals.

Ratio data were generated through “a constant sum scale” from a sample of 362 managers from the B2C sector, besides data on after-tax revenue for two years. The data file was created. Then, a factor analysis was performed on the data. Furthermore, an econometric model with interaction terms was fitted to the data.

The results show that allocating funds to multiple marketing goals – demand generation, customer experience, brand image, marketing competency and purchase intention – influences business performance. Furthermore, a goal’s impact on business performance is higher when coupled with other goals than in isolation.

The findings of the study should assist managers in increasing revenue while spending less on marketing and shifting funds from less efficient goals and pairs of goals to highly efficient ones.

By extending the relevant theory on the relationship between the process of marketing fund allocation, multiple goals and business performance, this study contributes to the literature on marketing.