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Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) every year produces peace setting scores of many countries over the globe. The peace index score (PIS) and its ranking are fabricated by involvement of numerous recognised variables. The internal and external violence factors and their intensity regulate the strength of such scores. The present study deliberates such peace scores and rank of the countries in terms of regional variation and income class specifications. The study uses alteration of rank over three consecutive years and the growth of the PIS to elucidate the disparities over the region and income classification. The study recognised that income classification of countries smoothly elucidates the rank differences in terms of peace scores, but regional variation wise enlightenment remains misnomer. Further, this study contemplates four violence indicators and their growth over three years to describe the non-conformities of peace score between the countries. Studies acknowledged that inter-correlation between the peace growth scores and also between the growth of violence indicators is the significant factor to comprehend the peace score behaviour. Over the years, studies confirm that high-income countries are able to improve their PIS though there has large levels of inconsistency among countries. Among the regional specification, studies perceive that countries around the globe improved their peace score during 2018–2019, rather than 2019–2020.

This research aimed to assess the leadership role of principals in the implementation of peace education in selected secondary schools in the Western Cape, South Africa.

This study employed qualitative research approach to assess the leadership role of principals in the implementation of peace education in selected secondary schools in the Western Cape, South Africa. Data were gathered from a small sample of six principals from six selected secondary schools which were engaged in the implementation of a peace education programme, and data were analysed using thematic content analyses.

Findings of the study suggest that principals possess a low level of understanding or awareness of their leadership role in the implementation of peace education. The study pointed out the constraints such as time constraints and learners' negative attitudes and social influences hinder the effective implementation of peace education in selected secondary schools.

First, the data were self-reported and therefore subject to social desirability bias; participants may have provided socially desirable responses rather than their true belief or experiences. Thus, participants may have overstated their role in and commitment to the peace education programme.

Studies that aim to explore alternative approaches to combat violence, such as peace education, are still limited in South Africa. Hence, this paper served to close that gap by contributing to the growing body of research on the leadership role of the principal in the implementation of peace education in the school and exploring barriers hampering its effective implementation.

Conflicts between herders and farmers in Nigeria in the last five years have been destructive to the corporate existence of Nigerian society and the Nigerian State, especially in Northcentral, Northwestern and Southern Nigeria. This paper aims to investigate the relationships between state responses and peace-building in rural grazing communities in Nigeria using a National Survey on Peace-building in Nigeria conducted by this team using a cross-sectional survey of 1,711 farmers and herders.

The study adopted the political economy of the herder–farmers conflict in Africa to contextualise the problem. Data generated from the study were analysed using chi-square test and binary logistic regression model.

The results showed that protection of victims of herder–farmers conflict (P = 0.024), blockage of sources of illicit weapons (P = 0.000), arrest of leaders (P = 0.043), provision of shelter (P = 0.030), provision of food (P = 0.037), protection of women from sexual exploitation and abuse (P = 0.019) and use of the media were positively related to peace-building in the rural grazing areas. The study further found that when the Federal Government (ß= 0.452, P = 0.018), State Government (ß= 0.522, P = 0.018), private individuals (ß = 0.855, P = 0.000) and cooperative societies (ß = 0.744, P = 0.021) established ranches, peace was likely to be guaranteed as opposed to where herders (ß= –0.355, P= 0.029) were allowed to establish ranches in the rural grazing communities in Nigeria implying that the Federal and State Government must be cautious in the implementation of the Livestock Transformation Plans not to create an impression that it is designed to favour the herders.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is original and the paper has not been submitted to any journal.

The purpose of this study is to explore the understanding and observance of the program “This School is a Zone of Peace” (SZOP) in schools where conflict and violence are not prevalent.

This paper followed a qualitative research tradition – narrative inquiry. Eight teachers and a school head participated in the study. Data were gathered through nonparticipant observation, photography and focus group discussion with photo elicitation.

The participants elucidated the declaration, “This School is a Zone of Peace,” as a message of assurance to the community that the school is a home for learners that is welcoming and violence free. Furthermore, learners in a school that is a zone of peace are honed holistically with the participation, cooperation and togetherness of the school community members. Teachers at the forefront viewed themselves as mentors, implementers and models. Teachers contended that peacebuilding practices in schools could be sustained through regular implementation, encouraging others to get involved and have commitment.

A handful of articles have illustrated the essence of the School as Zone of Peace program, which pointed out to create a culture of peace in schools; however, it leaned toward the negative conception of peace – the absence of conflict and violence. This study bared additional insights and fresh perspectives of the SZOP initiative observed in schools with different contexts and experiences that may be helpful to policymakers for the enhancement of the adapted program with the goal of peacebuilding to making schools highly functional.

The Horn of Africa which has geostrategic importance is endowed with huge natural resources. However, the region is one of the conflict-prone regions in the world. Deficiencies in governance systems, deprivations and poverty, resource-based inter-communal conflicts and unduly interventions of external powers in the internal affairs of the countries have been the main triggers of conflicts. With the persistence of conflicts, the Horn of African countries have remained underdeveloped with poor development outcomes. The conflicts in the region, thus, must be reversed through genuine cooperation among the Horn of African countries. For regional durable peace and sustainable development in the Horn of Africa, the following measures are suggested: (i) Political recommitment and political willingness of leaderships in the Horn of African countries for broader regional cooperation for durable peace and development to address regional challenges jointly. (ii) Promote good governance and democratic principles. (iii) Strengthen regional cooperation among institutions of higher education to facilitate access to global knowledge. (iv) Establishment of regional media that promotes good images of the Horn of Africa. (v) Establishment of Horn of Africa Institute for Peace and Development to cultivate good governance and tolerance. (vi) Provision of civic education at all levels of education to promote understanding among different ethnic groups. (vii) Increase investments to improve the livelihoods of marginalised groups, particularly nomadic communities and unemployed youth. (viii) Refrainment of external powers from meddling in the internal affairs of the Horn of African countries.

What kinds of support do interstate rivals provide to domestic actors in ongoing civil wars? And how do domestic actors utilize the support they receive? This chapter answers these questions by comparing Iranian and Saudi military and non-military (mediation, foreign aid and religious soft-power promotion) support to the Houthis and to the Government of Yemen (GoY) during the Saada wars (2004–2010) and the internationalized civil war (2015–2018). It also focuses on the processes through which the GoY and the Houthis have utilized this support for their own strategic purposes. This chapter applies a structured, focused comparison methodology and relies on data from a review of both primary and secondary sources complemented by 14 interviews. This chapter finds that there were less external interventions in the conflict in Saada than in the internationalized civil war. During the latter, a broader set of intervention strategies enabled further instrumentalization by domestic actors, which in turn contributed to the protracted nature of the conflict. This chapter contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry and third-party intervention. The framework of analysis is applicable to civil wars that experience intervention by rivals, such as Syria or Libya.

This paper aims to examine the association between money laundering (ML)/terrorist financing (TF) risks (hereafter, money laundering risks) and democratic governance across 117 countries.

A cross-sectional design was used to examine the association between ML risks and democratic governance by a quantitative approach. The findings are based on annual ratings of 117 countries on ML/TF risks and democracy while controlling for criminality and peace. The data was compiled from the Basel Anti-Money Laundering/Countering Financing Terrorism Risks Index, the Economic Intelligence Unit (Democracy Index), the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crimes (Criminality Index) and the Institute for Economics and Peace Index for 2020.

A multiple linear regression model found a statistically significant negative association between democratic governance and ML risks (B = −0.354, t = −7.454, p = <0.001) and a significant positive association between criminality and ML risks (B = 0.242, t = 2.692, p = 0.008).

A cross-sectional design cannot determine causal inferences and generalization (Levin, 2006). The study only used a year to examine the hypothesis of a negative correlation between ML risks and democratic governance, thus making generalization difficult.

Extant literature examined ML, terrorism and AML diversely. There was a need to estimate the association between ML risks and democratic governance, especially globally, during a global crisis like COVID-19, when democratic principles, such as the rule of law, transparency and accountability, are challenged. Many personnel were laid off, thus limiting supervision for ML and TF. This study presents evidence of this association.