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Donald Trump portrayed himself as a crusader against corrupt elites, claiming he would “drain the swamp.” Corporate elites generally depicted themselves as either trying to work with him or as directly opposed to him. Yet a closer analysis of Trump's policies and their outcomes in key issue areas, from taxes to immigration to the environment, shows continuity with previous pro-corporate policies. Furthermore, by positioning Trump as opposed to the elite, Trump and commentators on his presidency created a “radical flank” effect that made status quo, pro-corporate policies appear as progressive victories. This analysis suggests that a focus on the personal characteristics of politicians is misleading, and that the focus of political discourse needs to be on the power structure that shapes policy outcomes.

The chapter examines whether the lowering of dividend taxes as part of the US Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) resulted in an increase in dividend payouts at the expense of research and development (R&D) spending. Using 1,206 US firm-years data, we find that R&D investments responded negatively to higher levels of dividend payout in the post-JGTRRA of 2003 tax regime compared with the pre-regime. We also find that R&D intensity and financial constraint moderate this negative relation. That is, this relation only holds for firms in low R&D-intensity industries and firms facing high levels of financial constraint. From a tax policy perspective, even though the tax cut on dividend receipts has the benefit of lowering the cost of equity capital, the benefit appears to have come at the expense of R&D investment.

I trace and explain how the ratcheting of corporate mergers and deregulation transformed the structure of elite relations in the United States from 1960 to 2010. Prior to the 1970s there was a high degree of elite unity and consensus, enforced by Federal regulation and molded by structure of U.S. government, around a set of policies and practices: interventionism abroad, progressive tax rates, heavy state investment in infrastructure and education, and a rising level of social spending. I find that economic decline, the loss of geopolitical hegemony, and mobilization from the left and right are unable to account for the specific policies that both Democratic and Republican Administrations furthered since the 1970s or for the uneven decline in state capacity that were intended and unintended consequences of the post-1960s political realignment and policy changes. Instead, the realignment and restructuring of elites and classes that first transformed politics and degraded government in the 1970s in turn made possible further shifts in the capacities of American political actors in both the state and civil society. I explain how that process operated and how it produced specific policy outcomes and created new limits on mass political mobilization while creating opportunities for autarkic elites to appropriate state powers and resources for themselves.

It is important to consider economic and political factors when designing the tax mix and setting the level of corporate taxation. Increasing corporate taxation can be seen as an inefficient way to raise revenue for the state, as it can have a negative impact on investment and the competitiveness of firms. However, lowering corporate taxation can encourage investment and job creation, but it can also be perceived as supporting large corporations. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate corporate taxation, its position in the tax mix and its potential impact on economic growth. The revenues of corporate income tax (CIT) have an increasing tendency even though the tax rate was reduced from 41% to 19%. Revenues are influenced by both legislative changes and economic cycles. The level of taxation is also influenced by deductions, which include asset depreciations, research and development expenses, or loss deductions. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient was used to examine the correlation between the selected factors. A moderately strong positive correlation was found between GDP growth and CIT as a percentage of total taxes, as well as between GDP growth and CIT as a percentage of GDP.

This chapter investigates whether and to what extent tax benefits affect the likelihood of firms undertaking leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions.

With an identified sample of LBO firms and similar non-LBO counterparts, this chapter utilizes staggered changes in state corporate income tax rates as exogenous shocks and adopts a Logistic regression to analyze how these tax changes affect firms' probability of engaging in LBOs.

Firms are more likely to engage in LBOs after increases in corporate income tax rates. Specifically, the increase in the likelihood of firms undertaking LBOs following tax increases is between 6.9% and 12.9%. We also find that this positive relation is more pronounced for firms with higher levels of return on assets (ROA) and marginal tax rates (MTR). Finally, we report that the mean value of tax benefits accounts for between 28.5% and 170% of the premium paid to pre-buyout shareholders.

This chapter provides strong evidence that tax benefits constitute an important source of value creation in LBOs and adds to the debate regarding the role of tax benefits in LBOs.

Purpose: In reality, financial decisions are made under conditions of asymmetric information that results in either favorable or adverse selection. As far as financial decisions affect growth of the firm, the latter must also be affected by either favorable or adverse selection. Therefore, the core objective of this chapter is to examine the determinants of each financial decision and the effects on growth of the firm under conditions of information asymmetry.

Design/Methodology/Approach: This chapter uses data for the non-financial firms listed in S&P 500. The data cover quarterly periods from 1989 to 2014. The statistical tests include linearity, fixed, and random effects and normality. The generalized method of moments estimation method is employed in order to examine the relative significance and contribution of each financial decision on growth of the firm, respectively. Standard and proposed proxies of information asymmetry are discussed.

Findings: The results conclude that there is a variation in the impact of financial variables on growth of the firm at high and low levels of information asymmetry especially regarding investment and financing decisions. A similar picture emerges in the cases of firm size and industry effects. In addition, corporate dividen d policy has a similar effect on firm growth across all asymmetric levels. These findings prove that information asymmetry plays a vital role in the relationship between corporate financial decisions and growth of the firm. Finally, the results contribute to the vast literature on the estimation of information asymmetry by demonstrating that the classical and standard proxies for information asymmetry are not consistent in terms of the ability to differentiate between favorable or adverse selection (which corresponds to low and high level of information asymmetry).

Originality/Value: This chapter contributes to the related literature in two ways. First, this chapter offers updated empirical evidence on the way that financing, investment, and dividends decisions are made under conditions of favorable and adverse selection. Other related studies deal with each decision separately. Second, the study offers new proxies for measuring information asymmetry in order to reach robust estimates of the effects of financial decisions on growth of the firm under conditions of agency problems.

The over 125-year-old economic miracle called the Corporation is suddenly shaken in its foundations. The corporate business world is rapidly changing not only in the USA, but also across the globe. The front covers of business magazines and dailies, once dominated by names and faces of “Corporate Giants,” are now being replaced with success stories of great startups and small business entrepreneurs. The reasons for these radical changes progressively reveal the imperfections existing in the current corporation and the business boardroom paradigm. For over a century, huge corporate entities spawned by capitalism have established and entrenched themselves in their respective industry arenas and have since been ruling the world, dominating money, capital, cash, and market opportunity. Once they provided solutions to people’s employment and career needs, they have made a fortune for themselves thereby. In the course of their evolution, the businesses have transformed into corporations, seeking people’s money for doing business and, in turn, giving a share of proportionate ownership to the investor people in the form of dividends and capital gains. Such a brilliant method of raising capital has empowered the corporations to grow and expand beyond physical and political boundaries. Today, however, the corporations are run by the BOD, most of whom are representing gigantic promoter-investor institutions. That is, the main administrative role is now replaced by private equity firms and hedge funds that provide the required capital but who also exert undue pressures on CEOs to focus on short-term strategies that have massive profitability potential, thus defying the usual business management model and paradigm the CEOs were trained for in B-schools. The massive CEO exodus that has migrated from the traditional corporations to newly created startups and smaller business entrepreneurial ventures has also made the corporation an endangered species. In such a market turbulence, how do we redefine, redesign, and reinvent the morally embattled corporation? This chapter explores solutions.

Most US activists place a high priority on elections. The default strategy for those seeking policy change is some combination of electoral campaigning and pressure campaigns targeting politicians. Yet policies show a high degree of continuity across recent presidential administrations. Despite substantial differences in rhetoric and legislative agendas, the policies resulting from Republican and Democratic presidencies have stayed within a narrow range, defined by the promotion of corporate profits, the impunity of law enforcement agencies, the defense of imperial prerogatives, and nearly unfettered ecological destruction. Focusing on the Trump and Biden presidencies, I analyze some of the structural barriers that inhibit major policy change. I also explore why the ruling class as a whole has not yet united against parasitic industries like fossil fuels and pharmaceuticals that endanger the interests of other capitalists. I argue that activists must move beyond electoral and legislative approaches by directly disrupting ruling-class interests that have the power to change policy. Only then will we win major progressive reform.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR)¹ has become such an important and popular concept along with the rise of the importance of sustainable development (SD) in the world. Nowadays, CSR is focused on goals such as poverty reduction and SD. It has become clear to the business world that SD is no longer only the concern of governments and related non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and that they should also immediately start becoming concerned about the sustainability of resources and human development along with their financial sustainability. In this sense, establishment of multi-stakeholder dialogues and partnerships among all these actors has also become extremely important.

Labor unions play a key role in combating inequality. Recent research focuses on unions' ability to shape “moral economies” that make greater inequality socially inappropriate. But this research largely hypothesizes moral economy pathways for combating inequality, rather than showing them in action. Through a case study of the 2018 teachers' strike wave, we identify mechanisms that allow unions to shape moral economies. Based on analysis of in-depth interviews with key strike leaders, social media discussion groups, and contemporaneous media coverage, we find that the interaction of sustained mass disruption and worker–organizer intervention were the key mechanisms that allowed the teachers and their unions to reshape moral economies. Externally, the strikes created a social and political crisis to which political elites had to respond, while tying the teachers' struggles to broader community issues, galvanizing public support for the strikes. As disruptions escalated, the teachers' experience of collective action created a positive feedback effect, reshaping workers' understanding of what they wanted, what they deserved, and what they could win. The 2018 teachers' strike is analytically useful because it managed to reshape norms and expectations around educational and economic inequality rapidly, on a large scale.