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This chapter investigates whether and to what extent tax benefits affect the likelihood of firms undertaking leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions.

With an identified sample of LBO firms and similar non-LBO counterparts, this chapter utilizes staggered changes in state corporate income tax rates as exogenous shocks and adopts a Logistic regression to analyze how these tax changes affect firms' probability of engaging in LBOs.

Firms are more likely to engage in LBOs after increases in corporate income tax rates. Specifically, the increase in the likelihood of firms undertaking LBOs following tax increases is between 6.9% and 12.9%. We also find that this positive relation is more pronounced for firms with higher levels of return on assets (ROA) and marginal tax rates (MTR). Finally, we report that the mean value of tax benefits accounts for between 28.5% and 170% of the premium paid to pre-buyout shareholders.

This chapter provides strong evidence that tax benefits constitute an important source of value creation in LBOs and adds to the debate regarding the role of tax benefits in LBOs.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the informational asymmetry (informational advantage of managers) in leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions.

Unlike previous studies of informational asymmetry in LBOs, this research uses a set of reverse‐LBO and re‐LBO firms. The paper proposes and empirically tests three hypotheses that draw on the informational advantage of managers in LBOs. Specifically, the value gain (VG) realized by the reverse‐LBO firms is compared with that realized by a control sample of firms; the wealth distribution between managers and pre‐buyout shareholders is studied; and, finally, the performance of re‐LBO firms relative to reverse‐LBO firms is evaluated.

The results do not support the view that managers use buyouts to exploit their informational advantage. Specifically; the performance of LBO firms under the private ownership is comparable to those of matching public firms; the management team's return in a LBO deal is not significantly more than pre‐buyout shareholders’ return; and repeating reverse‐LBO firms (re‐LBOs) do not necessarily perform better than the non‐repeating reverse‐LBO firms.

While reverse‐LBOs have been investigated to some extent in the prior literature, studies on re‐LBOs are quite scant – although these transactions offer a new and interesting avenue to examine the motivations behind LBOs in general. The use of the entire LBO − reverse‐LBO − re‐LBO cycle in testing the informational advantage of managers is a novelty. It is hoped that re‐LBOs will attract the amount of attention they deserve as these firms may offer interesting means to reinvestigate commonly debated theories of corporate finance.

This study aims to examine the governance structure of the firm undergoing a complete buyout cycle (reverse leveraged buyout). Its purpose is to empirically explore the evolution of corporate board structures as a unique source of value creation, in addition to the agency mechanisms of the discipline of debt and incentives of equity participation.

The authors rely on agency theory and the resource dependence perspective to develop sets of hypotheses that examine changes in the board composition of 65 R‐LBOs and 65 matched continuing firms spanning a 25‐year period (1979‐2004).

The empirical results reveal numerous insights about why R‐LBOs go private, to what extent boards restructure during the buyout phase, and how those changes relate to firm performance. Taken together, the findings give strong credence to the argument that boards represent a supplemental source of value creation in the buyout process.

For scholars, the study presents a platform for further inquiry into the role of boards of directors in R‐LBOs as well as the inclusion of resource dependence theory to inform on the phenomenon.

The study helps to address this new source of value creation for practical interest. It offers a benchmark for buyout firms to compare their board characteristics by establishing linkages between pre‐buyout deficiencies, post‐buyout modifications, and post‐SIPO performance.

The results shift scholarly attention away from the structural governance tools to the group dynamics of the board. The findings call into question the restricted attention given by buyout researchers to leverage and ownership as value drivers by prompting a closer evaluation of the relationship between buyout board structures and related structuring of debt and managerial equity participation. Furthermore, the inclusion of the resource‐dependency perspective alongside agency theory as an explanatory theory allows for a richer account of the LBO phenomenon and its sources of value creation.

The tax advantage of debt is considered an important motivation for highly leveraged transactions. The German government limited the tax deductibility of interest expenses to 30.0 percent of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (the interest barrier rule) in 2008 to reduce the tax incentives for debt financing. This study aims to evaluate the impact of the introduction of the interest barrier rule.

The paper analyzes the changes in the value of the tax shield for German leveraged buyouts as a result of the promulgation of an interest barrier rule. Tax shields are computed to quantify the wealth transfer from taxpayers to corporations.

Prior to the 2008 tax reform, tax shields contributed 8.4 percent to the transaction price, thereby raising the equity value by 33.0 percent on average. With the introduction of the interest barrier rule, the value of tax shields is reduced by 35.1 percent. Affecting more than 75 percent of buyouts, the rule significantly lessens the tax incentive for high levels of debt. The reduction of the corporate tax rate from 31.7 percent to 26.3 percent further lowers the value creation potential. The limited interest deductibility may therefore reduce the number of leveraged buyouts and hence economic growth, unless other non‐debt forms of financing can fulfill the need for capital.

As the first continental European study, this research concentrates on the impact of the German interest barrier rule on value creation in highly leveraged transactions. Conclusions can be drawn in a broader European context.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the governance structures of two distinctive governance forms: the family firm and the leveraged buyout (LBO). The paper also explores the relative performance of these two organizational forms over the course of the economic business cycle.

The paper provides a theoretical treatment of the family firm and the LBO using the stewardship perspective and agency theory. The analysis anticipates the board structure for each organizational form and relates family firm and LBO governance to performance over the business cycle.

From a conceptual treatment, the family‐owned concern exhibits board characteristics reflecting the longer‐term orientation of the firm, with boards empowered to include non‐economic, as well as economic, goals. LBOs are structured to maximize shareholder value over a shorter time horizon. LBOs may take advantage of expansionary environments whereas family firms may be better prepared for economic down‐cycles.

The paper takes a holistic approach to contrasting two organizational forms that fit their respective theoretical frames and compares some of their more salient governance characteristics and performance over the business cycle.

Managers and boards can structure governance to manage the business cycle. Stakeholders can selectively engage firms that portray vital governance characteristics for their benefit and may also pressure boards and top management to make necessary governance improvements.

The paper offers an introductory comparison between family firms and LBOs in terms of governance and managing the firm over the business cycle. This paper makes the case that some organizational forms are better suited to certain types of economic climates.

Seeks to investigate whether the financial characteristics of leveraged buy‐out (LBO) targets differ from those of firms that have not undergone an LBO before the deal. Specifically, to examine the free cash flows (FCFs), income taxes, capital intensity, business risk, profitability, financial structure and asset characteristics of 175 French LBO targets that are mainly privately held and rather small companies, between 1996 and 2002.

Predictions derive from the FCF and the tax savings hypotheses, and from the criteria used by LBO firms in their acquisition rationale. Tests were conducted of differences between LBO targets and control companies and logit regressions run.

Results show that LBO targets are less indebted, have more liquid (financial) assets, and exhibit higher business risk than their industry counterparts. A distinction between LOBs according to the vendor type shows that independent companies are smaller, more profitable, and have higher tax income levels, whereas former subsidiaries or divisions of groups are less profitable, and have more financial assets than their industry counterparts. Logit regressions suggest that LBOs of smaller independent targets that LBOs of smaller independent targets fit fiscal and succession motives, whereas LBOs of former subsidiaries address management issues.

The likelihood of an LBO is related to accounting ratios only. Further research could include other financial or strategic variables in the models.

The unexpected risky profile of targets has implications for LBO firms.

A new result is the risky profile of LBO targets prior to the deal. This could help to explain the underperformance puzzle after the deal already emphasized on the French market.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the research on private equity by studying the drivers of leveraged buyout (LBO) operating performance in Latin America. The authors consider a large set of candidate drivers (financial, governance, macroeconomic and industry variables) and study their effects on performance over short- and long-terms.

To conduct this study, the authors used Capital IQ as a database as well as a hand-collected data set covering LBO in Latin America from 2000 to 2008.

The empirical results show that macroeconomic variables have an important impact on LBO value creation. Governance variables show also that LBO transactions reduce information asymmetries between existing and new management teams. Consequently, a concentrated shareholder structure has a better impact on performance than diluted stockholders. Financial variables present significant effects after the delisting.

The characteristics of the debts included in the balance sheets (maturity for example) are not available in the authors' data basis. A test including this information could bring other elements of explanation. The measure of cumulative abnormal returns around going-private announcements and their impacts on shareholder’s value could also be of interest. This last study has been published for the UK (Wright et al., 2006). Further research should introduce other continents and particularly Asia in the analysis but also comparisons between the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS) countries.

This study makes five main contributions. First, the authors construct an LBO sample with emerging markets and specially Latin America. It is the first time that an academic article has been realized. Data are very difficult to obtain to do empirical tests. Latin America is a part of emerging markets, which is an interesting study subject due to their attractiveness in terms of growth of private equity funds. Second, to understand clearly how LBOs create value, the authors construct a sample control to highlight the key factors. Criteria of size, sector of activity and Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes were strictly enforced. Third, the authors do not focus on the moment where the transaction is realized like many studies but before and after the delisting. Indeed, they observed, on the one hand, the operating performance between year −1 and year +1 and, on the other hand, the operating performance between year −1 and year +3. Generally, only the market reaction around the acquisition announcement is examined. Post-performance is not considered due to lack of data. Fourth, the authors take into account the macroeconomic effects on performance of LBOs. It is the first examination of the impact of macroeconomic factors on performance of LBOs in Latin America. And fifth, they analyze the impact of going-private decisions on employees.

The purpose of the study is to explore the board of directors in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) as a distinct source of value creation and to conceptually investigate the going‐private transaction via LBO as a response to deficient governance structures as well as the post‐buyout board restructuring.

The paper provides a review of the literature on LBOs boards, and relies on agency theory and the resource dependence perspective to develop testable propositions. The work suggests that the board as a particular source of efficiency gains in LBOs warrants further empirical research.

The paper gives strong credence to the argument that boards represent a unique source of value creation in LBOs. Previous agency‐theoretic work is complemented by focusing on the monitoring function of the board, but resource dependence theory introduced to suggest the importance of a strategic service and support function. The work is conceptual in nature and thus requires subsequent empirical testing to verify assertions set forth in this study.

The paper shows that incentives of managerial equity participation and the discipline of debt are gradually losing their distinctiveness in today's buyout industry. To compete in an increasingly crowded environment, LBO specialists need to identify new sources of value to generate attractive returns for their investors.

The paper extends the existing LBO literature by introducing resource dependent as a complementary framework. Given that the traditional LBO literature examines the discipline of debt and managerial ownership that explain their efficiencies, the role of LBO boards as a distinct value creation mechanism in buyouts is introduced.

In the next five years, there will be a shortage of divestiture candidates qualified for leveraged buyouts relative to the number of interested buyers and the available supply of financing. Corporations will, therefore, be well positioned to negotiate favorable terms of sale for qualified divesture candidates using this technique.

This paper reviews economic studies on the effects of various aspects of finance on labour market outcomes.

The paper is a systematic literature review that reviews the weight of the evidence on the relationships between specific elements of finance and labour outcomes. The review is divided into three major sections: (1) job quantity and job quality; (2) distributional effects; and (3) resilience and adaptability.

Finance interacts with labour market institutions to jointly determine labour outcomes. Firm financial structures influence their labour practices – highly leveraged firms show greater employment volatility during cyclical fluctuations, and leverage strengthens firm bargaining power in labour negotiations. Bank deregulation has mixed impacts on labour depending upon the state of prior bank regulations and labour markets. Leveraged buyouts tend to dampen acquired-firm job growth as they pursue labour productivity gains. The shareholder value movement may contribute to short-termism among corporate managers, which can divert funds away from firm capital accumulation toward financial markets, and crowd out productive investment. Declining wage shares of national income in most OECD countries since 1990 may be driven in part by financial globalisation. The financial sector contributes to rising income concentration near the top of the distribution in developed countries. The availability of finance is associated with increased reallocation of labour, which may either enhance or impede productivity growth. Finally, rising interest rate environments and homeowners with mortgage balances that exceed their home's value may reduce labour mobility rates.

This review contributes to the understanding of the effects of finance on labour by reviewing and synthesising a large volume of literature.