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This paper aims to examine whether the money laundering/terrorist financing (ML/TF) model excludes important aspects of terrorist resourcing and whether the terrorist resourcing model (TRM) provides a more comprehensive framework for analysis.

Research consisted of case studies of resourcing activities of four listed terrorist organizations between 2001 and 2015: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hamas, a grouping of Al Qaeda-inspired individuals and entities under the heading “Al Qaeda inspired” and Hezbollah.

The most prevalent resourcing actors observed were non-profit organizations/associations, and the most prevalent form of resourcing was fundraising that targeted individual cash donations of small amounts. Funds were pooled, often passed through layers of charitable organizations and transmitted through chartered banks. The TRM is indeed found to provide a more comprehensive framework for identifying sources of resourcing and points of intervention. However, it does not in itself recommend effective means of response but it has implications for counter-resourcing strategies because it identifies resourcing actors and nodes where counter-resourcing could occur.

This paper advances the state of knowledge of terrorist resourcing activities in Canada and about the value of doing so through the analytical lens of the TRM as opposed to the predominant ML/TF model.

This paper aims to examine whether from a factual standpoint, it is sufficiently reasonable to address the suppression of terrorist financing by analogy with money laundering.

The process of terrorist financing will be examined in regard to the funding requirements of terrorists and the methods and tools that terrorists use to raise, move and store their funds. The process of money laundering will be compared with terrorist financing. The role of money laundering in terrorist financing will be discussed. In the core part of this paper, the assumptions justifying the inclusion of anti-money laundering measures to terrorist financing will be challenged.

What terrorist financing and money laundering share in common is money. However, there are fundamental differences between them with regard to the sources of funds and the direction of financial flows. None of the elements –“accumulation” and “legitimization”– involved in money laundering are necessarily engaged in the process of terrorist financing. This questions the authenticity of the assumptions which underlie the adopted approach. It also requires further investigation on the effectiveness of the integrated counter-terrorist regime, which will not be covered by this paper.

This paper provides a comprehensive introduction for those dealing with the greater question of whether the terrorist financing can and should be tackled by anti-money laundering measures.

Traditionally, terrorism risk has been priced based exclusively on the relationship between supply and demand in the insurance market, with no basis in actuarial principles. This article discusses how the tragic events of September 11, 2001, have irrevocably changed the market for terrorism insurance, since terrorism has become a U.S. catastrophe risk. The author states that since insurers seek to quantify risk distributed over several months (versus a period of only a few days), quantitative assessment of terrorism risk may be achievable. The article proceeds to address the challenge of quantifying terrorism risk, and ultimately suggests that developing quantitative terrorism risk models may provide a foundation for securitizing and trading terrorism risk. The author introduces three examples of potential alternative risk transfer instruments for terrorism risk: 1) a catastrophe bond triggered by workers' compensation claims from extreme terrorism‐related events; 2) a catastrophe bond to cover life insurers from losses related to an attack employing a weapon of mass destruction; and 3) a contingent financing instrument triggered by a terrorism event whose natural buyers are financial short‐sellers.

As part of a larger global phenomenon, the election of Donald Trump in the USA represents a crucial moment for the (re)conceptualization of digital literacies. The purpose of this paper is to build theory with respect to what this moment means for English education.

This teacher reflection focuses on what digital literacies meant for my teaching before and after the 2016 election. Using a before-and-after format, I argue that the before conceptualization of digital literacies, while still relevant and useful for introducing many important ideas to English educators, was missing a direct treatment of political power. The after conceptualization takes up this topic.

Themes taken up in the before section involve a parallel between digital literacies and disciplinary literacies and a distinction between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 interfaces. Themes in the after section address the propensity for governments and other well-resourced groups to occupy Web 2.0 environments for their own ends. Methods for accomplishing these ends involve restricting, surveilling and targeting flows of information and enacting three populist practices via internet trolling: aggregating the unmet demands of disparate groups, establishing popular subjectivity and dichotomizing the social space through the persistent construction of the enemy.

A critically conscious approach to digital literacies must consider the ways in which political entities occupy digital environments.

Further research should be done in English education classrooms to understand the ways in which individual online meaning making becomes entangled within a nexus of political activity. Further research should investigate how online meaning making intersects with political power.

The role of political entities is often downplayed or ignored in discussions of digital literacies. In an age of alternative facts, fake news and echo chambers, it is important to foreground the interplay between the social, the political and the digital in contemporary meaning making. This contribution offers concepts that can be taken up and expanded, as well as a set of questions for English educators to use in framing a critically conscious conversation about digital literacies.

The purpose of this paper is to re‐discover the nature of the crime of terrorist financing in order to challenge the assumption which requires the criminalization of terrorist financing as a predicate crime to money laundering.

Illustrating the nature of the crime of terrorist financing and money laundering, the necessity of the criminalization of terrorist financing as an inchoate crime in accordance with the principles of Islamic criminal law will be examined.

While the criminalization of money laundering in Islam is based on the illegality of crimes already happened, impermissibility of terrorist financing needs to be forward‐looking, concentrating on the destination of the crime of terrorist financing. This requires criminalization of terrorist financing as an inchoate offence which is compatible with the principles of Islamic criminal law.

The paper provides new insight into the criminalization of terrorist financing.

This study aims to explain how cryptocurrency is leveraged for illicit purposes across the global financial system. Specifically, it establishes how cryptocurrency has been changing the nature of transnational and domestic money laundering (ML). It then assesses the effectiveness of conventional anti-money laundering (AML) policy and legislation against the proliferation of crypto laundering, using Canada as a critical case study.

Data was collected from court cases and secondary sources to build cross-case trends of cryptocurrency use in ML. Illicit International Political Economy forms the theoretical foundation for this study, whose contribution is situated in the current literature on crypto-ML.

This study finds that Bitcoin is common among crypto-money launderers, though most also use some form of alt-coin, and that the use of third-party currency exchanges is a prevalent method to create illicit funds and conceal proceeds of crime. The findings validate two hypotheses that illicit use of crypto is prevalent in the first two stages of ML, and that crypto is most often used in conjunction with other fiat currencies. Although law enforcement is improving on monitoring and understanding popular cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, alt-coins pose a significant challenge for criminal intelligence. New regulations for third-party currency exchanges are having a positive impact on curtailing crypto-laundering but are shown to be insufficient per se to contain the use of crypto in criminal activity.

This study contributes to a more robust understanding of the use of virtual currency in transnational and domestic ML. It contributes to an emerging body of literature on the role of technological change in enabling the global flow of illicit funds. It also informs public policy on virtual currency in general, and on AML regulation in Canada in particular.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a low-cost, high return model for implementing a programmatic foresight function that is collaboratively integrated with the organization’s existing policy, planning and intelligence (or policy research) functions. Focusing on government agencies, especially those supporting liberal democratic governments, the purpose of the current paper is to propose a new, practical, low-cost and high-return model for implementing a programmatic strategic foresight function that is collaboratively integrated with the organization’s existing policy, planning and intelligence functions. The paper describes the relevant organizational considerations and options for structural adjustments, and suggests how the proposed model can maximize decision-making effectiveness without disrupting pre-existing structures, operations and products. The paper further discusses the necessity and involvement of a central government foresight agency and a non-hierarchical distributed network linking the foresight units.

Possible solutions are considered with respect to costs of development and implementation, risk (likelihood, consequence and uncertainty) of the new function’s failure, direct negative or positive effect on the performance of existing functions, the level of cross-organizational involvement in or collaboration with the new function, the level of cross-organization tangible benefits and the level of vertical involvement, especially at the executive level.

With few exceptions, the implementation of foresight by governments has not been at all methodical, but has followed many different paths, where it has occurred at all. The approach proposed in this paper – establishing a central foresight agency, propagating individual agency-based small programmatic foresight units and virtual teams and creating a non-hierarchical distributed network to link all of them – appears to best meet the success criteria set out in the paper.

Governments, especially liberal democratic ones, and their agencies that have previously shied away from methodically implementing strategic foresight or that have attempted to do so without real success now have an approach that is likely to produce the desired results.

The paper creates a sound framework for governments, especially liberal democratic ones, and their agencies to consider and proceed with the implementation of foresight functions and networks to support them.

The proposed approach is entirely new and generally challenges current practices.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the public relations strategies of the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and their political wing Sinn Féin, throughout the historical period known as the Northern Ireland “Troubles”.

This study uses semi‐structured élite interviews as its primary data. The study structures a historical account of the development of republican public relations around three main phases: the “propaganda of the deed” phase; the development of political public relations phase; and the peace process phase.

Much previous research traces a common trajectory for terrorist organisations, where they begin with large‐scale “propaganda of the deed” activities, and then move toward more typical PR activities when their “message” begins to be heard. The findings suggest that this is only partially true for the republican movement. Previous research also claims that peace settlements virtually never acknowledge the demands of terrorist groups. However, the findings indicate that the republican movement, via the use of skilful public relations techniques and disciplined internal organisational communication, pushed itself to the forefront and remained central in the efforts to develop a peace process.

The study draws on interview data with a small group (six) of republican strategists, all of whom where involved in some capacity in public relations activities. While it is not claimed that they represent the views of the whole republican movement on the issues discussed, they do arguably represent the views of a “dominant coalition”. Future research could usefully investigate the public relations of power sharing since the Good Friday Agreement.

Previous approaches to analysing the subject of public relations and terrorism have tended to regard it as an activity engaged in by psychopaths or criminals. This paper's starting‐point is to problematise this definition of “terrorism” and at the same time widen the application of the term to include State actors. In this regard, it is in opposition to much current Western media, governmental and academic usage of the term. This research also differs from most other studies of terrorism in the public relations literature, in that it uses élite interviews as its primary source of data.

Designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) are important actors both in the formal and informal sectors owing to the nature of services they offer. The DNFBPs are key players in financial and economic development and thus are highly vulnerable to money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks. Globally, and indeed, within the West African region, typologies studies have indicated several instances of misuse of DNFBPs for the laundering of proceeds of crime and to a lesser extent, TF. Factors that make DNFBPs vulnerable to ML and TF in the region, include limited understanding of ML/TF risk and anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations, and poor implementation of AML/CFT measures by the sector. As reporting institutions, DNFBPs are required to implement appropriate measures to mitigate the ML/TF risk facing them. Mutual evaluation reports (MERs) of countries in the region noted weak implementation of AML/CFT measures by DNFBPs compares to financial institutions. These coupled with the general poor monitoring and supervision of DNFBPs for compliance, make them a weak link in member states’ AML/CFT regime. This study examined how Economic Community of West African States member states can plug the loopholes in the DNFBPs to strengthen their AML/CFT regime and thus improve their performance during mutual evaluation. This study reviewed data from the publications of Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and other credible sources.

This study is more of desk-review based on secondary data, including information obtained from GIABA, and FATF publications, and websites as well as information obtained from reliable sources on the internet. The authors reviewed the MERs of GIABA member states that have been assessed under the second round, especially that of Ghana, Senegal, Cape Verde, Mali and Burkina Faso, with particular focus on sections of the reports relating to preventive measures and supervision. In general, this paper adopts a policy approach with a view to explaining the importance and benefits of implementing AML/CFT preventive measures by reporting entities, especially the DNFBPs.

This study found that there is a general lack of information on the exact size of DNFBPs across member states, the risk of ML/TF associated with DNFBPs is generally identified as high across member states (albeit at different levels), the extent and level of monitoring/supervision of DNFBPs for AML/CFT compliance trails what is obtainable in financial institutions; the institutional and operational frameworks for regulating, supervising and monitoring DNFBPs are either weak or poorly defined in many member states; and the focus of AML/CFT technical assistance has been more on financial institutions than DNFBPs. Although the number of MERs reviewed for this work may be few, the findings and conclusions in the concluded MERs reflect regional peculiarities, including high informality of the economies, preponderance use of cash in transactions, diversity of DNFBPs and the general weak application of AML/CFT preventive measures by these entities, and the weak AML/CFT supervision or monitoring of DNFBPs which cut across all GIABA member states. Although efforts to address the weaknesses in the DNFBPs, including training and supervision, have commenced, in most member states, these are still at rudimentary levels.

However, this study is limited by the fact that it was desk-based review without direct inputs of industry players (DNFBPs and their supervisors).

In general, this paper adopts a policy approach with a view to explaining the importance and benefits of implementing AML/CFT preventive measures by reporting entities, especially the DNFBPs. It aims to bring to the fore the weaknesses of the DNFBPs in the implementation of AML/CFT preventive measures and therefore will be useful to national authorities who are striving toward strengthening their national AML/CT regimes and to DNFBPs who wish to protect the integrity and stability of their system.

It is imperative to mention that the weak compliance by DNFBPs, and indeed other challenges inhibiting effective implementation of preventive measures, is not peculiar to West Africa. A review of MERs of 17 African countries (eight countries in the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti Money Laundering Group region, five in GIABA region and three in the Middle East and North Africa region assessed under the current round as on October 2020, show a similar pattern of weak ratings under Immediate Outcome 4.

The purpose of this paper is to research the relationship between terrorism and multinational enterprises (MNEs), focusing on operational costs, marketing planning, supply chain management, and distribution activities. Terrorism is a growing threat to internationally active firms, but there has been no empirical research to address the distinctive challenges that terrorism poses for the international marketing activities of firms.

The paper opted for an exploratory investigation, following a two-phase research design. In the first phase it was based on qualitative interviews with internationally active firms. In the second phase, an online survey of a large sample of international firms based in the USA was performed. All measures were developed specifically for the study.

The paper provides empirical insights about how terrorism affects MNEs, especially those operating in emerging markets. It suggests that terrorism accounts for significant costs in the international marketing budget of MNEs, as well as in planning, and the design of supply chains and distribution channels. Findings also reveal that firms with significant resources and international experience appear to cope better with terrorism’s effects.

Given the early stage of empirical research on terrorism and international marketing, this study was necessarily exploratory.

The paper includes implications and suggestions for multinational companies to increase the security of their businesses through the development of corporate preparedness.

Terrorism represents not only an organizational crisis at the level of a firm, but it affects the whole society.

This paper fulfills an identified need to study the relationship between the growing threat of terrorism and international business.