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This paper aims to investigate how user expectations affect value-added service (VAS) investment and pricing decisions of two-sided platforms. It draws on the information asymmetry theory and offers suggestions on how platform operators can manage user expectations.

According to the game theory, this study considers three user expectations (responsive, passive and wary). By framing the Hotelling duopoly model and comparing the VAS investment, price and platform profits, the optimal platform decision is analyzed and discussed.

The conclusions demonstrate that the monopolistic two-sided platform obtains more profits from the informed users with responsive expectations than uninformed users with passive or wary expectations. The marginal investment cost and cross-network externalities are two key factors that determine the platform's VAS investment and pricing strategies of passive or wary users. Furthermore, considering the expectation preferences, i.e. the uniformed users hold wary expectations with more information and hold passive expectations with less or no information, the results suggest that the proportion of wary users to all uninformed users increases the platform's VAS investment, profits and the price of informed users, and increase (decrease) the price of uninformed users when the cross-network externalities of informed users are relatively small (larger).

These results can provide insightful enlightenment into how platform operators utilize bilateral users' expectations and information level to guide their VAS investment and pricing decisions.

This paper is one of the first to explore the impact of three user expectations and the heterogeneity of preferences in informing users' passive or wary expectations, based on different levels of information on the decision-making of two-sided platforms regarding VAS.

The search of the optimal economic design of the Bayesian adaptive control charts for finite production runs can be a long and tedious procedure due to the intrinsic structure of the optimization problem, which requires a dynamic programming approach to select the best decision at each sampling epoch during the production horizon of the process. This paper aims to propose a new efficient procedure implementing a genetic algorithm neighbourhood search scheme embedded within the dynamic programming procedure with the aim of reducing the computational burden and achieving significant cost savings in the chart implementation.

The efficiency of the developed procedure has been verified through a comparison with another existing exhaustive approach working exclusively on one‐sided X¯ Bayesian control charts; then, it has been extended to the design of two‐sided Bayesian control charts.

The proposed procedure implementing the genetic algorithm neighbourhood search is very fast and efficient in detecting optimal solutions: it allows significant quality control cost savings to be achieved during the Bayesian charts implementation thanks to the possibility of investigating larger spaces of decisions than the existing optimization procedures.

With reference to discrete part manufacturing, where the assumption of finite production runs is often realistic, the design and implementation of adaptive Bayesian control charts by means of the proposed procedure allows significant cost savings to be achieved with respect to the fixed parameters Shewhart charts.

The exhaustive optimization procedure cannot be executed in a reasonable computational time when the space of decisions to select Bayesian chart design parameters significantly enlarges, which is the case of two‐sided control charts. The paper documents the proposed procedure which overcomes this problem and allows the two‐sided Bayesian chart to be designed and proposed as an efficient means to monitor short production runs.

This study aims to empirically examine the impact of the price structure of two-sided markets on transaction volume and market share (MS) in the context of the Korean credit card industry. The Korean credit card market differs from those in the United States (U.S.) or Europe in terms of transaction structure (i.e. a three-party system in Korea vs a four-party system in the U.S. or Europe) and government policy. In addition to the merchant discount rate and the cardholder annual membership fee rate, the authors included and analyzed exogenous variables to eliminate any endogeneity. Based on the analysis results, the authors found that credit card usage performance (i.e. transaction volume) increases with an increase in the relative price ratio (merchant discount rate ÷ cardholder membership fee rate) paid by merchants and cardholders, provided that the total price (merchant discount rate + cardholder membership fee rate) paid by merchants and cardholders remains constant. Therefore, this study is the first to confirm that the Korean credit card market operated as the theoretical mechanism of a two-sided market during the analysis period. This effect can only be observed in specific cases such as the launch of the so-called “Chief Executive Officer(CEO)-designed card.” When a new CEO takes office in a credit card company and launches a “CEO-designed card,” there is a significant increase in not only card usage performance but MS as well owing to the price structure changes caused by expanding the benefits that customers derive from card use.

With the rapid development of the digital economy, an increasing number of digitalized two-sided platforms have deployed the tying strategy to leverage their market power from the core two-sided product to other two-sided products in the competitive market, which transforms the competition among single platforms into that among platform ecological networks. To clarify the mechanism of the formation of the digital platform ecological networks, this paper aims to analyze the expansion and stability of platform ecology by exploring the impacts of network externalities and sellers’ heterogeneity on the tying strategy of two-sided platforms.

This paper develops a game model of two-sided platforms based on Choi and Jeon (2021), which highlights the decisive influence of non-negative price constraints (NPC) on platforms’ tying motivation. Taking the operating systems market as an example, we expand from the perspective of platform service differences to relax the NPC and explore the internal logic of platform ecosystem expansion.

Platforms have an incentive to charge lower prices or even subsidize buyers when the network externalities on the sellers’ side are relatively strong. When the product is highly differentiated and heterogenous, platforms are motivated to tie to capture more buyers with a lower price and grab excess profits from sellers. Eventually, tying is able to consolidate the two-sided platform ecological networks by excluding competitors, capturing user value and deterring entry.

In order to describe the characteristics of platform ecological network more generally, this paper extends the research based on the analyses of Choi and Jeon (2021) by (1) allowing horizontal differences between tied products and (2) relaxing the NPC. Unlike Choi and Jeon (2021), this paper allows platforms to charge users of two-sided platforms at negative prices (or to subsidize them). (3) Setting simultaneous pricing in two-sided platforms. Classical two-sided market theory stresses that the presence of cross-network externalities can give rise to a “chicken and egg” problem.

This paper seeks to contribute to the debate about the regulation of termination rates in the context of Africa.

The methodology is based on analysis of secondary data and a case study of a regulatory intervention in Namibia and its impact.

Mobile call termination is a monopoly and not one side of a two‐sided market. Cost‐based termination rates increase competition between operators and lead to lower prices, more subscribers and more investment.

The case of Namibia is presented as an example of termination rate benchmarking as an alternative regulatory strategy to overcome regulatory and institutional bottlenecks in Africa.

African regulators are presented with a tool for removing market distortions.

Cost based termination rates will lead to lower retail prices and allow more people to use mobile phones.

The paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence against the waterbed effect and the two‐sided market argument.

This article is based on a systematic and comprehensive review of the literature on two-sided platforms, the business structure based on the concept of matchmaking groups of customers (e.g. Uber or Airbnb). The research aims to identify gaps in the existing literature while providing a structured summary of the existing knowledge in the field. Finally, we propose a conceptual framework enabling platform thinking, the ability to see hybrid multi-sided platforms as a useful resource-orchestration structure to unveil innovation opportunities.

This study adopts a bibliometric approach, combing co-citation and text mining analyses of 196 papers, also implementing a longitudinal analysis that highlights the evolution of the field since its inception till today.

The novel aspect of the paper consists in taking a purely managerial stance of a very peculiar kind of platform, merging existing knowledge in comprehensive frameworks while providing potential avenues for research.

From an academic perspective, this research highlights the double nature of two-sided platforms: as an operational choice or as a way to exploit (digital) assets and reach the economic sustainability. A research agenda is proposed, based on three pillars: a side-based standpoint, a business model perspective and an evolutionary stance to see how these businesses may evolve.

The research identifies different literature streams that may help practitioners in identifying how two-sided platforms may help them in fostering innovation.

The identification of two-sided platforms as a different way to create value (transaction platforms) or to capture value (non-transaction platform), enhancing the debate on this innovative business model. A research agenda to bring the field forward is proposed.

This paper aims to explore the allocation of the exit value of a start-up company in market equilibrium between an angel investor and an entrepreneur in the very early-stage financing market.

The theoretical model is established based on the two-sided random search theory and the model’s ability to match the empirical data is evaluated via simulation.

The model indicates that the allocation of the final investment outcome is not proportional to the initial investments by the angel investor and the entrepreneur. The simulation results show that the continued investment by the entrepreneur and the private benefit acquired by the angel investor have a more profoundly negative influence on the angel investor’s share of the exit value of the start-up company. Moreover, the market search structure represented by the matching probability of an angel investor to an entrepreneur has a more significant impact on the angel investor’s share than the other model parameters.

The importance of market search friction in the very early-stage financing market is emphasized. The concepts of continued investments and private benefits are introduced and quantified for the first time under the framework of angel investment. The impacts of such model parameters as the matching probability of an angel investor to an entrepreneur, the success rate of a start-up company, the bargaining power of an angel investor and the discount rate on the allocation of the exit value of the start-up company are investigated as well.

This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.

A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.

The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.

Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.

From the perspective of two-sided review systems, this study aims to investigate how guests’ prior reputation influences their subsequent satisfaction on Airbnb.

This study applied a conceptual framework based on social capital theory to explain the effect of guests’ reputation decided by hosts’ prior evaluations on their subsequent satisfaction. The authors collected 96,204 guest reviews posted for 17,325 properties on Airbnb and used the review polarity to measure guest satisfaction. All historical evaluations generated by hosts for each guest were collected and treated as a proxy of guest reputation. Ordinary least squares regressions were conducted to estimate the effect of guests’ reputation on their subsequent satisfaction.

Results show that guests whose historical evaluations have higher valences or larger variations tend to be more satisfied in their subsequent bookings. However, the number of reviews that guests received from hosts in the past does not influence their subsequent satisfaction.

This study provides new insights into the hospitality literature by identifying the influencing factors of guest satisfaction on peer-to-peer rental platforms from the perspective of two-sided review systems. Results also present practical implications to property owners and website designers to gain a deeper understanding of the determinants of guest satisfaction and the consequences of social interactions between hosts and guests.

This study is a novel attempt that analyzes the effect of guests’ reputation on their satisfaction with subsequent bookings based on two-sided review systems on peer-to-peer rental platforms. Thus, this study provides a starting point for investigating how two-sided review systems affect use behavior on peer-to-peer rental platforms.

There are only a limited number of empirical analyses on the impacts of MTRs. According to the data from 2006-2011 by the European Regulators Group (ERG), many countries have continuously reduced their MTRs. This paper therefore aims to enrich the empirical analysis of the impacts of MTRs according to EC policy on retail prices.

This paper applies the one-step generalised method of moments (GMM) approach to dynamic panel data.

The results support the hypothesis that lower MTRs will reduce consumer retail prices, which is consistent with the EC framework. It is therefore recommended that regulators in the calling party network pays (CPNP) regime reduce MTRs to at least the same level as the operators' cost to raise overall social welfare, especially consumer welfare. However, the approach by each country can differ depending on its situation.

This study supports the idea that it is appropriate for the EC to regulate MTRs by reducing the rates to at least the same level as the efficient operators' cost, and other regulators with a calling party network pays regime from other regions could also follow this strategy.