Mobile termination benchmarking: the case of Namibia

Abstract

Purpose

This paper seeks to contribute to the debate about the regulation of termination rates in the context of Africa.

Design/methodology/approach

The methodology is based on analysis of secondary data and a case study of a regulatory intervention in Namibia and its impact.

Findings

Mobile call termination is a monopoly and not one side of a two‐sided market. Cost‐based termination rates increase competition between operators and lead to lower prices, more subscribers and more investment.

Research limitations/implications

The case of Namibia is presented as an example of termination rate benchmarking as an alternative regulatory strategy to overcome regulatory and institutional bottlenecks in Africa.

Practical implications

African regulators are presented with a tool for removing market distortions.

Social implications

Cost based termination rates will lead to lower retail prices and allow more people to use mobile phones.

Originality/value

The paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence against the waterbed effect and the two‐sided market argument.

Citation

Stork, C. (2011), "Mobile termination benchmarking: the case of Namibia", info, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 5-31. https://doi.org/10.1108/14636691111131420