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Despite a raft of important qualitative reservations and at best poor empirical evidence, the argument that, in case of business problems, large banks are more likely to be bailed out by government intervention than smaller banks (‘too big to fail’) cannot be dismissed entirely. The question, though, is whether or to what extent this has any implications for competition or the stability of the banking system. Under realistic assumptions, especially with respect to incentives for bank management and shareholders, too big to fail hardly leads to excessive risk taking by large banks. The impact of too big to fail on a bank's rating and, accordingly, its refinancing conditions is only marginal, as a breakdown of the various rating components clearly documents. This suggests that the effects on competition of too big to fail come nowhere close to the refinancing advantages enjoyed by public sector banks in Germany. The refinancing advantage of the Landesbanken afforded by state guarantees (Anstaltslast and Gewährtragerhäftung) comes to as much as 50 basis points. Given the continual narrowing of lending margins, an advantage on this scale plays a decisive role in competition. Too big to fail has substantial implications for the architecture of banking supervision. Suitable institutional arrangements need to be created in order to deal with large banks in case of a, potentially systemic, crisis. With banking becoming increasingly global and the number of cross‐border mergers on the rise, this requires solutions at an international, if not at a global, level. Implementing the concept of a European Liko‐Bank, as suggested by the Bundesbank, will require that the supervisory authorities and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) first create appropriate public sector counterparts.

This paper aims to highlight the shift of impunity from institutions to individuals within the “too big to fail, too big to jail” paradigm and to restore individual liability in the financial industry.

The paper is based on the analysis of HSBC deferred prosecution agreement concluded on December 10, 2012 and of a report by the US House of Representatives Financial Committee released in July 2016.

“Too big to fail, too big to jail” is a paradigm which contains justice. It leads to the impunity of individuals involved due to the absence of trial. Containment of justice is denial of justice. However, the systemic risk is attached to institutions, not to individuals. Therefore, it should not hamper the prosecution of individuals.

Setting sanctions applicable to individuals and proportionate to the crime would contribute to deter financial misconducts.

The value of the paper is the demonstration that there is no basis for a limited personal liability in the financial industry.

Outlines the US development of the “too‐big‐to‐fail” (TBTF) doctrine following the collapse of the Continental Illinois Bank, reviews relevant research and explores the impact on the efficiency of the banking system. Uses 1983‐1985 call report data, explains the methodology and presents the results, which analyse economies and diseconomies of scope and scale between different types of loans; and levels of inefficiency for TBTF and non‐TBTF banks. Shows that TBTF banks had the greatest increase in inefficiency following Continental’s failure but reduced this in the following year, as did small banks which did not benefit from complete depository coverage. Confirms that the TBTF doctrine increased stability for all banks, but particularly those covered by the doctrine.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the implicit subsidies received, in the form of stock market returns, from the perception that large banking organizations are too big to fail, and implications for financial regulation.

The empirical analysis focuses on the responses of stock prices of various size groups of banking organizations to announcement of government capital injections to banks (troubled assets relief program) during the 2008 financial crisis, and summarizes responses of regulatory authorities to the crisis.

The paper finds positive and statistically significant stock return reactions both for a portfolio of the large banking organizations that are part of the initial capital injection plan and a portfolio of the large banking organizations that are not part of the initial capital injection plan, implying a too‐big‐to‐fail (TBTF) effect, especially for the latter group of institutions.

The paper focuses on a short time frame of stock price reactions to specific events, for the largest US banks. Further examination of longer‐term stock price effects on US as well as foreign banks may be of interest.

The results have implications for the manner and scope of financial regulatory actions and changes in regulators' approaches to systemic risk and individual bank regulation.

The paper examines TBTF bank subsidy effects in response to a rapidly unfolding financial crisis. These have implications for longer term responses, particularly in the regulatory sphere.

The purpose of this paper is to study the information content of about 3,300 global bank rating changes before and after the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008 to assess if differences in stock market reactions for small and big banks emerge.

The analysis of the stock market reactions of rating changes (upgrades and downgrades) and bank’s size (small and big) is conducted by an event study approach.

The authors find that while upgrades are not associated with significant abnormal bank stock returns, downgrades have a significantly negative effect. This result holds for both small and big banks, while negative abnormal returns are considerably stronger for the former. For small banks, the authors observe an increase in negative cumulative abnormal returns post-Lehman. The lack of a reaction to large banks’ rating downgrades in the narrow [−1,+1] event window indicates that their stock prices may, to some extent, be insulated from negative rating information even post-Lehman, which the authors attribute to an implicit “too big to fail” subsidy anticipated by equity investors.

This paper provides insights to the differences in the information content of changes in small and big banks’ credit rating on stock returns that is unrelated to the well-known size effect. Compared to small banks, big banks seem to some extent be insulated from negative rating changes even post-Lehman – contributing to the on-going too big to fail debate.

This paper analyses English Premier League (EPL) and English Football League (EFL) championship clubs during the period 2002–2019 to anticipate financial distress with specific reference to footballs' Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations.

Data was collected for 43 professional football clubs competing in the EPL and Championship for the financial year ends 2002–2019. Analysis was conducted using the Z-score methodology and additional statistical tests were conducted to measure differences between groups. Data was split into two distinct periods to analyse club finances pre- and post-FFP.

The results show significant cases of financial distress amongst clubs in both divisions and that Championship clubs are in significantly poorer financial health than EPL clubs. In some cases, financially sustainability has worsened post-FFP. The “big 6” clubs – due to their size – seem to be more financially sound than the rest of the EPL, thus preventing a “too big to fail” effect. Overall, the financial situation in English football remains poor, a position that could be exacerbated by the economic crisis, caused by COVID-19.

The findings are not generalisable outside of the English football industry and the data is susceptible to usual accounting techniques and treatments.

The paper recommends a re-distribution of broadcasting rights, on a more equal basis and incentivised with cost-reduction targets. The implementation of a hard salary cap at league level is also recommended to control costs. Furthermore, FFP regulations should be re-visited to deliver the original objectives of bringing about financial sustainability in European football.

The paper extends the evidence base of measuring financial distress in professional team sports and is also the first paper of its kind to examine this in relation to Championship clubs.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of the 2008 SEC short‐sell moratorium on regional bank risk and return. The paper also examines the decline in “failures to deliver” securities in the wake of SEC short‐sell moratorium.

In total, six regional bank portfolios are derived and the beta coefficients from a CAPM model are estimated using the integrated generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (IGARCH) method accounting for the short‐sell moratorium. Data on 110 regional banks in six US regions from January 2002 to December 30, 2011 are used to estimate the model.

The ban on naked short selling and the SEC short‐sell moratorium significantly increased individual bank risk for a majority of banks in six geographic regions, but also increased return in three of three regions. There was also reduced naked short selling as failures to deliver securities declined sharply after the September 2008 moratorium took effect.

Regional banks have generally not achieved the size needed to be deemed “too big to fail” by policy‐makers. Thus, policy changes such as the SEC short‐sell moratorium might be expected to have larger effects on regional banks than on larger banks, which might be shielded from the policy change by having achieved “too big to fail” status. The authors' results are consistent with research that has shown that short‐sell restrictions increase risk by reducing liquidity and trading volume.

The Independent Banking Commission (Vickers) Report is not only one of the most significant developments in the banking regulatory and supervisory context in the UK in recent times but is also one that would considerably impact banking and capital markets functions and trends in this decade. The purposes of this paper are two‐fold: to analyse the interim Vickers Report within the larger paradigm of the prudential banking regulatory approach in the UK, particularly in the context of the debate of bailing out banks that are too‐big‐to‐fail; and to critically examine the recommendation of the Report in the context of the failure of Northern Rock in 2007. The central focus of the paper is to analyse the probable impact and shortcomings of the key recommendation of the Vickers Report, i.e. requirement to hold an additional capital buffer in order to separately ring‐fence retail functions and retail deposits of universal banks and financial institutions operating in the UK.

The method used is a combination of legal examination and case‐study based analysis. This paper sees the failure of Northern Rock as essentially a consequence of supervisory lapses by the FSA and raises relevant critical questions as to the efficacy of the recommendation of the Vickers Report in the context of such supervisory lapses and failures. While relying primarily on official publications in the public domain, journal articles, academic writings, and, newspaper articles, this paper explores the related regulatory and financial implications of the Vickers Report recommendation in the backdrop of the banking crisis in the UK.

The paper concludes that the key recommendation of the Vickers Report, to ring‐fence retail functions universal banks operating in the UK, goes only mid‐way in securing the twin objectives of stability and safety that the Report has set out to achieve.

The present Report is an interim one and the final version of the Report is expected in September. Further, various oversight reports and recommendations by the FSA and other bodies are expected as a follow‐up to the final Report. The key recommendation of the requirement for universal banks operating in the UK to hold additional capital for ring‐fencing their retail functions and deposits is not expected to undergo any substantial modification or revision in the final Report.

This paper is of immense significance to bankers, supervisors, lawyers, auditors, consultants, researchers, jurists, and, those engaged in or with various issues and sectors in financial and banking regulation.