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The Dodd‐Frank Act of 2010 is the keystone policy response directed at reforming US financial system activities and oversight in the wake of the 2007‐2009 financial crisis. The USA also has financial system reform policy commitments in the international arena, including in particular by virtue of its membership in the G20. The purpose of this paper is to consider US policy initiatives related to a core dimension of financial system reform: risks posed by systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”).

The paper provides a deta‘iled comparison of SIFI policy initiatives and timetables under both the Dodd‐Frank Act and the G20 agenda, as reflected in the ongoing work plan of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and poses the question “Are US domestic and international financial system reform commitments in sync?”

The study finds that, fundamentally, the answer is “yes.” However, the comparison yields two caveats with potential policy implications. First, the two agendas differ in their relative emphasis on the coverage of both banks and nonbanks. The G20/FSB focus, at least over the near‐term, is bank‐centric compared with the Dodd‐Frank Act, which consistently addresses both bank and nonbank financial firms. Second, implementation of Dodd‐Frank Act provisions is subject to long‐established US law mandating that there be sufficient opportunity for public input into the rulemaking process, whereas the G20/FSB process has been less systematic and transparent on public consultation and feedback.

These observations may be relevant to the current debate over the speed and scope of Dodd‐Frank Act implementation measures, and to the discussion about the future international competitiveness of US banks and nonbank financial firms.

This study is the first to present a detailed, comprehensive comparison of financial system reform initiatives and provisions in the Dodd‐Frank Act and the G20 agenda.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between internal audit function (IAF) characteristics and organizational variables and IAF’s self-investigation about fraud and irregularities (SIFI) in the French context.

This paper uses the responses of 96 chief audit executives (CAEs) to a global survey of the internal auditing profession carried out by the Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation (IIARF) in 2010. A logistic regression model is used to determine factors influencing IAF’s SIFI.

The authors’ findings reveal that IAF’s SIFI is positively correlated to independence and objectivity, the number of activities performed by the function, adoption of a systematic approach to evaluate the effectiveness of risk management and the size of the company.

This study examines the factors associated only to IAF’s investigation rather than assessment of the risk of fraud. It remains for future research to analyze determinants those related to internal auditors’ approaches when they evaluate the risk of fraud.

The findings have implications for CAEs who wish to improve the IAF’s ability to investigate fraud.

Even if the IIA has stipulated since 2009 that internal auditors must have knowledge to evaluate the risk of fraud, no disclosure requirement exists, in France, for IAF or its charter. The areas of research related to internal audit behavior in relation to fraud concern fraud risk investigation of financial fraud and management/employee misconduct.

The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2008 had far-reaching consequences for the global economy, triggering widespread economic turmoil. We use the event-study method to investigate whether investors priced the effect of significant events before the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy in European and Asia-Pacific banks. Abnormal returns on the event days range from −4.32% to 5.03% in Europe and −5.13% to 6.57% in Asia-Pacific countries. When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt on September 15, 2008, abnormal returns averaged the lowest at −4.32% in Europe and −5.13% in Asia-Pacific countries. The significant abnormal returns show that Lehman Brothers' collapse was a turning point, and investors paid attention to the precrisis events as warning signs of the oncoming crisis.

Financial crises pose a challenge to the legal systems of the concerned countries and international organizations. The current crisis has exposed significant failures of regulation and supervision, making the Financial Market Law a key topic on the political agenda. Thus, great changes and challenges are ahead of us. These were the focus of an interdisciplinary and comparative conference held at the University of Marburg. The paper deals with the individual presentations and carries out an overall analysis.

The paper covers the most important issues in financial regulation.

An extensive regulation is confronted with several obstacles; suitable approach could be the co-regulation; desirable aim is the instauration of the mechanism of capital markets. Those who gain the benefits in case of success should also bear the losses in case of failure instead of being rescued at taxpayers’ expense.

The difficulties arising from extensive regulation suggest a more liberal approach to financial regulation.

Basel III and the capital stress testing introduced new requirements and new definitions while retaining the structure of the pre-2010 requirements. The total number of requirements increased, making it difficult to determine which and how many constraints are binding. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the new financial regulations in the post-financial crisis period, focusing on the capital and liquidity regulations.

The authors explore the impact of financial regulations using various data sources – financial and accounting data from Y-9C Reports. Market data such as daily bond trading from TRACE through the Wharton Data Research Services and Treasury yield from the Bloomberg. The authors use regression analysis to examine the roles of capital adequacy and liquidity regulations.

The authors’ analysis in this paper suggest that Basel III, CET1 and Level 1 HQLAs requirements post-financial crisis have reshaped the balance sheets of large financial institutions, with some differential impacts on traditional versus capital markets banks. These changes appear to respond to the binding constraints (CET1 being a preponderance of required regulatory capital, Level 1 HQLAs a majority of required HQLAs and the expense of both) created by these new requirements, which also appear to have constrained asset growth at such institutions. Consistent with the authors’ view, their results suggest that the new requirements are less constraining for large traditional banks (such institutions show a rapid increase in CET1 capital to steady-state levels by 2012 and strong retail deposit rebuilding resulting in a relatively low required HQLA) and much more so, particularly the liquidity requirement, for the capital markets banks (such institutions show continuous building of CET1 capital over the post-crisis observation period, declines in the share of trading assets and increases in the share of HQLAs combined with efforts to increase retail deposits). Credit risk spreads rose dramatically during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Although decreased, they remain higher and with greater dispersion (for both groups of banks) than pre-crisis. Preliminary regression analysis suggests that the market responds to changes in measured liquidity, rather than the regulatory capital ratios, when pricing bank risk (as reflected on bond spreads).

The estimation is based on historical relationship in the data. We must be cautious in extrapolating the results in a different environment.

There appears to be an arbitrage between HQLA and retail deposits. Capital markets banks and traditional banks follow different business models as evident in the analysis in this paper.

Market pricing suggests that the liquidity measures are more transparent and easier to understand. Capital ratios are not as easy to interpret.

Original research. To the authors’ knowledge, there is no paper that examines impacts of capital and liquidity regulations after the crisis at capital markets banks vs traditional banks – using both accounting data and market data.