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Scholars have begun calling for broader conceptualisations of moral disengagement processes that reflect the interaction of dispositional and situational antecedents to a predilection to morally disengage. The authors argue that collective leadership may be one such contingent antecedent. While researching leaders from the Gilded Age of American business history, the authors encountered a compelling historical case that facilitates theory elaboration within these intersecting domains. Interpreting evidence from the embittered leader dyad of Andrew Carnegie and Henry Clay Frick, the authors show how leader egoism can permeate moral identity to promote symbolic moral self-regard and moral licensing, which augment a propensity to morally disengage. The authors use insights developed from our analysis to illustrate a process conceptualisation that reflects a dispositional and situational interaction as a precursor to moral disengagement and explains how collective leadership can function as a moral disengagement trigger/tool to reduce cognitive dissonance and support the cognitive, behavioural, and rhetorical processes utilised to justify unethical behaviour.

The purpose of this paper is to proffer a reconstructed theoretic model of entrepreneurial generatively that accounts for personal and social identities in the narrative construction of entrepreneurial identity..

The authors followed general analytically structured history processes using the life of Andrew Carnegie to understand how generativity scripts aid in aligning personal and social identities in the formation of entrepreneurial identity.

The authors argue that Carnegie used entrepreneurial generativity as a form of redemptive identity capital during the narrative reconstruction of his entrepreneurial identity.

This paper extends Harvey et al.’s (2011) model of entrepreneurial philanthropy motivation by including forms of self-capital (psychological capital and self-identity capital) as part of the co-construction of entrepreneurial identity and proposing a reconstructed capital theoretic model of entrepreneurial generativity.

Erving Goffman has been variously interpreted as a symbolic interactionist, a structural functionalist, or an a-structural power-game theorist. However, when considering Goffman’s affiliation with the human ecology (HEC) of Robert Park and Everett Hughes, one is able to shed new light on Goffman’s relationship to the aforementioned sociological paradigms. This chapter will demonstrate that his Darwinist underpinnings and overall implicit evolutionary perspective allowed him to develop a dramaturgical theory that explicates how actors are able to understand, predict, anticipate, accommodate to, and influence others while pursuing one’s own or own group’s interests, through one or more of role “taking,” “playing,” and “making.” Furthermore, Goffman elaborates upon Park’s use of dramaturgy, following him in making more room for competition and inequalities in status and power, and offering new dimensions and categories for specifying when and why different adaptive strategies will be used, within different types and degrees of accommodation. Ecological dramaturgy is the term we give to these interdependent lines of social action within stratification contexts. Such structural concerns ultimately separate Goffman from the more subjective and less deductive elements of traditional symbolic interactionist thought. We argue that Goffman’s much neglected ecological and evolutionary-minded approach to role-taking and its inspired analysis of competitive interactive processes provide a missing link in better understanding his complicated intellectual heritage.

Purpose – How did cooperation emerge in large-scale, fluid societies? Standard theories based on direct and indirect reciprocity among self-regarding agents cannot explain the high level of impersonal exchange observed in developed market economies.

Approach and findings – Drawing upon recent research from across the behavioral sciences, we attribute the emergence of cooperation in early trade to an evolved characteristic of human psychology that makes revenge sweet: people are willing to pay a price to punish those who betray their trust. Once cooperative expectations became fixed, institutions such as the law merchant and ethnic trading networks, as well as certain “bourgeois virtues,” helped sustain and extend trade during the medieval period.

Contribution of the paper – Our argument continues the tradition begun by F.A. Hayek in The Sensory Order (1952), by providing an integrated explanation for the rise of the market based upon the coevolution of human psychology, culture, and institutions. In our conclusion, we revisit Hayek's (Hayek, 1976, 1978, 1988) analysis of the conflict between our instincts and the institutions that have created the market order.

We examine collective responses to identity threats in organizations, conceptualizing these responses as identity contests in which members of opposing groups share an identity and strive to protect the social psychological rewards derived from that identity.

We present an argument for the importance of identity as a basis for motivation, suggesting that the desires to obtain and protect identity rewards underlie much behavior in organizations. We also present two case studies from which we derive further theoretical implications about identity contests as drivers of organizational change.

Our case studies show how organizational subgroups perceived identity threats arising from actual or proposed changes in policies and practices, mobilized to resist these threats, and negotiated further changes in organizational structure, policies, and practices.

Applying this analysis, social psychologists who study identity threats can see how responses to such threats are not solely individual and cognitive but sometimes collective and behavioral, leading to changes in organizations and in the surrounding culture.

Our analysis of how identity contests arise and unfold can enrich understandings of how self-definition and mental well-being are shaped by organizational life.

By focusing on collective responses to identity threats, we offer a new way of seeing how intra-organizational identity struggles are implicated in social change.

The purpose of this article is to develop a moral identity perspective on Barnard's conceptualization of executive responsibility.

The paper uses a prospective study design, as an alternative to a transitional grounded approach, to develop a theory-based framework to compare textual patterns in Barnard's writings. By using Barnard's conceptualization of executive responsibility within the identity control theoretical framework, the paper analyzes the challenges of executive moral identification.

The paper develops a theory-based, yet practical, typology of moral identification of responsible executive leaders.

Although this proposed typology appears rather parsimonious, it is recognized that issues of moral behavior are certainly complex, and therefore should be addressed in a requisite manner in future model developments.

The paper posits that Barnard's conceptualization provides a useful channel to address the critical domain at the intersection of responsible executive leadership, identity, and ethics relative to the issues of CSR, diversity management, gender equity, and community involvement. The paper considers the typology of moral identification to be an operative conduit for subsequent empirical research and practical guidance for executive leadership development.

Marketing is commonly assumed to be responsible for the consumer society with its hedonistic lifestyle and for undermining other cultures by its materialistic stance. This, for many critics, is the dark side of consumer marketing, undermining its ethical standing. This paper considers the connection between marketing, the consumer society, globalization and the hedonistic lifestyle, and whether marketing is guilty as charged. After all, anything that affects the image of marketing as a profession is important, as this influences both recruitment and social acceptance.

The meaning of justice and dignity have changed over time, as has the idea of a normative or moral ‘foundation’. Given that justice and dignity are commonly ascribed foundational roles in practical philosophy, this chapter charts important changes in these concepts and changes in how they have interacted. The ideas of rights and status capture the most persistent points of interaction between justice and dignity. However, because rights and status are themselves unstable concepts, and because both rely upon contextual theories of freedom and the state for their meaning, no simple reconciliation between justice and dignity as foundations is possible. In sum, we cannot treat justice and dignity as equally foundational if foundational is taken to mean the final determinant of our obligations.

In The Passions and the Interests, Hirschman explored a movement in 18th century thought whose aim was to shape human motivations by establishing the prominence of interests, particularly material interests, in order to diminish the negative effects of the passions in political life. If the pursuit of gain could replace the pursuit of glory, for example, commercial transactions might replace bloody wars as a means of resolving conflict. Hirschman finds this claim overly optimistic. And, in his view, in making their case, these thinkers oversimplified and impoverished our understanding of human psychology by reducing all motivation to interest – a problem that persists in contemporary social science. After exploring Hirschman’s account of 18th century thinkers, this paper attempts a discussion of a richer psychology identifying the variety of passions that motivate action toward different political goals; viz. status, justice, solidarity, and security. These political passions – including ambition, compassion, righteous indignation, loyalty, and fear – can have positive as well as negative political consequences.