Instincts and institutions: the rise of the market

Abstract

Purpose – How did cooperation emerge in large-scale, fluid societies? Standard theories based on direct and indirect reciprocity among self-regarding agents cannot explain the high level of impersonal exchange observed in developed market economies.

Approach and findings – Drawing upon recent research from across the behavioral sciences, we attribute the emergence of cooperation in early trade to an evolved characteristic of human psychology that makes revenge sweet: people are willing to pay a price to punish those who betray their trust. Once cooperative expectations became fixed, institutions such as the law merchant and ethnic trading networks, as well as certain “bourgeois virtues,” helped sustain and extend trade during the medieval period.

Contribution of the paper – Our argument continues the tradition begun by F.A. Hayek in The Sensory Order (1952), by providing an integrated explanation for the rise of the market based upon the coevolution of human psychology, culture, and institutions. In our conclusion, we revisit Hayek's (Hayek, 1976, 1978, 1988) analysis of the conflict between our instincts and the institutions that have created the market order.

Citation

Carvalho, J.-P. and Koyama, M. (2010), "Instincts and institutions: the rise of the market", Butos, W.N. (Ed.) The Social Science of Hayek's ‘The Sensory Order’ (Advances in Austrian Economics, Vol. 13), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 285-309. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1529-2134(2010)0000013014