Search results

This paper investigates how the global financial crisis changes the effects of state ownership and foreign ownership on corporate cash holdings in an emerging market.

We employ an interactive term between state ownership (foreign ownership) and a crisis dummy to analyze how the global financial crisis determines the effect of state ownership (foreign ownership) on corporate cash holdings.

With a research sample including 5,493 observations from 621 listed firms over the period 2007–2017, we find that state ownership (foreign ownership) is negatively (positively) related to corporate cash holdings and the effect of state ownership (foreign ownership) is stronger (weaker) during the crisis period. Moreover, the increase in the effect of state ownership is larger in financially unconstrained firms.

Prior research shows that the effects of state ownership and foreign ownership on corporate cash holdings in emerging markets are still debatable. This paper extends this line of research by investigating how the global financial crisis – an exogenous shock – changes these effects.

The history of the public enterprise sector in Nigeria is described in some detail, with an emphasis on the steps that have been taken to improve the running of the enterprises since civilian government of the country. In the face of extremely difficult circumstances, including massive devaluation, the country has fought its way back from a position of enormous problems to one of relative economic growth.

Using imbalanced panel data of nonfinancial Vietnamese listed firms from 2005 to 2021, this paper explores the potential effect of ownership on firms' cash levels.

Two hypotheses are tested using different methods, including pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and system-generalized method of moments (GMM), to investigate the ownership–cash holding relationship for various firm scenarios. Both book and market measures of the cash ratio are examined.

Results show that foreign and state ownership encourages firms to increase their cash reserves. The positive relationship between ownership and cash holding is, especially, pronounced for firms in the financial deficit.

This research suggests that in this emerging market, outside ownership substantially accelerates cash to hedge against the unexpected issues caused by poor investor protection, low political accountability and information asymmetry.

The study contributes to the existing understanding of the relationship between ownership and corporate cash holdings in the context of a typical emerging market. Besides, it expands the existing knowledge to the extent of such relations in the event of a financial shortage.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and performance for a comprehensive sample of Chinese listed firms for the years 2000‐2004. In particular, the paper seeks to explore the effect of the dominance of state and private blockholders and control on firm performance. It aims to use a more differentiated approach than previous research on the subject, which has mainly focused on the effects of the pervasive state ownership on firm values. Accordingly, the main theme of the paper intends to relate to the analysis of the effects of private blockholders on firm value.

The paper tests the ownership‐performance relationship for the state and for sub‐samples with predominantly private shareholders. The paper uses both an ordinary least squares and a two‐stage least squares analysis, which treats ownership concentration as endogenous.

The paper finds evidence that large private blockholdings are to the benefit of firm value for the full sample. Conversely, for smaller samples of companies without or with very low shareholdings by the various state players, there is some evidence that large private block shareholdings might be to the detriment of firm value.

The study contributes to the literature by presenting a more comprehensive treatment of the ownership‐performance relationship of listed firms in China. The main theme of the paper relates to ownership concentration and the effects of private blockholders on the performance of firms, in addition to the endogeneity of ownership. It also contributes by utilising the alternative ownership classification system developed by the National University of Singapore.

Since the core issue of Chinese economics is to elucidate the logical relationship between socialism and the market economy, it necessitates a robust foundation for microeconomic analysis to uncover the behavioral patterns and characteristics of microeconomic agents in a socialist market economy and identify the conditions and methods for the functioning of market mechanisms.

The core issue of microeconomics with Chinese characteristics is to identify the economic logic of how market mechanisms play a decisive role in resource allocation under the basic socialist economic system based on China's reform.

The core issue in building the foundation of microeconomic analysis of Chinese economics is addressing the compatibility issue between SOEs and a market economy.

In the author’s view, this can be achieved under the logic of classified reform so as to build the microeconomic foundation for the effective functioning of a socialist market economy.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an exploration on how important are “other block-holders” in explaining the performance of family-controlled corporations in Malaysia. Three important groups of block-holders are identified for the purpose, namely the “foreign institutional investors”, the “domestic institutional investors” and the “government”.

The sample was drawn based on the companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia. All the relevant block-holders’ ownership data are hand-collected from the annual reports published by the listed corporations and descriptive statistics together with regression analysis are employed.

Overall it is found that the presence of a second block-holder in family-controlled corporations leads to better performance compared to the corporations where the controlling families act as the sole block-holder. Moreover, this study finds that the identity of the block-holders with the extent of their ownership is important in explaining the performance. Specifically, “foreign institutional investors” and “government” are found to be significant in terms of the extent of their equity holdings and the performance of these corporations, respectively. Conversely, no such relationship is found in the equity holdings of “domestic institutional investors” and the corporation performance. Such finding may imply the possible limited ability and constraints faced by the “domestic institutional investors” in Malaysia to exert effective monitoring and pressure on the management for enhanced corporation performance.

Many studies researched the influence of family ownership on the performance of family-controlled corporations but there are limited studies conducted on the influence of “other block-holders” in affecting the performance of these corporations. This paper is an attempt to provide an initial exploration on how important are these “other block-holders” in explaining the performance of these corporations in the context of a small emerging economy, Malaysia.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between ownership type and the likelihood of publication of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) report.

Drawing on stakeholder salience theory, the probit model is used for a sample of 1,839 Chinese listed firms to study how different types of owners influence firm CSR engagement.

The analysis reveals that the Chinese stock exchanges exert a positive influence on the likelihood of a firm producing a CSR report, an effect which is more significant in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Foreign investors lead to a greater likelihood of publication of a CSR report, though this effect is weaker in SOEs. In contrast, the holdings of state and domestic institutional investors are broadly neutral.

The study helps corporate managers to recognise how particular types of shareholders will value their efforts regarding CSR activities and disclosure and also assists policymakers in improving the level of CSR disclosure through the development of new policy.

Apposite CSR disclosure enhances trust and facilitates the shared values on which to build a more cohesive society.

The novelty of this study is that it addresses the effect of institutional investors on Chinese firm CSR engagement and thus provides an important insight for firms, investors and other stakeholders into the interplay of portfolio investment and CSR.

The first step in the reform of the Romanian enterprise sector after the collapse of communism was the commercialization of state enterprises. This was completed by 1991. Two types of enterprises were established: regies autonomes and commercial companies. The regies autonomes were legal entities with the social capital owned by the state. This legal status was restricted to enterprises that were “natural monopolies or of public interest or essential for national defense and security.” The governance of regies autonomes of national importance was the responsibility of the ministries, while the governance of regional regies autonomes was devolved to local authorities. The commercial companies were mainly joint stock corporations and about 6,300 of them were incorporated between 1990 and 1991. Their social capital was split between the state-ownership fund (SOF) and five private-ownership funds (POFs, latter called PIFs). Table 1 presents the structure of state holdings at the beginning of privatization in 1992.

State ownership has been common especially in industries with restricted competition. In Russia, state-controlled firms represent around 41 percent of the market value of all listed firms (Deloitte, 2015). Yet, there is a significant gap in the literature regarding the effects of various forms of government control in listed firms. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by exploring the impact of the complexity of state ownership and competition on the performance of Russian listed firms.

The sample consists of data for 72 firms (360 firm-years) in the Russian MOEX broad market index during 2011–2015. The complexity of state ownership is captured by studying forms of state control including majority/minority, direct/indirect, federal/regional, mixed structures and golden shares.

The authors find significant differences in performance relating to different forms of state ownership. State control is negatively related to firm valuation and the sales/employees ratio. Performance is weakest when state ownership takes the form minority, regional or direct ownership. State control through golden shares typically outperforms other state-controlled firms. The authors find indications of employment prioritization beyond the economical optimum. In addition, the relation between state ownership and profitability becomes positive in sectors where state firms appear to enjoy lower competition.

While the effects of state ownership have been studied on many markets, there is a lack of studies on the effects of different forms, or the complexity, of state ownership beyond direct and indirect ownership. The authors contribute to the literature on the performance effects of state ownership by studying a multitude of forms of governmental ownership as well as the role of competition in Russia. Especially the profitability of state-controlled firms is significantly affected by industry characteristics. Implications of the results are discussed both from firm and policy maker perspectives.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the rights of shareholders, particularly those of minority shareholders in the management of firms in Ghana.

As a result of the largely unexplored nature of this issue in Ghana, a qualitative analysis was conducted to offer a painstaking understanding needed. The case study design is in particular relevant for exploring such phenomenon, as it evolves through the experiences of several key players.

Data indicate that minority shareholders’ influence is, in most cases, nil in every aspect of their firms. Whilst majority shareholders have an absolute right to appoint or influence the appointment of top officials of the firms, minority shareholders’ role in the selection is limited. In addition, in regards to control of corporate decision-making processes, unlike the majority shareholders, the minority shareholders do not have any influence on them. Further, in terms of relevant information, whilst the majority shareholders have absolute access to them anytime they desire, the minority shareholders only rely on annual general meetings to get hold of them, thus limiting their access to corporate information. The revelations unambiguously grant the majority shareholders of the firms absolute control rights whilst undermining the rights of the minority shareholders. This paper was concluded by itemizing the implications of our findings for management, regulators and governments.

It is believed that this is among the handful of studies that have been conducted using developing or emergent economy data to empirically analyse how minority shareholders wield their rights in emergent economies and to add to the mounting pool of scattered cross-country evidence.