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The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of relational mechanisms and market contracts on cross‐enterprise knowledge trading in supply chain and to examine the role of market contracts. Relational mechanism is categorized into indirect and direct relational mechanism in this paper. Cross‐enterprise knowledge trading is categorized into explicit and tacit knowledge trading. The indirect relational mechanism is mainly expressed by knowledge brokers, while the direct relational mechanism consists of shared goals and trust.

Multiple regression analysis was performed on questionnaire data from 256 Chinese manufacturing enterprises in supply chain in order to assess the relationships between relational mechanisms, market contracts and cross‐enterprise knowledge trading.

The results show that knowledge brokers and market contracts have significant and positive effects on explicit knowledge trading, but the effects on tacit knowledge trading are not significant. Shared goals and trust have significant and positive effects not only on explicit knowledge trading but also on tacit knowledge trading, while trust has a stronger positive effect on tacit knowledge trading than explicit knowledge trading. Finally, the moderating effects of market contracts are proven in the relationships between relational mechanisms and knowledge trading, excluding the relationship between knowledge brokers and tacit knowledge trading.

Previous studies about the cross‐enterprise knowledge trading in supply chain focused on theoretical research which did not match with reality, especially in China, where the relational mechanism in trading activities is strong. Based on relational exchange theory and transaction cost theory, a conceptual model for the effects of relational mechanisms and market contracts on cross‐enterprise knowledge trading in supply chain is proposed in this paper, and then empirically tested using the data collected from 256 Chinese manufacturing enterprises in supply chain with multiple regression models. The findings provide a theoretical basis for knowledge trading participants selecting an appropriate governance mechanism to promote knowledge trading, and these also guide the knowledge trading among members of supply chain in practice.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the impact of closing mechanism changes on market quality, investor trading behavior and market manipulation in the Shanghai stock market.

A dummy variable is constructed indicating whether the closing mechanism is call auction or continuous auction. Market quality is measured from aspects of liquidity, volatility and price continuity; investor trading behavior is scaled by order timing and order aggressiveness, and a price deviation indicator is the proxy of manipulation. Using panel regression, this study examines the impact of closing mechanism changes based on intraday transaction data from the Shanghai stock market.

The conclusions are as follows: First, market quality improves after the closing mechanism is reformed in terms of liquidity, volatility and price continuity. Second, order strategy changes significantly in the closing call market, and investors trade more aggressively in the continuous trading period before closing. Third, the closing call mechanism restrains the closing price manipulation and thus prompts an efficient closing price.

This paper examines the policy effects of closing mechanism changes from aspects of market quality, trading behavior and price manipulation, providing pieces of evidence for trading mechanism design and market supervision in emerging markets.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of four different incentives in improving hedging effectiveness and propose an alternative regulatory mechanism for China’s futures market.

The research method that this study uses is a laboratory experiment, and this study follows the basic norms of experimental research. In addition, this paper designs and conducts a game experiment between hedgers and futures brokerage firms (FBFs) under different incentive mechanisms.

By analyzing the experimental data, it is found that compared with other incentive mechanisms, hedgers’ willingness to hedge and FBFs’ regulatory intention are both significantly higher for the dynamic linkage updating mechanism, indicating that hedgers have a stronger willingness to follow their hedging plan, and FBFs are more responsible for their regulatory behaviors. Additionally, the dynamic linkage updating mechanism has a long-term impact on effective hedging in the futures market.

The findings suggest that the dynamic linkage updating mechanism is beneficial for effectively restricting both hedgers’ over-speculation and FBFs’ regulatory slack and improving the hedging efficiency of the futures market.

To solve the problem of inefficient hedging in China’s futures market, i.e., hedgers’ over-speculation and FBFs’ passive collusion with hedgers, the regulators of China’s futures market should reform the existing incentives and adopt a dynamic linkage updating mechanism to encourage all the participants to actively improve hedging effectiveness.

This paper analyzes and verifies, for the first time, the role of the dynamic linkage updating mechanism in the investing behaviors of hedgers and the regulatory behaviors of future brokerage firms. The futures market experiment that was designed and used in this study is a pioneering and exploratory experiment that applies game theory and mechanism design theory to the field of behavioral finance.

In this chapter, we reexamine the notion that socially responsible behavior by firms will lead to increased financial performance. By identifying the underlying processes, institutional settings, and actors involved, we present a framework that is more attentive to the multiplicity and conditionality of the mechanisms operating in the often tenuous connection between firms’ social behavior and financial performance. Building and expanding upon existing analyses of the CSP–CFP linkage, our model helps to explain the mixed results from a wide range of empirical studies which examine this link. It also provides a novel theoretical account to help guide future researches that are more attentive to conditionalities and contextual contingencies.

In the strategic management literature, two mechanisms have been proposed to explain how managers generate economic rents: resource selection, and capability building. Resource selection is a Ricardian perspective where the productivity of resources are heterogeneously distributed among firms (Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984), and managers outsmart the factor markets by selecting resources based on their future values (Barney, 1986). The alternative Schumpeterian perspective is capability building, a mechanism that depends on deployment of resources to affect a desired end (Amit & Shoemaker, 1993; Mahoney, 1995). While capability building requires that managers develop a capacity to manage firm specific tangible and intangible processes, the resource selection mechanism demands managers to accurately assess expectations about the future value of resources.

The development of China's foreign exchange market and the reform of Chinese yuan (hereinafter “CNY”) exchange rate are closely linked with each other. Their respective journey through the past 70 years can both be divided into three historical periods; as follows: China's foreign exchange market underwent a difficult exploration period, a formation and development period and an innovative development period; in the meanwhile, the formation mechanism of CNY exchange rate also witnessed three periods marked successively by a single exchange rate system with administrative pricing, an explorative formation mechanism of CNY exchange rate and a reformed, marketized CNY exchange rate mechanism.

In the present world, the development of almost every country is closely linked to the international community, which is the result of the heterogeneity in system, market, humanity and history, in addition to the differences in natural resource endowments and the diversity in technology, administration, information, experience and diplomacy. International economic exchanges require foreign exchange, which gives rise to the existence and development of the foreign exchange market.

The 70-year history of China's foreign exchange market has proven the need to continue safeguarding national sovereignty and interests of the people, stick to the general direction of serving economic development, adhere to the strategy of steadily and orderly promoting the construction of the foreign exchange market, keep on making innovation in monetary policy operation and unbendingly stay away from any systemic financial risks.

During the 70-year history of the new China, as an indispensable economic resource in China's economic development, the foreign exchange mechanism bolstered each stage of economic development and was always an important manifestation of China's economic sovereignty. It is argued that during the 30-year planned economy that preceded reform and opening-up, China pursued a closed-door policy with few international economic exchanges. The subtext of such argument is that China did not have (or hardly had much of) a foreign exchange mechanism during this period, which is clearly in conflict with historical evidence. In fact, although China did not have an open foreign exchange market before the reform and opening-up, it had a clear foreign exchange management system and exchange rate system.

The aim of this research is to explore the behavioral model of Chinese organizational leaders acquiring resources for the development of their organizations under the influence of hierarchically oriented social governance.

The paper compares the differences between Western and Chinese contexts and conducts a grounded multi-case study to explore leadership behavioral model in the Chinese context.

First, the Chinese social governance structure is hierarchically oriented, whereas the Western social governance structure is market oriented. Second, this unique inconformity found in the Chinese organizational leaders as contorted leadership, which refers to the inconsistency between leaders’ cognition and their behavior when acquiring resources for the development of their organizations, is defined. Third, the conflict between leaders’ cognition and behaviors is caused by the social governance mechanism within which leaders are embedded.

The authors have just made a first step to understand contorted leadership in the Chinese context, further researches should pay more attention to exploring the origins, functions and impacts of leaders’ contorted behaviors.

First, leadership is linked with social governance by emphasizing on the core role of social governance in allocating the resources which organizational leaders scramble for. Second, a new kind of leadership –contorted leadership – in the Chinese context that emphasizes on the contradiction between leaders’ cognition and behavior, which deepens the understanding of leadership contextualization, is identified.

Knowledge market has become an important issue of knowledge management. The purpose of this paper is to study the design of an internal knowledge market for enabling knowledge transfer within an organization.

The knowledge market is modeled as a pull market, where buyers post and price their questions to elicit answers from potential sellers. Designing and offering different incentives and information technology (IT) support to knowledge workers with heterogeneous knowledge levels, a firm maintains the efficiency of the market and maximizes the organizational benefit from knowledge transfer.

The authors identify two payment policies, a priori and a posteriori, and two market‐regulating mechanisms, Locking and Open mechanisms. The optimal designs of incentive contracts and IT support are fully demonstrated for the a priori policy and Locking mechanism. The benefits of the market for knowledge transfer are illustrated from three aspects: transaction price as sharing reward; market as payment platform; and IT as transaction facilitator.

The paper provides valuable insights for practitioners to effectively manage knowledge assets within markets.

This paper aims to identify and analyze the neoliberal, Anglo-American corporate governance mechanisms which embed shareholder value in Nigeria, and assess how they constitute major “practical barriers” to effective corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the country. While some of these mechanisms operate internally – performance-related pay (executive remuneration) – the use of non-executive directors – others operate externally – the markets for corporate control and the stock markets.

The paper adopts the doctrinal approach through a critical evaluation of concepts. Using existing literature in the subject area, it evaluates the nature of these mechanisms and argues that their operations amount to “practical barriers” to effective CSR in the country.

The paper finds that the existence of these mechanisms incentivizes corporate managers to maximize shareholder value and raise the share price of corporations as high as possible. It also leads to the financialization of corporate governance, rent seeking and the pursuit of short-term profits by corporations. In this context, within the Nigerian corporate governance framework, the existence and operations of these mechanisms amount to “practical barriers” to effective CSR.

The paper offers a fresh insight into the existence and operations of the neoliberal corporate governance mechanisms which embed shareholder value. By critically assessing the operations of these mechanisms in the Nigerian situation, it extends the body of knowledge in this area by showing how they amount to practical barriers to effective CSR in the country.

This study aims to identify institutional work mechanisms that public actors employ in market shaping.

The paper uses an abductive theorizing process, combining a literature review with an empirical exploration of three different market-shaping contexts.

The study identifies 20 granular mechanisms of institutional work that market-shaping public actors employ. These mechanisms are all potentially employable in creating, maintaining or disrupting markets. Institutional work vis-à-vis individual institutions may differ in direction from the institutional work vis-à-vis the market system. Public actors are not a homogeneous group but may have different values and support competing institutional logics even when operating in the same market.

The empirical data were limited to three cases in three small open economies. Data collected from other markets and with other methods would provide more rigorous insight into market-shaping public actors.

The findings revealed institutional work mechanisms that public actors can use to shape markets. Companies wanting to engage public actors in market shaping should be aware of the values and institutional logics that influence market-shaping public actors.

The paper unites and expands on the scattered knowledge regarding institutional work in market shaping. It illuminates and dissects the role of public actors in market shaping, challenging the reactive stance that is often assigned to them. The study provides a better understanding of how conflicting market views affect markets. It also brings insights into the interplay between market-shaping actions and the multiple levels of market systems.