Search results

Purpose – Examine the role of institutional investors in accelerating the development of capital markets and economies abroad, the determinants of their investment, both in the domestic and foreign markets, and their importance in promoting good corporate governance practices worldwide and facilitating increased financial integration.

Methodology/approach – Review and synthesize recent academic literature (1970–2011) on the process of international financial integration and the role of foreign institutional investors in the increasingly global financial markets.

Findings – Despite the concern that short-term flow of international capital can be destructive to the emerging and developing market economies, academic evidence on a destabilizing effect of foreign investment activity is limited. Institutional investors’ systematic preference for stocks of large, well-known, globally visible foreign firms can explain the presence of a home bias in international portfolio investment.

Research limitations – Given the breadth of the two literature streams, only representative studies (over 45 published works) are summarized.

Social implications – Regulators of emerging markets should first improve domestic institutions, governance, and macroeconomic fundamentals, and then deregulate domestic financial and capital markets to avoid economic and financial crises in the initial stages of liberalization reforms.

Originality/value of paper – A useful source of information for graduate students, academics, and practitioners on the importance of foreign institutional investors.

Political risk should be seen as arising from renegotiation of implicit or explicit contract under which foreign investors enter a host country. Governments will legitimately enter into renegotiation to increase the share of rents earned by the society. Corrupt political leaders, however, will use their powers to extract rents from foreign investors for personal gains rather than for the good of the society. Political risk assessment, therefore, should assess the intentions of government as well as the strengths of political and social institutions that keep leaders under control. Firms should also understand that their own actions may contribute to creating political risk.

This study focuses on listed and over-the-counter (OTC) companies in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. It found that an increase in the ownership proportion of institutional investors (INs), including foreign investors, investment trusts, and dealers can enhance the informativeness of stock prices. The relationship between these factors follows an inverted U-shaped pattern, indicating that excessively high ownership ratios can actually lead to a decrease in the informativeness of stock prices. Additionally, increasing the ownership proportions of foreign investors and investment trusts can reduce the risk of stock price collapse, while dealers show no significant relationship in this regard. This study also reveals that the technical variable of the price deviation rate is an important explanatory factor for post-collapse returns. It is positively correlated with the magnitude of the price decline after a collapse, meaning that stocks with weaker pre-collapse performance experience larger post-collapse declines. When the data during the 2020 pandemic period are excluded, changes in foreign ownership ratios show a significant positive correlation with postcrash returns in both the long and short term. The significant correlation in the short term may be due to a high proportion of foreign ownership. Any reduction in this could put pressure on stock prices, and retail investors may follow suit and sell-off, using foreign investors as a reference. The significant correlation in the long term might be due to foreign investors themselves possibly also trying to avoid the pressure that their own short-term sell-offs could exert on stock prices. The changes in the ownership ratios of investment trusts and dealers indicate that medium and long-term changes have a significant impact on postcrash returns, while the changes in the major players' ownership show no significant correlation. When data from 2020 are included in the analysis, the significance of all INs decreases.

Extending the extant literature and using Qatar’s equity market as a case study, this paper aims to look into the potential impacts of foreign investor groups’ trading activities on market volatility in comparison with those of Qatar’s domestic investor counterparts.

The dataset is comprised of daily aggregated values of stock purchases and sales made separately by four investor groups, namely, foreign individual investors, foreign institutional investors, domestic individual investors, and domestic institutional investors. An ex post measure of volatility introduced by Rogers and Satchell (1991) is employed. Four proxies for investor trading are considered separately in the analysis. The objective of the study is empirically addressed in the context of the Generalized Method of Moments estimation technique.

In general, there exists substantial contemporaneous price impact associated with foreign equity investment in the Qatari capital market, despite the fact that foreigners’ buy and sell trades are not as large as those of their domestic counterparts. More specifically, foreign institutional sales (purchases) tend to increase (reduce) market volatility. Like those of foreign institutions, the sell trades by foreign individuals have a positive impact on volatility. On the other hand, domestic institutional purchases are significantly negatively related with market volatility, whereas the sell trades by the same category have no impact on volatility. Finally, surprises in foreigners’ trading volumes turn out to be responsible for adding to volatility.

Although a sudden reversal of foreign capital flows can pose a real threat to the stability of the Qatari capital market, such capital flows are deemed to be an indispensable vehicle for enhancing the liquidity and efficiency of the market. Accordingly, policy makers in Qatar should overhaul the current foreign investment legislation to make it even more streamlined and better suited to achieving the country’s strategic vision for the market. Foremost in these reforms is relaxing the stringent 25 percent foreign ownership restriction. Such a relaxation process is highly recommended to be phased in only gradually, in order to weigh its pros and cons. In this regard, the authorities concerned should consider embarking on a range of procedures intended to ward off the adverse ramifications of foreign capital outflows.

To the author’s best knowledge, no study about the impact of foreign equity flows on domestic markets has been so far conducted using trading data from the Qatari market. This work presents one such attempt.

The purpose of this paper is to: investigate whether the foreign institutional investors in Taiwan herd towards the stocks in the same industry; identify the causes of industrial herding; analyze whether herding behavior impacts future industrial returns; and trace the changing pattern of industrial herding, especially during the 2007‐2008 financial crisis.

This paper applies Sias' herding measure to identify foreign institutional industrial herding behavior. Moreover, to identify the causes and impacts of herding, the authors use regression models to analyze the relationship between foreign institutional demand for stocks in some particular industries and industrial returns, controlling industrial market capitalization, the number of firms in the industry and industrial speculative intensity. The above methods are applied to the full sample period, as well as two sub‐periods, respectively, to trace the time‐varying trading behavior.

First, on average, foreign institutional investors herd in the Taiwan securities market. They follow each other into and out of the same industries. Second, they were momentum traders in the tranquil period from 2002 to 2006 and contrarian traders in the period of 2007‐2008 financial crisis. Third, such herding behavior has positive impacts on future industrial returns both in the tranquil period as well as in turbulent time. The authors thus conclude that foreign institutional investors demonstrated contrarian trading strategies to stabilize future industrial returns in the financial crisis period; they buy past losers to support the prices and sell past winners to suppress the price volatility.

This paper investigates foreign institutional herding behavior in an emerging market, Taiwan on the micro setting of industrial base. It identifies the causes and impacts of foreign institutional industrial herding from the outlook of information‐base versus non‐information‐base trading. It also traces time‐varying herding behavior, especially during the 2007‐2008 financial crisis. This paper provides useful information to investors participating in emerging markets like Taiwan.

The purpose of this article is to analyze and draw conclusions from recent SEC staff proposals and commissioners' comments and a recent roundtable discussion concerning access to foreign exchanges and broker‐dealers by US investors.

The paper summarizes a proposal by Erik Sirri, Director of the SEC Division of Market Regulation; a proposal by Ethiopis Tafara and Robert J. Peterson, respectively, the Director of the SEC Office of International Affairs and its Senior Counsel; and comments in speeches by Commissioners Roel Campos, Paul Atkins, and Annette Nazareth; and draws conclusions regarding the SEC's current efforts to develop and articulate a strategic approach to mutual recognition.

As the securities market becomes globalized, there is a growing interest among US investors for foreign securities and for more direct access to foreign broker‐dealers and exchanges. The SEC is determined to remain in the forefront among US government agencies on securities exchange mutual recognition issues, and therefore is pursuing an accelerated agenda to address these issues. The SEC sees its role as not only to function as a bulwark for the protection of US investors but also to take constructive, affirmative steps that serve to strengthen the US capital markets. While the SEC has historically been an advocate for the global convergence of national regulatory standards, it is now considering proposals for a country‐by‐country bilateral approach based upon cooperation among regulators with substantively comparable regulatory regimes.

This paper presents a useful analysis of the direction the SEC is likely to take on the mutual recognition issue by an experienced securities lawyer.

This paper seeks to explore such questions as: “What are the impacts of foreign investors and what are the channels through which foreign investors contribute to or detracts from firm value in Korea?” It aims to discuss how foreign investors and foreign outside directors interact to enhance firm value.

Using longitudinal data from the KOSPI200 index in Korea during 2004‐2007, the study examined the direct and interaction effect of foreign blockholders and foreign board members. To address the representativeness of foreign investors, the authors verified the mandates of foreign board members though telephone interviews.

Foreign block shareholders and foreign outside directors respectively provide expertise and independent monitoring over management. Foreign blockholders' management control via board membership is likely to mitigate leverage of value enhancement when foreign outside directors represent private interests of foreign blockholders. The moderating effect is also supported since foreign ownership concentration has an inverted U‐shaped relationship with value enhancement. The paper confirms that board independence reinforces the positive impact of foreign outside directors on firm value.

This study offers a key to understanding corporate governance in that mutual monitoring and a balance among various types of stakeholders are crucial to value enhancement.

The paper provides clues to the extant diverse findings concerning the impact of foreign investors on firm value. It applies an integrated perspective to the empirical analyses of the impact of foreign investors by giving consideration to the agency – foreign outside directors – to implement management control on behalf of foreign blockholders.

Political risk is a complex phenomenon. This complexity has incentivized scholars to take a piecemeal approach to understanding it. Nearly all scholarship has targeted a single type of political risk (expropriation) and, within this risk, a single type of firm (MNCs) and a single type of strategic mechanism through which that risk may be mitigated (entry mode). Yet “political risk” is actually a collection of multiple distinct risks that affect the full spectrum of foreign firms, and these firms vary widely in their capabilities for resisting and evading these risks. We offer a unified theoretical model that can simultaneously analyze: the three main types of political risk (war, expropriation, and transfer restrictions); the universe of private foreign investors (direct investors, portfolio equity investors, portfolio debt investors, and commercial banks); heterogeneity in government constraints; and the three most relevant strategic capabilities (information, exit, and resistance). We leverage the variance among foreign investors to identify effective firm strategies to manage political risk. By employing a simultaneous and unified model of political risk, we also find counterintuitive insights on the way governments trade off between risks and how investors use other investors as risk shields.

This study examines the effect of host government interference with foreign investors’ assets on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow. The author hypothesizes that the relationship between host government interference and FDI inflow takes the form of an inverted U shape. The author tests this hypothesis using data from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes between 1996 and 2017. The results support the above hypothesis. While host government interference with the assets of a few foreign investors may not deter FDI inflow, frequent interferences, which result in an increasing number of host state–foreign investor disputes, reduces FDI inflow in a host country. The analysis also shows that when faced with an increasing host country uncertainty, investors adopt a wait and see strategy. However, how long investors wait depends on the economic situation of the host country. For high-income countries, investors wait until approximately 10 disputes before reducing investments level in a host country, while for low-income countries, this waiting period is a mere two disputes. The findings of this study suggest that countries seeking to attract more FDI should not interfere with the activities of foreign investors, however, if they do, disputes should be settled at home, not in international arbitration courts, because doing so frequently may poison the host environment and deter other foreign investors from investing in the host country.

Purpose – We study the investment behavior of foreign institutional investors operating in China. A detailed analysis of foreign institutional investors is examined, along with a comparison of domestic Chinese investors.

Methodology/approach – We adopt annual Chinese stock market data for the period 2003–2009 for both foreign and domestic funds to analyze the industrial preference of foreign funds and compare the different preferences between foreign funds and domestic Chinese funds in relation to financial characteristic and corporate governance indicators.

Findings – The analysis reveals that foreign funds have a preference for a range of sectors such as transportation, metals and nonmetals, and machinery, as opposed to industries with a requirement for local knowledge. The portfolios of domestic Chinese funds are distributed more evenly across sectors, compared to foreign funds. The comparative analysis reveals that the companies foreign funds invest in are significantly different from those firms favored by domestic funds in terms of size, profit, and management compensation.

Social implications – These empirical findings highlight the differences between foreign and domestic funds investment preferences and has implications for policy makers aiming to attract foreign investors to emerging markets.

Originality/value of chapter – Our chapter not only provides an introduction on the QFII scheme in China, but also examines the impact of a comprehensive range of firm-level characteristics, financial and corporate governance indicators, on the investment decisions of foreign and domestic funds in emerging markets.