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This study aims to address the question of what coordination mechanism can be used for cultural production and, in particular, for the governance of music culture production. The authors locate their reflection within the specific institutional innovations introduced in Italy in 2017, focusing on the idea of shared administration and the public–private collaboration instituted in Trentino (a province located in northern Italy) in support of its cultural policy.

This study focusses on the Trentino’s music school system. This includes 13 organisations (musicians’ cooperatives as well as associations of musicians and students, plus one municipal school which do not overlap with the public school system). To analyse shared administration features, the authors rely on selected information from 50 interviews with Trentino Music Schools (TMS) teachers and administrators, and on the proceedings of the 1994 music school conference organised by the schools at the time when this novel educational system was created.

To offer an innovative educational service, the public actor (Provincia Autonoma di Trento [PAT]) and the schools (TMS) have developed a strong interdependence at the different levels of decision-making: PAT needs organisations that are sufficiently structured and organised to respect requirements of transparency and accountability, as well as educational standards, whereas TMS need public funding to maintain their service accessible for users, good labour conditions and be financially sustainable. Likewise, the success of TMS in educating thousands of students every year, including additional teaching programmes funded by PAT within general public schools, has contributed to decrease the exclusion from music education, raise interest in young people for music and fed enrolment in TMS as well as in the public schools related to the conservatoire filière. Conclusions emphasise the existence of a polycentric system of music culture production which needs to acknowledge the risk of being trapped in a static disequilibrium, while recognising change and the need to support and promote a culture of cooperation among schools and across layered institutional levels over time.

Further research can observe this system of cultural production over time, to appreciate changes and organisational tranformations, while introducing comparative analysis with other systems in different regions.

The relationship between the public and private sectors to design, organise and manage activities of collective interest (in the social, cultural, sporting and other fields) can increasingly become an effective and efficient alternative to the traditional bureaucratic as well as to the competitive method. For this to happen, however, all actors involved must be aware not only of areas of efficiency but also of inefficiency. To remedy the latter, corrective measures will have to be introduced. For example, fostering and improving “co-programmazione” and “co-progettazione” means giving all stakeholders involved the opportunity to actively participate. Should the number of participants increase, more discussion fora could be set up because one alone may not be sufficient to foster maximum involvement, to enhance different points of view, to allow for intersectoral and multidisciplinary interpretations and responses.

The system governance based on co-programming and co-design has allowed – despite limitations – to pursue educational purposes and thus well-being for the users, as well as for the teachers and the community as a whole. The continuity of this educational and cultural action has been guaranteed by the economic and financial sustainability of the schools, which is highly dependent on the public actor funding personnel costs, and in turn tied to the number of students (demand) attending each school. Actors embedded in the system need to build awareness of industry and cultural changes and knowledge of how to introduce more adaptive capacity. This points towards the need for strengthening networking capacity and collaboration among schools and other relevant stakeholders.

The case presented is a unique system of music culture production in Italy, and its governance has never been addressed by previous studies. It provides an application of shared administration to which public administrations and communities can learn to improve access to music culture and education. For public and private organisations to take advantage of the method of “co-programmazione” and “co-progettazione”, to make the production of a meritorious good more efficient and to favour its maximum accessibility, this study considers the strengths and weaknesses of this approach, or the areas of efficiency and inefficiency, for which new measures will have to be introduced.

With the continuous improvement of public–private partnership (PPP) projects, the participants' value creation goals are not only limited to achieving the basic performance objectives but also to realising value added. However, the effect of traditional contract management on realising the value creation objectives of PPP projects is limited. According to the view of multifunctional contract, joint-contract functions that integrate contract control and flexibility are likely to be effective in enhancing the value creation of PPP projects. This study aims to explore the effects of joint-contract functions on PPP project value creation and relevant influencing mechanism by investigating the mediating effect of in-role behaviour and extra-role behaviour.

After collecting 258 valid questionnaires from PPP professionals in China, this study used structural equation modelling to validate the hypotheses.

Contract control and flexibility can improve PPP project value creation. Specifically, contract control improves the achievement of the basic contract objectives of PPP projects, whereas contract flexibility enhances the achievement of the value-added of PPP projects. Moreover, only in-role behaviour mediates the effect of contract control on value creation. In addition, the mediating effect of extra-role behaviour on the impact of contract flexibility on value creation is stronger than that of in-role behaviour. The mediating effect of in- and extra-role behaviour is mainly reflected in the realisation of basic and value-added performance, respectively.

The findings of this study can help realise value creation in three ways. Firstly, new perspectives for PPP project value creation should be proposed by combining the improvement of contract objectives and the realisation of the participants' implicit demands. Secondly, the effects of different contract functions on value creation should be analysed instead of a single dimension of contractual governance. Thirdly, the mediating effects of different types of cooperation behaviour that may influence the relationship between contractual governance and value creation should be evaluated.

This study verifies the impacts of different contract functions on PPP project value creation. In addition, cooperative behaviour is embedded as a mediating variable, and the mediated transmission path from contract function to cooperative behaviour and further to PPP project value creation is systematically analysed.

Promoting low-carbon in the construction industry is important for achieving the overall low-carbon goals. Public–private partnership is very popular in public infrastructure projects. However, different perceptions of low-carbon and behaviors of public and private sectors can hinder the realization of low-carbon in these projects. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to cooperate towards low-carbon goals, an evolutionary game model is constructed.

An evolutionary game model that considers the opportunistic behavior of the participants is developed. The evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) under different scenarios are examined, and the factors that influence the willingness to cooperate between the government and private investors are investigated.

The results illustrate that a well-designed system of profit distribution and subsidies can enhance collaboration. Excessive subsidies have negative impact on cooperation between the two sides, because these two sides can weaken income distribution and lead to the free-riding behavior of the government. Under the situation of two ESSs, there is also an optimal revenue distribution coefficient that maximizes the probability of cooperation. With the introduction of supervision and punishment mechanism, the opportunistic behavior of private investors is effectively constrained.

An evolutionary game model is developed to explore the cooperation between the public sector and the private sector in the field of low-carbon construction. Based on the analysis of the model, this paper summarizes the conditions and strategies that can enable the two sectors to cooperate.

Trust is the glue that holds cooperative relationships together and often exists in an asymmetric manner. The purpose of this study is to explore how to mitigate the issue of losses or increased transaction costs caused by opportunistic behavior in a soft environment where trust asymmetry is quite common and difficult to avoid.

This study focuses on examining asymmetric trust between the government and the private sector in public-private partnership (PPP) projects. Drawing upon both project realities and relevant literature, the primary conditional variables influencing asymmetric trust are identified. These variables encompass power perception asymmetry, information asymmetry, interaction behavior, risk perception differences and government-side control. Subsequently, through the use of a survey questionnaire, binary-matched data from both the government and the private sector are collected. The study employs fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to conduct a configurational analysis, aiming to investigate the causal pathways that trigger asymmetric trust.

No single conditional variable is a necessary condition for the emergence of trust asymmetry. The pathways leading to a high degree of trust asymmetry can be categorized into two types: those dominated by power perception and those involving a combination of multiple factors. Differences in power perception play a crucial role in the occurrence of high trust asymmetry, yet the influence of other conditional variables in triggering trust asymmetry should not be overlooked.

The findings can contribute to advancing the study of trust relationships in the field of Chinese PPP projects. Furthermore, they hold practical value in facilitating the enhancement of trust relationships between the government and the private sector.

The risks and uncertainties of public–private partnership (PPP) projects threaten their sustainability. Contract flexibility, which is based on the theory of incomplete contract and transaction cost, may be a viable solution to this issue. The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between contract flexibility and the sustainability performance of PPP projects. The multiple mediating roles of justice perception and cooperation efficiency are assessed, thereby allowing the pathways and conditions to be understood more comprehensively for improving the sustainability performance of PPP projects.

Nine hypotheses in the proposed research model are tested via structural equation modeling using data acquired from 218 Chinese PPP professionals.

Results show that contract flexibility positively affects PPP project sustainability performance. Justice perception and cooperation efficiency play direct and sequential mediating roles in this effect.

This study validates that contract flexibility positively impacts the sustainability performance of PPP projects, where justice perception and cooperation efficiency serve direct and sequential mediating roles. The findings of this study contribute to an improved understanding of the effect of contract flexibility on the sustainability performance of PPP projects. Furthermore, they provide important theoretical and practical insights into contract management as well as beneficial information and valuable initiatives for improving the sustainability of PPP projects.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, it explores the influencing factors of the government’s trust decision-making in the private sector; second, it explores how these influencing factors affect the government’s trust decisions.

A theoretical model was established, and a questionnaire survey was conducted among 152 professionals. The collected datas were analyzed by the structural equation modeling (SEM) method.

The study identified four critical factors that influence the government’s decision to trust the private sector in public-private-partnership (PPP) projects. All the four factors have a positively correlated impact on the government’s trust decision-making. The structural equation path analysis shows that the most important factor affecting the government’s trust decision-making is the trustee’s (private sector) trustworthy characteristics, and the path coefficient is 0.92. The path coefficients of risk perception and the trustor’s trust tendency are 0.83 and 0.74, respectively. The influence of the legal system environment on government trust decision-making is moderate, with a path coefficient of 0.68.

This paper contributes to the literature in two aspects. First, the factors influencing decision-making to government trust in the private sector in PPP projects have been identified. Second, a comprehensive view of the mechanism of government trust in the private sector in PPP projects has been theorized by the SEM method.

Despite the widespread study and application of public-private partnerships (PPPs) since the 1980s, the field lacks a universally accepted definition that captures the concept's complexity. This study aims to offer a definition and foster a more substantive and comprehensive discourse on PPPs to improve communication and understanding between academics and practitioners from diverse disciplines and legislative backgrounds.

Grounded in the family-resemblance concept proposed by German philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, this study conducts a comprehensive literature review to identify core and non-core elements frequently cited in PPP descriptions. The authors used these findings to develop the PPP sunflower model as a structured framework for defining PPPs.

The analysis elucidates six core elements consistently present in PPP descriptions: clarity of roles and responsibilities, appropriate risk allocation and sharing, injection of expertise and resources, cooperation and teamwork, a bundle of services, and long-term contracts. Coupled with identified non-core elements, these core components comprise the PPP sunflower model, a structured framework for defining PPPs that accommodates their multi-faceted nature.

The PPP sunflower model distinguishes itself as a unique contribution to the PPP literature. It offers a rigorous theoretical framework that can elucidate the complexity of PPPs for various stakeholders. The model serves as a practical tool for evaluating the authenticity and viability of PPP projects. The study's novelty lies in its adoption of the family-resemblance concept, thereby providing a comprehensive, multi-dimensional framework that enhances the understanding of PPPs across different disciplines and legislative contexts.

Early termination of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in China is caused by various risk factors, resulting in significant losses. This study aimed to clarify the key factors and identify the causal relationships among these factors.

Social network analysis (SNA) was used to analyze 37 risk factors that were summarized from 97 early terminated PPP cases and to identify the relationships among these key risk factors. Interpretive structural modeling (ISM) was conducted to explore the causal relationships. Data were collected from case documents, questionnaires and interviews.

A total of 17 key risk factors were identified and distributed in a hierarchical structure with six tiers. Among these key risk factors, the root causes affecting the early termination of PPP projects were government oversight in decision-making, local government transition, policy and law changes and force majeure. The direct cause was insufficient returns. Furthermore, local government and private sector defaults were essential mediating factors. Local government transition and the low willingness of the private sector were highlighted as potential key risks.

The cases and experts were all from China, and outcomes in other countries or cultures may differ from those of this study. Therefore, further studies are required.

This research provides knowledge regarding the key risk factors leading to the early termination of PPP projects and guidance on avoiding these factors and blocking the factors' transmission in the project lifecycle.

This study contributes to the knowledge of risk management by emphasizing the importance of local government transition, the low willingness of the private sector and project cooperation and operation, whose significance is ignored in the existing literature. The proposed ISM clarifies the role of risk factors in causing early termination and explains their transmission patterns.

Reasonable risk sharing is the key to the smooth implementation of infrastructure public-private partnership (PPP) projects and the optimization of benefit distribution among the participants. This study aims to explore the risk redistribution ratio between the government and the private sector under different degree of fairness concern.

Renegotiation is a mechanism to provide flexibility and make up for incompleteness of PPP contracts. However, the threshold value of risk redistribution ratio and negotiation cost are not explicitly considered in previous studies. In addition, these studies do not consider the influence of the fairness concern psychology on the negotiation process. To address these gaps, based on risk-income equilibrium analysis, this paper established the bargaining optimization model of PPP projects renegotiation considering the fairness concerns of the negotiating parties. Furthermore, this study analyzed the influence of fairness concern degree on negotiation thresholds, negotiation results, and negotiation incomes under three scenarios.

The results showed that excessive focus on the fairness of incomes may exclude the risk redistribution ratio that is most beneficial to project incomes from the negotiation threshold. Moreover, the increase in the fairness concerns of negotiating parties can reduce the negotiation success period, but the net income may not necessarily be improved.

The main contribution of this paper is to propose a new risk renegotiation methodology based on the risk-income equilibrium analysis, which is helpful to develop risk management strategies in the construction field. The research results can provide government with reference about renegotiation in decision making and provide theoretical support for the practice of PPP renegotiation.

This study aims to develop a collaborative governance framework (CGF) to systematically investigate the impeding factors (IFs) in terms of the operational sustainability of PPPs. It examines the transmission pattern (i.e. the way in which network members react to each other) of the IFs network.

Literature review and interview were adopted to identify the IFs. Then, with the data collected from the interview in China, the social network analysis and interpretive structure model were synergised to examine the chain reaction, driving and dependent powers, and hierarchical structure of the identified IFs.

The results reveal that the cognition, institutional, financial and participation aspects are key barriers confronted by PPP sustainability, and the government plays a leading role in controlling factors causing sustainability-related problems in PPPs. Weak government leadership and institutional environment were identified as the most fundamental reasons triggering a chain of IFs, while project governance and management activities act as bridge nodes that play an intermediary role in the IFs network.

This research contributes to the literature on PPP governance by (1) bridging the literature gap through the development of CGF for explaining the governance of PPP sustainability with a holistic view that considers both macro environment and operational project processes; and (2) identifying the transmission pattern of IFs network which uncovers the underlying dynamics causing the unsustainable operation of PPPs.

This research provides practitioners with a list of key checkpoints for preventing failure escalation, enables decision-makers to prioritise obstacle-mitigation efforts and develop a feasible process to control PPP operation, and offers management countermeasures to remove the key barriers impeding PPP sustainability.

This study is novel for adopting network-oriented techniques to quantify the relative importance of the IFs and examine the transmission pattern of the IFs system. Therefore, it visualises the complex underlying dynamics causing unsustainable PPP operation, identifies root and direct causes of PPP failures, and provides decision-makers with insights into sustaining PPP sustainability from a network-oriented perspective.