Search results

An increasing number of Danish municipalities wish to minimize tax avoidance due to profit shifting in their public procurement. To facilitate this effort, this study aims to develop a firm-level indicator to assess the potential risk of profit shifting (PS-risk) from Danish subsidiaries of multinational corporations to subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions.

Drawing from previous research, PS-risk is assumed to depend on the maximum difference in the effective corporate tax rate between the Danish subsidiary and other subsidiaries under the global ultimate owner, in conjunction with the tax regulations relevant to profit shifting. The top 400 contractors in Danish municipalities from 2017 to 2019 are identified and their relative PS-risk is estimated by combining information about corporate ownership structure with country-specific information on corporate tax rates, tax regulations and profit shifting from three independent data sets.

The PS-risk estimates are highly significantly positively correlated across the data sets and show that 17%–23% of the total procurement sum of the Danish municipalities has been spent on contracts with corporations having a medium to high PS-risk. On average, PS-risk is highest for large non-Scandinavian multinational contractors in sectors such as construction, health and information processing.

Danish public procurers may use the indicator to screen potential suppliers and, if procurement regulations permit, to ensure high-PS-risk bidders document their tax practices.

The PS-risk indicator is novel, and to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the analysis provides the first estimate of PS-risk in Danish public procurement.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the pricing decisions and earning potential of the software supplier and the smart device manufacturer in different software promotion strategies.

Based on game theory, the authors formulate two promotion models, that is, the supplier implements software promotion activities individually (SP model) or outsources the promotion activity to the manufacturer under profit-sharing contract (MP model) when taking different channel power structures into consideration. Besides, in order to test the robustness of the conclusions, the authors also extend the basic model to the following situations: (1) the customers have different price elasticity toward service fee and product price; (2) the revenue sharing contract is employed by the supply chain members; and (3) the manufacturer's product promotion practice is taken into consideration.

The optimal service fee (product price) of the supplier (manufacturer) under SP model is always lower (higher) than that under MP model. Surprisingly, if the supplier is the channel leader and the profit sharing ratio exceeds certain threshold, the manufacturer's profit decreases in profit sharing ratio, which remains robust in three extension models. Moreover, the supply chain's profit in supplier-led game is always lower than that in Nash game irrespective of the promotion strategy in profit sharing context. When revenue sharing contract is adopted, the result holds only when the revenue sharing ratio is relatively low.

The authors originally explore two promotion strategies of the software supplier when taking the channel power structures into considerations, which has not been explored in the literature to the best of the authors' knowledge.

With the rapid development of the sharing economy in manufacturing industries, manufacturers and the equipment suppliers frequently share capacity through the third-party platform. This paper aims to study influences of manufacturers sharing capacity on the supplier and to analyze whether the supplier shares capacity as well as its influences.

This paper deals with conditions that the supplier and manufacturers share capacity through the third-party platform, and the third-party platform competes with the supplier in equipment sales. Considering the heterogeneity of the manufacturer's earning of unit capacity usage and the production efficiency of manufacturer's usage strategies, this paper constructs capacity sharing game models. Then, model equilibrium results under different sharing scenarios are compared.

The results show that when the production or maintenance cost is high, manufacturers sharing capacity simultaneously benefits the supplier, the third-party platform and manufacturers with high earnings of unit capacity usage. When both the rental efficiency and the production cost are low, or both the rental efficiency and the production cost are high, the supplier simultaneously sells equipment and shares capacity. The supplier only sells equipment in other cases. When both the rental efficiency and the production cost are low, the supplier’s sharing capacity realizes the win-win-win situation for the supplier, the third-party platform and manufacturers with moderate earnings of unit capacity usage.

This paper innovatively examines supplier's selling and sharing decisions considering manufacturers sharing capacity. It extends the research on capacity sharing and is important to supplier's operational decisions.

The present study assesses the commercial bank profit efficiency and its relationship to banking sector competition in a rapidly growing emerging economy, India from 2009 to 2019 using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).

Lerner indices, conventional and efficiency-adjusted, quantify competition. Two SFA models are employed to calculate alternative profit efficiency (inefficiency) scores: the two-step time-decay approach proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992) and the recently developed single-step pairwise difference estimator (PDE) by Belotti and Ilardi (2018). In the first step of the BC92 framework, profit inefficiency is calculated, and in the second step, Tobit and Fractional Regression Model (FRM) are utilized to evaluate profit inefficiency correlates. PDE concurrently solves the frontier and inefficiency equations using the maximum likelihood process.

The results suggest that foreign banks are less profit efficient than domestic equivalents, supporting the “home-field advantage” hypothesis in India. Further, increasing competition drives bank managers to make riskier lending and investment choices, decreasing bank profit efficiency. However, this effect varies depending on bank ownership and size.

Literature on the competition bank efficiency link is conspicuously scant, with a focus on technical and cost efficiency. Less is known regarding the influence of competition on bank profit efficiency. The article is one of the first to examine commercial bank profit efficiency and its relationship to banking sector competition. Additionally, the study work represents one of the first applications of the FRM presented by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and the PDE provided by Belotti and Ilardi (2018).

Diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) have become prioritized goals of business, such as hiring more women and racial minorities. This study adds to the body of research regarding the value of diversity in organizations by examining the relationship between diversity at the workforce level and the financial performance of the organization. The empirical results of prior research have provided mixed results, finding mainly positive, but also negative, and nonsignificant relationships (Sharma et al., 2020; Vlas et al., 2022). The purpose of this study is to examine the current employment status of women and racial minorities in top US companies, then analyze if a correlation exists between a company’s profit margin and its percentage of women and racial minority employees and managers.

This study examined the top 200 companies in the Fortune 500 companies; these are the largest companies by revenue in the USA. Companies were ranked according to each variable (% of women employees, % of racial minority employees, % of women managers and % of racial minority managers) and then divided into equal quartiles. The mean profit margin for the top quartile was compared with the mean profit margin for the bottom quartile. T-tests were used to determine whether significant differences in profit margin exist between companies. This methodology of comparing top and bottom quartiles was developed in prior studies.

Fortune 200 companies have an average of 40% women and also 40% racial minorities in their workforce. Both women and racial minorities account for a smaller percentage of managers. Women account for 34% of managers, while racial minorities account for 29%. There is a significant positive relationship between profit margin and two of the variables. Companies with 45% or more women managers have a significantly higher profit margin than companies with the lowest percentages of women managers. Companies with 48% or more racial minority employees have a significantly higher profit margin than companies with the lowest percentages of racial minority employees. These findings are in-line with the existing body of research that has found mixed impacts of diversity on firm performance (cf. Hoobler et al., 2018; Leung et al., 2022) and draws attention to the need to consider the impact of gender and racial diversity on firms at various management levels within the firm to better understand the impact that increasing diversity has on firm performance (cf. Curado et al., 2022).

This paper adds to the body of knowledge by assessing the current status of women and racial minorities in top US companies and, then, analyzing if a correlation exists between a company’s profit margin and the number of women and racial minority employees and managers. Findings provide companies with further incentive to maintain DEI as a prioritized goal.

The purpose of this paper is to study the US stock market and try to explain why short-term contrarian profits have largely disappeared in the past two decades.

In this work, the authors decompose the short-term contrarian profits into cross-sectional variations, firm-level overreactions and lead-lag effects to study the changes in their shares. Then, the authors study the behavior of the subgroups in the winner and loser subportfolios of contrarian investment strategies.

The authors find that short-term contrarian profits have largely vanished since 2000. Changes in the shares of the three components of contrarian profits, which are cross-sectional variations, firm-level overreactions and lead-lag effects, are not the main reason for the disappearance of contrarian profits in the past two decades. Instead, the disappearance of short-term contrarian profits is primarily due to the heterogeneous evolution of subgroups in the portfolio, which leads to a decrease in the overall level of overreactions that drive the contrarian profit.

The work explains the disappearance of short-term contrarian profits in the US stock market.

The purpose of this study is to propose a model of competition between a formal lender (bank) and an informal lender (moneylender) with informational asymmetry between these two lenders. Further, the authors introduce capacity constraint on the lending capacity of the moneylender and assume that borrowers differ in risk and wealth.

The solution concept of Nash equilibrium has been used to derive the optimal strategies of the lenders.

The equilibrium strategies in most of the results depend on the difference between the expected returns from risky and safe projects where the risky project has higher expected returns. The credit market is segmented in terms of risk and wealth levels. Rationing of poor safe borrowers from the credit market is inevitable when the moneylender's capacity is sufficiently small, suggesting a low-income trap for them. Further, when moneylender has capacity constraint of some form, a zero-profit outcome is never a Nash equilibrium outcome.

There is a possibility of collusion between the lenders. However, the authors do not derive all possible outcomes under capacity constraint

When the informal lender has limited capacity, competition between formal and informal lenders may not alleviate credit rationing, instead aggravate the problem. Thus, the government should devise policies to ensure credit availability to resource poor households

While the literature models strategic interaction between lenders under the assumption of zero-profit (Bertrand Paradox) condition, this study shows that zero profit is not the only outcome under such a set-up. Also, in presence of capacity constraint of the moneylender, a zero-profit outcome is never a Nash equilibrium outcome for the lenders. There is an optimal contract at which the lenders differentiate in terms of repayment and collateral and earn positive profits under certain conditions.

This paper aims to seek answers to the question: What are the relevant factors that allow not-for-profit innovation networks to successfully transition new technologies from proof-of-concept to commercialisation?

This question is examined using the knowledge-based view and network orchestration theory. Data are collected from 35 interviews with managers and engineers working within seven centres that comprise the High Value Manufacturing Catapult (HVMC). These centres constitute a not-for-profit innovation network where suppliers, customers and competitors collaborate to help transition new technologies across the “Valley of Death” (the gap between establishing a proof of concept and commercialisation).

Network orchestration theory suggests that a hub firm facilitates the exchange of knowledge amongst network members (knowledge mobility), to enable these members to profit from innovation (innovation appropriability). The hub firm ensures positive network growth, and also allows for the entry and exit of network members (network stability). This study of not-for-profit innovation networks suggests the role of a network orchestrator is to help ensure that intellectual property becomes a public resource that enhances the productivity of the domestic economy. The authors observed how network stability was achieved by the HVMC's seven centres employing a loosely-coupled hybrid network configuration. This configuration however ensured that new technology development teams, comprised of suppliers, customers and competitors, remained tightly-coupled to enable co-development of innovative technologies. Matching internal technical and sectoral expertise with complementary experience from network members allowed knowledge to flow across organisational boundaries and throughout the network. Matrix organisational structures and distributed decision-making authority created opportunities for knowledge integration to occur. Actively moving individuals and teams between centres also helped to diffuse knowledge to network members, while regular meetings between senior management ensured network coordination and removed resource redundancies.

The study contributes to knowledge-based theory by moving beyond existing understanding of knowledge integration in firms, and identified how knowledge is exchanged and aggregated within not-for-profit innovation networks. The findings contribute to network orchestration theory by challenging the notion that network orchestrators should enact and enforce appropriability regimes (patents, licences, copyrights) to allow members to profit from innovations. Instead, the authors find that not-for-profit innovation networks can overcome the frictions that appropriability regimes often create when exchanging knowledge during new technology development. This is achieved by pre-defining the terms of network membership/partnership and setting out clear pathways for innovation scaling, which embodies newly generated intellectual property as a public resource. The findings inform a framework that is useful for policy makers, academics and managers interested in using not-for-profit networks to transition new technologies across the Valley of Death.

This paper aims to analyze the potentials of dynamic, commitment and revenue-sharing contracts; that a nonrebate offering manufacturer can use to safeguard his profit while his competitor offers customer rebates in a supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and a common retailer.

We consider a two-period supply chain model to explore optimal decisions under eight possible scenarios based on the contract and rebate offering decisions. Because the manufacturers are selling substitutable products, therefore, a customer rebate on one of the products negatively impacts the selling quantity of other. Optimal price, rebate, and quantities are examined and compared to explore the strategic choice for both the rebate offering and non-rebate offering manufacturer. Comparative evaluation is conducted to pinpoint how the parameters such as contract parameters and its nature affect the members.

The results demonstrate that all these contracts instigate the rebate offering manufacturer to provide a higher rebate, but do not ensure a higher profit. If the revenue sharing contract is offered to the common retailer, the effectiveness of the rebate program might reduce significantly, and the rebate offering manufacturer might receives lower profits. A non-rebate offering manufacturer might use a commitment contract to ensure higher profits for all the members and make sure the common retailer continues the product.

The effect of customer rebate vs. supply chain contract under competition has not yet been explored comprehensively. Therefore, the study contributes to the literature regarding interplay among pricing decision, contract choice and rebate promotion in a two-period setting. The conceptual and managerial insights contribute to a better understanding of strategic decision-making for both competing manufacturers under consumer rebates.

The purpose of this study is to investigate how two types of drivers, namely, executive compensation and market competition, can affect hospital quality in the USA. Recently, patients, insurers and regulators have increasingly focused on hospital quality. Understanding the interplay of incentives in this industry is important because in 2019, hospital treatment contributed $1.161bn to health-care costs in the USA. This study answers the call for more studies in the so-called “mixed” industry, where ownership differences can affect organizational objectives and operating constraints.

This study explores the roles of hospital executive compensation and industry competition as determinants of health-care quality. Specifically, the study probes the heterogeneity in the factors that influence quality across hospital types in the USA.

Using California hospital data from 2006 through 2020, the findings show that the effects of compensation and competition on hospital quality differ by ownership type. Executive compensation is positively associated with quality in for-profit hospitals but is not associated with that of nonprofit hospitals, suggesting for-profit hospitals are more likely to use higher levels of compensation to attract managers with higher ability, whereas the utility function for nonprofit managers may be multidimensional. Within the nonprofit hospital group, competition is more positively associated with quality for religious nonprofits relative to secular nonprofits, suggesting that competition provides more monitoring for religious hospitals.

Taken together, the findings provide evidence that the drivers of quality vary across hospitals in ways consistent with differences in constraints and objectives across ownership types. The findings are important for regulators seeking to incentivize higher quality. For example, Medicare in the USA has incorporated quality measures into its new hospital reimbursement scheme (value-based purchasing) to incentivize quality. This study proposes that regulators should consider differences across ownership types when evaluating the best ways to incentivize hospital quality.