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The evaluation of maintenance tenders is a task that involves not only consideration of the prices offered, but the financial and technical expertise of the tenderers as well. The evaluations can be highly complicated and lengthy when dealing with large projects and numerous tenderers. Presents an evaluation methodology in the form of a tabular procedure to be used by the evaluators of maintenance contracts. Develops seven tables to provide quantitative values for the submitted tenders. The first five tables are designed to evaluate the technical efficiency of the tenderers, while the sixth table is designed for the final evaluation including prices. In the first table, the tender compliance as per the requirement of the tender document is evaluated. Uses the second table to evaluate the support and maintenance plan. The third table presents an evaluation of the experience and the financial status of the tenderer. The fourth and fifth tables are used to evaluate the tenderer’s staffing proposal and how it is related to the requirements of the project. The sixth table summarizes the evaluation of the previous four tables for each evaluator. The seventh table illustrates the final evaluation of each tenderer, and hence a decision could be made. By adding the average technical score of each tenderer to his price score, the evaluator can easily rate each tenderer’s ability to carry out the work rather than depending only on price, which might not always mean a good choice.

Target cost contracts are growing in popularity but concerns remain about the interplay between fee, target, sharing ratios and the final price. This paper offers a fundamental analysis of the principles under‐pinning target contracts. It shows that there is scope for manipulation of tenders and that suboptimal methods of tender evaluation are in use. The paper analyses both fixed fee and percentage fee contracts. Methods of tender evaluation are proposed that will both reduce the scope for manipulation by tenderers and increase the likelihood of the contract being awarded to the tenderer whose final price will be the lowest. The analysis reveals a strong case for setting the contractor's share of cost overrun or underrun at a value that is not less than 50%. Finally, the paper proposes two simplifications that would reduce the number of variables in target cost contracts of the future. One is for the employer to set the fee and the other requires only that a target be tendered but with the fee built into it.

During the tendering process for most major construction contracts there is the opportunity for bidders to suggest alternative innovative solutions. Clearly clients are keen to take advantage of these opportunities, and equally contractors want to use their expertise to establish competitive advantage. Both parties may very well benefit from the encouragement of such innovation and the availability of cheaper methods of construction than have been contemplated by the tendering authority. However recent developments in common law have raised doubts about the ability of owners to seek alternative tenders without placing themselves at risk of litigation. This common law has recognised the existence of the so‐called “tendering contract” or “process contract”. Since the tendering process is inherently price competitive, the application of the tendering contract concept is likely to severely inhibit the opportunity for alternative tenders. The “tendering contract” is automatically brought into being upon the timely submission of a conforming tender. This is contrary to the traditional view that an invitation to tender was considered to be no more than an invitation to treat, therefore submission of a tender creates obligations for neither party. Under the “tendering contract”, the owner becomes obliged to treat all tenderers equally and fairly. This paper is primarily based on the literature review. The aim of this paper is to highlight the problems with the competitive tendering process in relation to contractor‐led innovation and explore ways in which owners can develop procurement procedures that will allow and encourage innovation from contractors.

The British North American colonies were the first western economies to rely on legislature-issued paper monies as an important internal media of exchange. This system arose piecemeal. In the absence of banks and treasuries that exchanged paper monies at face value for specie monies on demand, colonial governments experimented with other ways to anchor their paper monies to real values in the economy. These mechanisms included tax-redemption, land-backed loans, sinking funds, interest-bearing notes, and legal tender laws. I assess and explain the structure and performance of these mechanisms. This was monetary experimentation on a grand scale.

This chapter focuses on policy intervention that has grown in popularity in the UK since the financial crisis of 2008. The focus is on inclusive growth and more specifically, community wealth building. The concept has been picked up by institutions and think tanks at multiple scales from the OECD to local government. We aim to address the tensions in community wealth building and in particular how local authorities in the UK are adjusting their procurements strategies to increase the tendering capabilities of SMEs in their political geography.

We introduce a UK-based study utilising an ESRC-funded case study, desktop research and semi-structured interviews to investigate how well the region of Greater Manchester (GM) ecosystem was equipped to prepare small firms to learn how to compete for public contracts with evidence applicable to other large-scale tenders.

Overall, at the time of writing business support across GM does not create the value proposition of enabling small firms to be capable at tendering and thus undermines community wealth building (CWB) efforts. The advice on offer is sparse; it offers partial or no advice about different capabilities and is often limited to simple guidance stating procurement rules and compliance demands. Information is often abstract and technical support is also fragmented, making it unlikely that small firms will find resources. Advice fails to engage with evidence on how small firms learn and to provide a learning process. In particular, support to raise absorptive capacity and strategic commitment to tendering, build basic tender readiness and develop and refresh tendering capability is not evident. Training, coaching and peer learning are largely absent.

UK appears to be an experimental ground for CWB with dedicated think tanks and several examples such as the ‘Preston Model’. GM is a suitably sized and comparable region to offer transferable knowledge and indicators to support regions to innovate. We offer a ‘Dashboard of Priorities’ to enhance business support to SMEs so they can win at tendering, thus strengthening CWB policy and impact. Furthermore, we are adding clarity to a fuzzy definition of CWB and define inclusive procurement. We assist global policymakers to answer the fundamental question; are we doing all that we can with these significant resources to create an economy which truly benefits the people? By examining the ideas of community wealth building and inclusive procurement from a local authority and SME perspective, we can extrapolate finings for international comparison and offer an in-depth look at how the execution of this policy can be strengthened to deliver maximum benefit to their communities. The implication is to focus attention on how institutions (public or private), by way of better execution, can enhance the economic resilience of their own local ecosystems/places.

Fluctuations in the tender price index have an adverse effect on the construction sector and the economy at large. This is largely due to the positive relationship that exists between the construction industry and economic growth. The consequences of these variations include cost overruns and schedule delays, among others. An accurate forecast of the tender price index is good for controlling the uncertainty associated with its variation. In the present study, the efficacy of using an adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system (ANFIS) for tender price forecasting is investigated. In addition, the Box–Jenkins model, which is considered a benchmark technique, was used to evaluate the performance of the ANFIS model. The results demonstrate that the ANFIS model is superior to the Box–Jenkins model in terms of the accuracy and reliability of the forecast. The ANFIS could provide an accurate and reliable forecast of the tender price index in the medium term (i.e. over a three-year period). This chapter provides evidence of the advantages of applying nonlinear modelling techniques (such as the ANFIS) to tender price index forecasting. Although the proposed ANFIS model is applied to the tender price index in this study, it can also be applied to a wider range of problems in the field of construction engineering and management.

Competitive tendering in South Africa is often associated with procurement based on the lowest fee tendered. Previous research on this topic did not provide in-depth examinations of how pricing within consulting engineering companies was affected by competitive tendering nor did it illuminate the extent to which professional services were impacted by competitive tendering. This paper aims to examine the implications of competitive tendering on pricing and delivery of consulting engineering services in South Africa.

A survey research strategy with a questionnaire as the research instrument elicited qualitative data from 28 experienced consulting engineers in South Africa. Thematic analysis was used to analyse qualitative data from the questionnaires.

Three key themes were identified, namely: considerations when determining consulting engineering fees on competitively tendered projects; the impact of reduced fees due to competitive tendering on the delivery of consulting engineering services; and interventions to prevent unsustainably “low” professional fees. Many consulting engineers in South Africa still determine fees using fee scales, while other considerations include resources, project complexity, risk, etc. Most participants asserted that design optimisation/value engineering, training, meetings and construction monitoring were adversely impacted by “low” fees.

This paper provides in-depth qualitative feedback from experienced consulting engineers (most having more than 20 years’ experience) on a topical issue in the South African construction industry. Thematic analysis was a novel method of analysis that was not used previously in this area of study.

Skewed pricing is a typical tactic used by tenderers in unit price projects to gain additional advantages at the expense of the owner or other competing tenderers. This paper aims to describe the development of a model for detecting skewed pricing in competitive tendering for unit price contracts.

The model evaluates how much the offered unit rates for work items deviate from the reasonable rate identified from the item’s submitted unit rates. Item rate deviations are integrated into a total deviation score for each submitted tender based on the relative weight of the work item to the total project amount. The model allows for assigning higher weights to work items that are more prone to skewed pricing, such as those that are performed early and those that are expected to experience quantity fluctuations.

The paper presents a detection model that uses only the submitted prices of the competing tenderers to perform the needed calculations, which reduces subjectivity in identifying skewed tenders. Two examples are given to demonstrate how the model may be used to detect skewed tenders.

The model supports tendering officials in the challenging task of identifying skewed tenders, which is required by rules and regulations governing public procurement. The model’s ease of use is expected to make it more widely used as a decision-support tool during the tender evaluation stage of real-world projects.

Despite the digitalization reforms attempting to enhance public service quality, paper-based tendering is still widely used in a number of developing countries (i.e. Morocco). This has led to many issues including waste of time, higher costs as well as labor-intensive issues. E-tendering has been widely recommended as a key resolution. Still, both scholars and practitioners raised concerns related the readiness of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to this digitalization process. The current research aims to investigate the key drivers of SMEs intention to adopt electronic tendering in the context of an emerging African market (i.e. Morocco). Specifically, the authors focus on SMEs contributing to the public procurement process and registered in the online portal recently created by the Moroccan government.

To achieve this goal, the authors proposed a conceptual model combining the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) and technology acceptance model (TAM). Based on data collected from suppliers participating in Moroccan public tenders, the authors empirically tested the conceptual model using a partial least squares (PLS) estimation.

Facilitating conditions and social influence had a positive impact on SMEs intention to adopt electronic tendering. The study’s findings also convey a negative impact of effort expectancy on SMEs intent to adopt e-tendering. Unexpectedly, perceived performance had no significant impact on the intention to adopt electronic bidding among Moroccan SMEs.

This research filled the gap in the literature with regards to SMEs e-Tendering readiness in emerging markets. With the recent digitalization reforms of public tendering in many developing economies (i.e. Morocco), the study findings can be used to improve not only government implementation of electronic bidding but also SMEs' user experience.