Search results

This study examines specific budget execution items (as proxies of vulnerability and sustainability) along with political factors to identify earnings management (EM) practices in Greek municipalities.

The study employs a sample of 1,831 financial and budget execution statements for the period 2011–2019. EM is proxied by unsigned discretionary accruals that are assessed through the performance-matched modified-Jones model and the modified-Jones model.

The findings provide evidence that the municipality’s dependence on subsidies (or its self-sufficiency) affects EM, especially during the pre-election year. Municipalities that maintain their financial autonomy engage less in EM in pre-election years. Lastly, it is proven that electoral cycles, weak opposition and other variables exert an effect on the size of EM. Sensitivity analysis confirms the results.

This paper contributes to the literature on EM by analyzing for the first time budget execution items (as proxies of vulnerability and sustainability) and their impact on the size of unsigned discretionary accruals.

This study aims to develop a collaborative governance framework (CGF) to systematically investigate the impeding factors (IFs) in terms of the operational sustainability of PPPs. It examines the transmission pattern (i.e. the way in which network members react to each other) of the IFs network.

Literature review and interview were adopted to identify the IFs. Then, with the data collected from the interview in China, the social network analysis and interpretive structure model were synergised to examine the chain reaction, driving and dependent powers, and hierarchical structure of the identified IFs.

The results reveal that the cognition, institutional, financial and participation aspects are key barriers confronted by PPP sustainability, and the government plays a leading role in controlling factors causing sustainability-related problems in PPPs. Weak government leadership and institutional environment were identified as the most fundamental reasons triggering a chain of IFs, while project governance and management activities act as bridge nodes that play an intermediary role in the IFs network.

This research contributes to the literature on PPP governance by (1) bridging the literature gap through the development of CGF for explaining the governance of PPP sustainability with a holistic view that considers both macro environment and operational project processes; and (2) identifying the transmission pattern of IFs network which uncovers the underlying dynamics causing the unsustainable operation of PPPs.

This research provides practitioners with a list of key checkpoints for preventing failure escalation, enables decision-makers to prioritise obstacle-mitigation efforts and develop a feasible process to control PPP operation, and offers management countermeasures to remove the key barriers impeding PPP sustainability.

This study is novel for adopting network-oriented techniques to quantify the relative importance of the IFs and examine the transmission pattern of the IFs system. Therefore, it visualises the complex underlying dynamics causing unsustainable PPP operation, identifies root and direct causes of PPP failures, and provides decision-makers with insights into sustaining PPP sustainability from a network-oriented perspective.

The purpose of this research is to expand a better understanding of how corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives affect climate for innovation and opportunism within architectural design firms (ADFs).

The literature review and discussions with industry practitioners identified an initial list of variables. A questionnaire survey was developed, validated and delivered to employees working in ADFs. 226 valid responses were collected. Then, the structural equation modeling (SEM) method was employed to empirically investigate the relationships between CSR performance, climate for innovation and opportunism in a single integrative model.

The results empirically support that CSR performance has a positive effect on climate for innovation and a negative effect on opportunism. In addition, climate for innovation shows a negative effect on opportunism.

This research highlights that CSR performance is essential for ADFs to better achieve sustainable development. By doing CSR activities, climate for innovation in ADFs is expected to be improved, and a sense of opportunism is mitigated. The findings of this paper are explicitly delivered in the context of Vietnamese ADFs and could not be straightforwardly generalized or translated to the construction industry or other sectors in different research contexts.

The findings show that a climate for innovation is crucial in ADFs. Business managers are encouraged to employ CSR initiatives to foster an innovation climate and reduce a sense of opportunism within ADFs.

This study is one of the first attempts to investigate the relationships between CSR performance, climate for innovation, and opportunism within ADFs. While the findings highlight the critical role of CSR performance, the study argues that CSR should be carefully implemented because there are no “one-size-fits-all” CSR strategies for different business contexts.

This study which is positioned in the ambit of control research investigates the impact of ex ante contractual completeness on opportunistic behaviors and ex post transaction costs, while assessing how these affect relationship termination intention. This study aims to examine alternative attractiveness as a necessary moderator of the nexus between transaction cost and relationship termination intention.

Data gathered from 211 companies in South Korea that have installed and run outsourced vending machines are analyzed and used to validate the study’s theoretical and empirical contributions.

The findings, which rely only on data from companies that outsource and those that run outsourced vending machines, show that contractual completeness negatively affects both active and passive opportunism. The study also discovers that active opportunism positively affects both bargaining costs and monitoring costs, whereas passive opportunism has a positive and direct effect on maladaptation costs but a negative effect on monitoring costs. It further finds that both bargaining and maladaptation costs have positive and direct effects on relationship termination intention, while monitoring costs have a negative effect on the same. Furthermore, it is observed that alternative attractiveness moderates the relationships between bargaining costs and relationship termination intention, as well as maladaptation costs and relationship termination intention.

This study demonstrates that contractual completeness can serve as an important ex ante control mechanism, whereas the two types of opportunism can raise transaction costs. Furthermore, alternative attractiveness is identified as a driver of the impact of transaction costs on relationship termination intention.

A key point of the departure of this study is that it examines the moderating role of alternative attractiveness in the relationship between transaction cost and relationship termination intention. The paper also advances the control literature by emphasizing the critical role that contractual completeness plays in reducing the occurrence of (both active and passive) opportunism in business relationships (especially companies that outsource).

The purpose of this study is to determine the dimensions of cultural differences, which are theoretically most relevant to contract functions in international marketing. Moreover, the contradiction between contract governance and opportunism is reconciled by exploring the boundary conditions of specific cultural differences.

The authors obtained 235 bilateral data provided by Chinese exporters and overseas distributors. The authors matched a secondary data set with the questionnaire data, which were analyzed by confirmatory factor analysis and a hierarchical moderation model.

The results demonstrate that while contract specificity is less successful in this area, contingency adaptability is useful in reducing opportunism. Moreover, as the national cultural differences regarding uncertainty avoidance, power distance or individualism-collectivism become more pronounced. One contractual dimension will be more effective at curbing opportunism, while the other will be less effective.

Despite sample limitations, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to theoretically identify the effect of cultural difference dimensions in contract governance, unlike past studies taking cultural differences as an aggregated variable. Furthermore, by exploring the boundary conditions of cultural differences, this paper effectively reconciles the conflicting findings on the relationship between contract governance and opportunism in various cultural context.

Exporters’ managers can design contingency adaptability to complement the limitations of contract specificity and consider cultural differences’ contingency effects.

First, the authors identify cultural differences dimensions related to contract governance, refining and emphasizing the research context. Second, comparing the efficacy of contract specificity and contingency adaptability in specific cultural context can show which contract is better at preventing opportunism.

Trade credit is an important business-to-business marketing tool for building firms’ competitive advantage. Many studies explore the determinants of trade credits from a trust-based view, but the role of political connections is largely overlooked, despite their potential influence in assessing firms’ trustworthiness in the context of emerging economies. This study aims to fill this gap by examining how political connections affect the capacity of emerging economy firms (EEFs) to grant and receive trade credit.

This study tests a conceptual model using secondary data collected from 1,149 Chinese privately owned listed manufacturing firms between 2008 and 2016.

This study finds that political connections reduce EEFs’ accounts receivable and payable; their philanthropic activities alleviate this negative effect for accounts payable, while patent applications reduce it for accounts receivable. These findings suggest the effect of political connections can spillover to EEFs’ relationship with their up- and down-stream partners.

This study has implications EEF managers, particularly in pointing to the detrimental effect of political connections on relationships with buyers and suppliers, and highlights the need to adopt suitable approaches to offset this effect.

This study sheds new light on the negative effect of political connections on EEFs’ capacity to grant and receive trade credit in their exchanges with up-stream and down-stream partners. It enriches the trust-based view of trade credit by revealing the significant influence of EEFs’ political connections, while also advancing a contingency view by testing the moderating role of corporate philanthropic activities and patent applications.

This study focused on establishing the mediating role of opportunistic behavior in the relationship between institutional pressures and procurement cycle time (PCT) in Uganda’s central government (CG) procuring and disposing entities (PDEs). The study also sought to establish the relationship between institutional pressures and PCT, between institutional pressures and opportunity behavior and between opportunistic behavior and PCT. This study was carried out because most PDEs had failed to perform well in terms of PCT, and beneficiaries had often complained of the lengthy PCT.

The unit of analysis was 126 CG PDEs within Uganda while the unit of inquiry was three employees per PDE, namely, giving a total of 378 respondents. Using a quantitative cross-sectional survey, the study realized a response rate of 88% for the unit of analysis and 71.7% for unit of inquiry. Data were analyzed using SmartPLS 4 with focus on ascertaining regression and mediation results.

The findings show that institutional pressures negatively and significantly predict both institutional pressures and PCT (ß = –0.569**; ß = –0.688**, respectively). Also, institutional pressures and opportunistic behavior are significant predictors of PCT, predicting 60.6% change in PCT. Furthermore, opportunity behavior partially moderates the relationship between institutional pressures and PCT.

For Uganda’s CG PDEs to reduce procurement delays and to procure within PCT, they should put more emphasis on institutional pressures and curtailing opportunistic behavior. The study recommends further amendment of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (PPDA) Act 2003 to reduce delays.

There is need for further amendment of the PPDA Act 2003 to reduce delays, especially those attributed to approvals by contracts committee and the minimum bidding period for competitive bidding.

The study explores PCT and its antecedents whose understanding is critical in exploring avenues of reducing PCT and boosting service delivery to the beneficiaries.

The PPDA Act (2003) was amended in 2014, but still the time spent in the procurement processes has remained long, hence delaying or denying citizens service delivery. This is a matter of concern to the country at large and may spill into political unrests, and yet, there is scant literature exploring PCT and its antecedents. This makes the present study one of the pioneer empirical studies on PCT, with emphasis on Uganda. This study provides a framework for examining PCT in a context where scholarly explanation of PCT is still limited.

The understanding of how to mitigate opportunism in construction projects is still limited and conflicting. The complexity of causalities and interdependence among antecedents of opportunism (transaction characteristics and governance mechanisms) is the major obstacle to current research. This study takes a holistic perspective to explore the different combinations of conditions that lead to high opportunism and low opportunism in project management.

Through 2 phases of the interview and questionnaire survey, the 91 valid survey data were collected from the buyer–seller relationships in construction projects and analyzed by adopting fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis.

A single transaction characteristic is rarely sufficient to explain opportunism, and combinations of different transaction characteristics and governance mechanisms (performance ambiguity, asset specificity, buyer's requirement certainty, informal control, and formal control) have different effects on opportunism. In the case of extremely unsatisfactory transaction characteristics, even the combination of formal and informal control cannot prevent high opportunism. The combination including low-formal control and high-asset specificity easily leads to high opportunism. Besides, performance ambiguity is a vital factor in mitigating high opportunism or achieving low opportunism.

Previous studies have always addressed the role of one or some factors independently and separately. This study is one of the first to explore the different combinations of conditions that result in high opportunism and low opportunism in project management based on transaction costs economics and agency theory.

Transaction cost economics sees a broad spectrum of governance structures spanned by two types of economic adaptation: autonomous and cooperative. Stakeholder theorists have drawn much inspiration from transaction cost economics but have not paid explicit attention to the centrality of the idea of adaptation in this literature. This study aims to address this gap.

The authors develop a novel conceptual framework applying the distinction between the two types of economic adaptation to stakeholder theory.

The authors argue that the idea of cooperative adaptation is particularly useful for describing the firm’s collaboration with primary stakeholders in the joint value creation process. In contrast, autonomous adaptation is more relevant for firms interacting with secondary stakeholders who are not directly engaged in joint value creation and may not have formal contractual relationships with the firm. Accordingly, cooperative adaptation can be seen as vital for resolving team production problems affecting joint value creation, whereas autonomous adaptation addresses how the firm maintains legitimacy within the larger stakeholder environment.

Similar to its significance for transaction cost economics, the distinction between the two types of adaptation equips stakeholder theory with a new systematic understanding of a potentially broad spectrum of firm–stakeholder collaboration forms.