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This study which is positioned in the ambit of control research investigates the impact of ex ante contractual completeness on opportunistic behaviors and ex post transaction costs, while assessing how these affect relationship termination intention. This study aims to examine alternative attractiveness as a necessary moderator of the nexus between transaction cost and relationship termination intention.

Data gathered from 211 companies in South Korea that have installed and run outsourced vending machines are analyzed and used to validate the study’s theoretical and empirical contributions.

The findings, which rely only on data from companies that outsource and those that run outsourced vending machines, show that contractual completeness negatively affects both active and passive opportunism. The study also discovers that active opportunism positively affects both bargaining costs and monitoring costs, whereas passive opportunism has a positive and direct effect on maladaptation costs but a negative effect on monitoring costs. It further finds that both bargaining and maladaptation costs have positive and direct effects on relationship termination intention, while monitoring costs have a negative effect on the same. Furthermore, it is observed that alternative attractiveness moderates the relationships between bargaining costs and relationship termination intention, as well as maladaptation costs and relationship termination intention.

This study demonstrates that contractual completeness can serve as an important ex ante control mechanism, whereas the two types of opportunism can raise transaction costs. Furthermore, alternative attractiveness is identified as a driver of the impact of transaction costs on relationship termination intention.

A key point of the departure of this study is that it examines the moderating role of alternative attractiveness in the relationship between transaction cost and relationship termination intention. The paper also advances the control literature by emphasizing the critical role that contractual completeness plays in reducing the occurrence of (both active and passive) opportunism in business relationships (especially companies that outsource).

The purpose of this study is to examine whether contractual completeness is a cornerstone to stakeholder management in Public–Private Partnership (PPP) projects in Uganda.

This study adopted a cross-sectional and quantitative approach. Data were collected by means of a questionnaire survey from a sample of 103 PPP projects in Uganda. Partial Least squares structural equation modeling was used to analyze the data.

The study found that contractual completeness dimensions (contractual obligatoriness, contingency adaptability, issue inclusiveness, term specificity) are all significantly and positively associated with stakeholder management in PPP projects in Uganda.

This paper is one of the few studies on stakeholder management in PPP projects from a developing country’s perspective, thus contributing to scanty literature on how to manage stakeholders in PPP projects.

This paper is limited to the relationship between contract completeness dimensions and stakeholder management in PPP projects in Uganda. Future studies should be conducted on other factors that affect stakeholder management in PPP projects in Uganda.

Our results imply that when all the relevant issues are included in the contract, contract terms are explicitly stipulated, all the unanticipated changes are described and when all the parties involved are restrained by a binding force of a contract, conflicts and opportunism reduces and stakeholders concerns are addressed.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate purchasing practices in service triads by exploring the link between ex ante contracting and ex post contract management and how these practices influence the satisfaction of buyers and suppliers (in concessionary arrangements) with their relationship in terms of meeting the needs of the buyer’s customers.

An in-depth exploratory multiple case study was carried out in a shop-in-shop context. Multi-method and multi-source data collection included interviews, documents and the contracts between buyer and supplier, providing evidence of the formal and relational structures in both the contracting and contract management stages.

The case findings provide evidence that behavioural standards established in a social contract are important prerequisites for the establishment and subsequent management of a formal contract. Second, this study shows that, when outsourcing core services in a service triad, a combination of performance-oriented and behavioural-oriented contract terms, covering a mix of topics related to both the customer-experience and to buyer-supplier-oriented aspects, contribute to aligning the buyer’s, suppliers’ and customers’ interests. The main findings are presented in a causal model and formulated as propositions.

This paper is one of the first studies to explore how core services are outsourced in a service triad. It provides evidence that the social contract between buyer and supplier influences the establishment of the formal contract as well as contract management, and a mix of contract topics, some related to the customers’ experience and others purely buyer-supplier oriented, contribute to the alignment of buyer’s, suppliers’ and customers’ interests.

Given the pivotal influence of institutional forces, an important yet underexplored question in supply chain management literature is how contractual and relational governance jointly affect supplier performance under weak legislative environments. This study tends to solve the debate by distinguishing contractual definability from contractual enforceability and by considering the contingent role of legal development in China.

Using a combined dataset of secondary data and a survey of 224 buyer–supplier dyads in China, this study examines how contractual definability and contractual enforceability interact with relational governance differently in driving supplier performance, and assesses the contingent role of legal development.

This study finds that contractual definability complements yet contractual enforceability substitutes relational governance in affecting supplier performance. Moreover, legal development weakens the complementary effect but strengthens the substitutive effect.

The study firstly enriches supply chain management literature by classifying the roles of contracts into contractual definability and contractual enforceability and showing their differential interplay with relational governance. Second, the study contributes to the complements–substitutes debate by revealing the shifting role of legal development. Third, the research enriches the understanding of supply chain management in the Chinese market.

This study aims to investigate how contractual vs. informal governance influences the performance of collaborative innovation projects considering their exploitation vs. exploration character.

Data are collected from a sample of 218 companies that have developed innovative projects in collaboration with other organizations. Regression models are estimated to test the hypotheses.

The results indicate that contractual governance is the most effective for co-exploitation projects compared to informal governance. Specialization in either contractual or informal governance is more effective for co-exploration projects.

Developing collaborative innovation projects with other organizations is an alternative for firms to innovate either by exploiting complementary assets or by exploring new opportunities. Thus, the success of the collaborative innovation project is significantly affected by the way the collaboration is governed. On the one hand, for co-exploitation projects, companies should rely on contracts to improve their performance. On the other hand, for co-exploration projects, governance may specialize in either contracts or informal mechanisms to reach higher performance.

Despite previous studies analyzing the effect of contractual or informal governance on the performance of collaborative innovation projects, no research has focused on comparing simultaneously these effects, by using the innovation character of the project of co-exploitation or co-exploration as a moderator. Therefore, this paper explores comparatively the most effective type of governance mechanism for co-exploitation and co-exploration projects.

This study aims to detect and mitigate opportunistic behavior in call centers through proper performance management and to provide companies considering outsourcing and/or offshoring their call center services with the important performance factors.

The study introduces performance management as an important mediating process affecting BPO performance, and presents insights to the performance management of call centers, particularly related to detecting opportunistic behavior. Building from contractual and agency theory, KPI data from two different companies using two different pricing schemes was analyzed. The data represented 107 weeks under each contract type covering specific Service Level Agreement measures.

The study indicates the importance of having in place a performance management system to manage BPO, and presents the notion of proxies to detect difficult to measure service level performance targets. The study confirms the existence of opportunistic behavior from the vendor side, and offers a structured method to detect and control for opportunistic behavior.

The research is limited to the call center outsourcing in the telecom industry. Price per call (PPC) and price per time (PPT) were the only pricing models studied.

The study supports telecom companies that are interested in outsourcing their call center services with the important factors they need to consider during the outsourcing process, particularly in light of the vendor opportunistic behavior.

The study contributes to the limited literature on performance management in BPO, and offers a structured method to test for the existence of opportunistic behavior.

This paper is prompted by the dissatisfaction of developing countries regarding the grant of special and differential treatment (SDT) under the legal framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As a result of such dissatisfaction, the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations explicitly called for a review of such treatment with a view to making it more precise, effective and operational. This mandate has not yet been met to the satisfaction of many developing countries. This paper aims to provide an alternative way of examining and evaluating the contestation which exists regarding SDT in the WTO.

This paper uses the conceptual framework provided by the economic contract theory and in particular, the concept of the incomplete contract to provide a scaffold for analysing SDT. This approach is intended to offer insights beyond those elucidated so far in the literature on the topic.

This paper, by using an economic contract theory approach, finds that SDT is constructed as an incomplete contract. Furthermore, the suboptimal outcomes associated with incomplete contracts are apparent in the constitution of SDT. This finding is useful in both an evaluative and programmatic sense, providing us with an alternative entry point to explain some of the shortcomings with SDT, as well as garnering us with a useful conceptual tool to think upon how SDT can be improved.

The paper contributes to the literature on SDT within the WTO in particular and differential treatment in international law in general. Drawing on literature on the WTO as an incomplete contract, the paper provides an original frame for analyzing SDT and draws attention, in particular, to the utility of the economic contract theory as a programmatic and evaluative frame for SDT and differential treatment more generally.

Based on social capital theory and the institutional theory, this paper aims to explain how a firm’s business ties and political ties affect contractual governance in an interfirm cooperation, and under which institutional conditions they can play a better role.

This study tests conceptual model using questionnaire survey data collected from 227 firms in China. Hierarchical regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses.

This study finds that business ties have significant effect on contract completeness, while political ties have significant effect on contract enforcement. Moreover, these effects are contingent on some institutional factors. Market information transparency strengthens the effect of business ties on contract completeness and weakens the effect of political ties on contract completeness. Legal system completeness weakens the effect of political ties on contract enforcement.

This study suggests that managers could actively and selectively use their managerial ties to enhance contractual governance in an interfirm cooperation.

This study adds to the current understanding of how an interfirm cooperation is shaped by the firm’s social capital derived from external network relationships and extends the research on what social antecedents affect contractual governance. Moreover, this study sheds new light on when managerial ties can play a more beneficial role in emerging economies.

Although outsourcing has emerged as a key business practice in global supply chain management it has not always been successfully adopted. Since the reasons for outsourcing success and failure are underexplored this research aims to investigate the role of contractual completeness and complementary enforcement practices such as cooperation and monitoring and sanctioning practices under varying risk scenarios. Critically, these relationships are examined in the context of two serious risks: legal risk in the guise of rule of law and supplier non-conformance risk.

Cross-country, survey data was collected through the global manufacturing research group and combined with secondary data from the World Bank. The authors carried out a series of regression analysis to explore their research questions.

The results indicate that risk is a critical component of outsourcing success with legal risk reducing outsourcing performance on both cost and quality and supplier risk reducing outsourcing performance on quality. The results also indicate that these outcomes can be mitigated in some settings via complete contracts and complementary practices. These findings are likely to be generalized throughout the supply chain and are of relevance beyond the dyad.

In the realm of supply chain practices this study presents a comprehensive attempt to assess the importance of risk and complementary practices for the success of outsourcing contracts. Furthermore, it assesses the role of contextual factors such as risk and the rule of law.

This study investigates both direct and moderation effects of two dimensions of contract control and information technology governance on platform participants' financial performance.

Using data collected from 384 platform participants from China's two largest digital platforms, hierarchical regression is used to validate the conceptual model and hypotheses.

The empirical results show that contract completeness and information technology governance independently improved financial performance, while contract enforcement had an inverted U-shaped effect on financial performance. Furthermore, information technology governance amplified the positive effect of contract completeness, but not of contract enforcement, on financial performance.

This study advances the literature on partnership control by showing the interactive role of information technology governance and contract control. It also enriches research on information technology usage by revealing how information technology governance benefits business partnerships. Finally, it extends transaction cost theory by demonstrating that different dimensions of contracts have different effects on governing interfirm relationships.