To read this content please select one of the options below:

Combining transaction characteristics and governance mechanisms to suppress opportunism in construction projects: qualitative comparative analysis

Wenqian Guo (Department of Construction Management, College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China)
Wenxue Lu (Department of Construction Management, College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China)
Fei Kang (School of Urban Economics and Management, Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Beijing, China)

Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management

ISSN: 0969-9988

Article publication date: 3 August 2022

Issue publication date: 28 November 2023

238

Abstract

Purpose

The understanding of how to mitigate opportunism in construction projects is still limited and conflicting. The complexity of causalities and interdependence among antecedents of opportunism (transaction characteristics and governance mechanisms) is the major obstacle to current research. This study takes a holistic perspective to explore the different combinations of conditions that lead to high opportunism and low opportunism in project management.

Design/methodology/approach

Through 2 phases of the interview and questionnaire survey, the 91 valid survey data were collected from the buyer–seller relationships in construction projects and analyzed by adopting fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis.

Findings

A single transaction characteristic is rarely sufficient to explain opportunism, and combinations of different transaction characteristics and governance mechanisms (performance ambiguity, asset specificity, buyer's requirement certainty, informal control, and formal control) have different effects on opportunism. In the case of extremely unsatisfactory transaction characteristics, even the combination of formal and informal control cannot prevent high opportunism. The combination including low-formal control and high-asset specificity easily leads to high opportunism. Besides, performance ambiguity is a vital factor in mitigating high opportunism or achieving low opportunism.

Originality/value

Previous studies have always addressed the role of one or some factors independently and separately. This study is one of the first to explore the different combinations of conditions that result in high opportunism and low opportunism in project management based on transaction costs economics and agency theory.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [grant numbers 71772135, 72031008]. Further, the authors thank it for its financial support and also appreciate all the respondents and interviewees who participated in our survey.

Citation

Guo, W., Lu, W. and Kang, F. (2023), "Combining transaction characteristics and governance mechanisms to suppress opportunism in construction projects: qualitative comparative analysis", Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, Vol. 30 No. 10, pp. 4914-4932. https://doi.org/10.1108/ECAM-02-2022-0164

Publisher

:

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2022, Emerald Publishing Limited

Related articles