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Organizational scholars studying compensation often place an emphasis on certain employee groups (e.g., executives). Missing from this discussion is research on the compensation systems for low-wage jobs. In this review, the authors argue that workers in low-wage jobs represent a unique employment group in their understanding of rent allocation in organizations. The authors address the design of compensation strategies in organizations that lead to different outcomes for workers in low-wage jobs versus other workers. Drawing on and integrating human resource management (HRM), inequality, and worker literatures with compensation literature, the authors describe and explain compensation systems for low-wage work. The authors start by examining workers in low-wage work to identify aspects of these workers’ jobs and lives that can influence their health, performance, and other organizationally relevant outcomes. Next, the authors explore the compensation systems common for this type of work, building on the compensation literature, by identifying the low-wage work compensation designs, proposing the likely explanations for why organizations craft these designs, and describing the worker and organizational outcomes of these designs. The authors conclude with suggestions for future research in this growing field and explore how organizations may benefit by rethinking their approach to compensation for low-wage work. In sum, the authors hope that this review will be a foundational work for those interested in investigating organizational compensation issues at the intersection of inequality and worker and organizational outcomes.

This paper studies the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck as well as the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay in which good luck is rewarded but bad luck is not penalized symmetrically. We further explore the impact of the regulatory changes on executive compensation taking effect in the 2000s on CEO pay for luck and asymmetry.

In this study, we examine the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO compensation. The sample consists of DJIA component companies over a 71-year period from 1950 to 2020. CEO pay-performance sensitivity is measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity.

We find that an increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity as measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity leads to an increase in the degree of CEO pay for luck but tends to reduce the level of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, we find that the major pay-related regulatory changes in recent years have mitigated the degree of CEO pay for luck and pay asymmetry, in which CEO pay structure and the associated CEO pay-performance sensitivity are major mechanisms through which the regulatory changes take effect.

Our findings provide empirical evidence supporting the argument that both optimal contracting and rent extraction should be considered as important determinants of CEO compensation.

When a firm designs the pay packages for its CEO to align CEO wealth to firm performance, CEO pay-performance sensitivity is expected to improve. However, the improved CEO PPS can also lead to an increased CEO pay for non-performance (Luck), which is an undesired outcome from the shareholder view. Therefore, a firm should thoroughly consider various advantages and disadvantages when compensating its top executives. Third, pay-related regulations have indeed achieved some intended outcomes such as the diminished pay for luck and asymmetry, but they also exacerbated the positive relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. It seems that executive pay-related regulations cannot achieve perfect outcomes without side effects. Continuous reforms and regulations on corporate governance should be a dynamic process under various changing situations.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck and asymmetry in several ways. First, our study is among the few studies empirically testing the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and pay for luck and asymmetry. We find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity tends to increase the degree of CEO pay for luck but reduce the level of asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. These findings partly support the rent extraction theory grounded on the managerial power hypothesis and partly support the optimal contracting theory. Our findings confirm that the optimal contracting theory and the rent extraction theory are both important for explaining the practices and historical trends of CEO compensation.

The literature suggests that increasing the intensity of compensation incentives for corporate venture capital (CVC) managers can contribute to successful exits of direct CVCs. This study explores the impact of compensation incentives on the successful exits of indirect CVCs under different geographical distances between parent companies and indirect CVC managers.

The authors observed the compensation terms of CVC managers through investment announcements made by listed companies and used a probit regression model to test the hypotheses from a sample of 241 investment events with indirect CVCs in China.

The results show that if parent companies are geographically close to the managers of indirect CVCs, increasing the intensity of compensation incentives for managers will help the successful exit of indirect CVCs. However, if parent companies are not geographically close to indirect CVC managers, increasing the intensity of compensation incentives for managers will not promote the successful exit of indirect CVCs.

This study contributes significantly to the CVC literature. First, it sharpens our understanding of the differences in operational mechanisms between direct and indirect CVCs. Second, we find that the threshold returns of indirect CVC managers are non-negligible compensation incentives. Finally, the empirical evidence supports that in indirect CVC investments, the geographical distance between parent companies and managers is concerning because it affects whether compensation incentives contribute to the successful exit of indirect CVCs.

In the past few decades, performance measuring systems have become important managerial tools for healthcare organizations. Healthcare performance metrics are a useful tool in understanding how healthcare organizations achieve their goals while satisfying the needs of their patients and conforming to national and international standards. Various efforts have been made to assess healthcare performance. Most of these measures are focused on a single perspective or developed by a single source to meet management and strategic objectives on time.

We develop a review of the literature to shed light on the measures used to assess performance in the healthcare sector at various points in time, as well as to establish a thorough understanding of healthcare performance measurement.

Developing real-time digital traceability of metrics and an integrative perspective that increases the actionability of information acquired is an attractive potential made possible by the introduction of new technologies and the digitization of data.

We conclude that a proper measurement system should be one to combine patient, physician, non-medical staff and system perspective, which will further facilitate the assessment of healthcare performance and the comparative function.

Resource orchestration theory proposes that firms need resources, capabilities, and horizontal and vertical alignment to achieve high performance. Thus, we investigate which combinations of horizontal fit of resources (commitment-based HR systems for managers and nonmanagers) and capabilities (HR flexibility) together with vertical fit with business strategy (innovation versus cost leadership strategies) relate to superior performance.

Our study is based on a sample of 113 Spanish firms from which we collected data on commitment-based HR systems for managers and nonmanagers, HR flexibility, business strategy and performance. We employ a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to analyze which configurations lead to firm performance.

The empirical analysis shows that both HR practices and policies (commitment-based HR systems) and HR capabilities (HR flexibility) need to be aligned for high performance. The path for performance is comprised of a combination of commitment-based HR systems for staff and HR flexibility and by the absence of an innovation strategy or commitment-based HR systems for managers, HR flexibility, and a cost leadership strategy. We also find four paths where performance relies on efficiently combining an innovation and cost leadership business strategy.

Our findings make three key contributions to the literature. First, we help elucidate multicausal relationships inside the black box of the “HR–performance” relationship for firm performance. Second, we study the vertical fit with business strategy by considering innovation and cost leadership strategies. Third, we analyze multicausal pathways, thus uncovering different combinations of resources and capabilities for performance.

Though public sector organisations have continuously borrowed human resource management practices from the private sector, there seems to be sparse evidence on the effectiveness of financial rewards for public sector employees, especially in developing countries where pay remains low. Therefore, the objective of this research is to test the effectiveness of financial rewards on the job performance of those working in the Maldives civil service from the perspective of a developing country where public sector pay, especially civil pay, remains comparatively low. Additionally, this study tested the mediating effect of organisational commitment on the relationship between financial rewards and job performance.

A cross-sectional study was conducted using quantitative design methodology, whereby data were collected from 341 employees working in the Maldives civil service and analysed using structural equation modelling.

The findings indicate that financial rewards negatively affect civil service employees’ job performance. However, financial rewards improve organisational commitment, which reduces the negative effects, although the effect sizes of the mediator are not very significant.

The results of this study present critical theoretical and practical contributions to public administration researchers on using financial incentives as a mechanism to boost job performance, particularly in developing countries, where salaries and other benefits remain low. Furthermore, it presents practical recommendations for managing employees in the Maldives and other countries, where the public sector is less developed and budget constraints remain a challenge.

Remuneration policies may differ from country to country, and their effect on bank stability could be due to the legal framework. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how the legal system impacts the relationship between CEO compensation and bank stability across countries.

To test the study hypotheses, the authors use panel data of 74 banks operating in ten OECD countries during the period 2009–2016 and apply the generalized moments method regression model to better remediate the endogeneity problem.

The findings confirm that a country’s banking regulations significantly affect its bank stability. Common law countries have less bank stability than civil law countries. This result can be interpreted by the fact that, in common-law countries, banks’ CEO are strongly protected by the law, so they allocate a large part of bank assets to risky loans to improve their variable remuneration.

The research can help policymakers understand bank stability in one country. Any legal reform would require prior knowledge of how risk-taking may arise in executive compensation.

The contribution is to explain the controversial effect of executive compensation on bank stability in the framework of legal theory. The authors argue that regulators should monitor compensation structures and that the country’s legal origin of law shapes the CEO compensation structure and is a determinant of bank stability. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies exploring this field. So, this study tries to shed more light on the dark side of CEOs’ behavior when undertaking risky projects to maximize their remuneration.

This research aims to test the role of the informational effect (IE) on the relationship between pay for individual performance (PFIP) and intrinsic motivation (IM). Special attention is also given to how the supervisor’s positive (PF) and negative feedback (NF) influence workers' perceptions of the informational content of PFIP.

We used a two-wave online survey among workers covered by a PFIP system and collected a total of 472 answers. To test our hypotheses, we adopted SPSS PROCESS macro Model 9.

The results suggest that IE fully mediates the positive impact of PFIP on IM, with this effect diminishing in the presence of NF, while PF shows no significant influence.

Organizations should invest in the development of mechanisms to mitigate perceptions of rewards as behaviour control mechanisms. Instead, PFIP should be perceived as a means to gain valuable insights into performance.

By using a research design allowing external validity in opposition to the widely used experimental one, we contribute to the debate about the relationship between extrinsic rewards and IM. Theoretical and practical implications in the workplace are also discussed.

This paper examines the effect of board reforms on managerial risk-taking incentive provision in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) whose managers are undue risk-averse.

We use the staggered implementation of board reforms in Chinese central government-controlled state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) as an exogenous shock to board governance. We collect data on board reforms for a set of pilot CSOEs during the period 2005 to 2020 from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) website by hand. We use a generalized difference-in-difference (DID) design to test the effect of staggered board reform adoption on managerial risk-taking incentive provision.

We find a positive relationship between board reforms and risk-taking inventive provision, i.e. pay-performance sensitivity, promotion-performance sensitivity and performance target difficulty. The documented relationship is stronger when the value of risk-taking is higher. We also find that board reforms lead to greater risky but value-enhancing investments and that managerial risk-taking incentive provision acts as an important channel through which board reforms improve value-enhancing risk-taking.

Our findings suggest that board reforms that improve board governance are effective in addressing risk-related agency conflicts in emerging markets. The findings also highlight the importance of managerial risk-taking incentive provision in inducing risky but value-enhancing investments.

This paper aims to examine the effect of executive compensation incentives, specifically CEO inside debt holdings, on the choice of industry specialist auditor.

High inside debt holdings are expected to constrain excessive managerial risk-taking and align the interests of managers and outside debtholders. The authors hypothesize that reduced debtholders’ expropriation concerns will decrease the demand for high audit quality, measured by industry specialization. The authors investigate a sample of US firms from 2006 to 2018 using OLS regression and use CEO relative leverage to proxy for CEO inside debt holdings. The authors conduct an additional two-stage least squares regression analysis to address potential endogeneity issues.

The paper finds that firms with higher levels of CEO inside debt tend not to appoint an auditor with industry specialization. This result is consistent with the notion that inside debt mitigates agency conflicts between managers and debtholders, reducing the demand for high-quality audits as a monitoring mechanism. The paper also finds that among firms which are excessively leveraged, those with higher levels of CEO inside debt tend to appoint an industry specialist auditor.

The findings contribute to the literature on agency cost and auditor choice by demonstrating that CEO inside debt has both substitutive and complementary effects on demand for industry specialist auditors.