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Using organizational theory as a lens, in this chapter, the author critiques the neoliberal rationality in which the national and international ranking systems take precedence over the institutional missions and visions in institutional operations. The author argues that these essentialized ranking systems overlook the necessary diversity and uniqueness of institutions in the higher education system. The author outlines the potential role of mission statements in setting the institutional priorities, and the unnecessary pressure caused neoliberalism against such priorities. The implications of such imperatives for quality in various academic practices are identified and the unfairness of coercive isomorphism in higher education is illustrated. The author then proposes a spatial approach in which universities, nationally and internationally, can appreciate diversity in identity and work together, drawing from each other’s strengths to strengthen the higher education system that will support students and promote national economies.

Factors of production (labour, land, capital), technology and technical progress are usually cited as the main sources of economic growth and development. However, there are a number of other factors that have a significant impact on the possibilities and extent of their use or their further improvement and development. These factors undoubtedly include the institutional environment, within which corruption is also a consideration. In this chapter, attention will be focused on the various institutional variables that are used to assess the quality of a country's institutional environment, including corruption. A number of studies have shown that a quality institutional environment and low levels of corruption are prerequisites for long-term economic growth. Using an analysis of individual indicators of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs), published annually by the World Bank, supplemented by the Corruption Perception Index (published by Transparency International), we look at where Czechia has moved over the last decade or two in terms of institutional quality and corruption.

This chapter examines the role of formal and informal institutions in foreign direct investment (FDI) dynamics.

We examine the effects of the quality of legal, political, and economic formal institution as well as the effect of institutional distance (based on new dataset) on bilateral inward FDI stocks in 34 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries for the period 1990–2010 using a gravity specification. Additionally, we also examine FDI for the effects of a specific informal institution – attitude of the public toward economic liberal issues. Reactions of FDI to liberal and nonliberal public opinion (part of informal institutions) are examined with and without controlling for formal institutions.

Findings show that the quality of legal and political institutions are important determinants of FDI, that legal and political institutional distance are both significant obstacles to FDI, and that public opinion also matters. We find that it is important to control for formal institutions when looking at the effect of informal institutions, and that both past liberal and nonliberal public opinion correlate with FDI, but only nonliberal public opinion significantly reduces inward FDI directly.

Results are relevant for enterprises’ investment strategies, marketing strategies influencing public opinion as well as for policy makers, and governmental agencies involved in investment promotion programs.

Exploring the interplay between formal and informal institutions, institutional quality, institutional distance, and their effect on FDI in a bilateral panel.

Whether institutional investors monitor corporations and improve firm value is a key question for corporate governance and investment management. I find little empirical support for the hypothesis that institutions undertake monitoring that increases firm quality and valuation. Granger causation tests show that while quality firms do attract institutional investment, institutions do not monitor and firm value subsequently declines. Instead, institutional incentives are critical; some institutions with strong incentives to monitor do, indeed, monitor. Institutions with concentrated portfolios successfully monitor while institutions with a larger percentage stake do not. Pensions and endowments are better monitors than insurers, banks and mutual funds.

This chapter examines the development of a quality assurance system for undergraduate education as one aspect of the transformation of education policy in China. The central structure of the chapter is the process/stages of policy development and implementation, with particular attention to the changes over time in central control versus institutional autonomy. The Chinese government has moved to a “steering at a distance” approach with ex post accountability, giving institutions of higher education greater autonomy for undergraduate education. Government authority continues to be strong, however, even though the mechanisms of control have changed. This study provides an analysis of quality assurance in Chinese higher education and the changing relationship between government and campuses, using the lens of policy development and implementation.

Informal entrepreneurship challenges sustainable economic performance and is a barrier to productive entrepreneurship. In this context, the level of development of formal and informal institutions and their impact on informal entrepreneurship is crucial. This chapter examines the informal sector entrepreneurship in Kosovo using institutional theory lenses. Using a survey with 500 owners/managers of private companies, the study finds that the service industry has the highest participation in the informal economy compared to other sectors. On average small firms, compared to larger ones, report a higher percentage of unreported incomes. Our findings also suggest that when informal entrepreneurs perceive penalties for tax avoidance from tax authorities as high, they tend to have higher compliance with reporting their income. In addition, our findings indicate that the higher the vertical (trust in formal institutions) and horizontal distrust (trust in business partners), the higher the involvement in the informal economy. The chapter concludes with some policy implications for tackling the informal economy in Kosovo and similar institutional contexts.

Conventional wisdom suggests that institutional development is a precursor to financial sector development. Using a panel of 122 countries over the period 1970–2000, we find that while there is a correlation between the quality of legal institutions and financial development, the relationship is not causal. Changes in the quality of legal institutions do not predict changes in the level of financial development. The results suggest that legal institutions and the financial sector develop simultaneously and are jointly determined by unobservable country-specific factors.

How does context shape the way in which corporations contribute to or impede progress toward sustainable development goals (SDGs)? In this chapter, the author studies how the state as corporate owner and in its broader function in the institutional environment affects companies’ involvement in misbehaving practices related to human rights issues, with a focus on the banking industry. Based on a longitudinal analysis of 178 banks over the cohort 1996–2018, the results show that state-owned banks, as well as those from institutionally weak environments, are more involved in business-related misbehaving practices. Moreover, in a strong institutional environment, state-owned banks are more involved in corporate misbehavior than non-state-owned banks. These results contribute to the literature on corporate misbehavior, focusing on the state’s role in preventing or facilitating banks’ involvement in misbehaving practices. The author concludes by discussing the findings’ implications and providing suggestions for future research.

In this chapter, we investigate the interactions between governance quality and economic development. More specifically, we analyze how the institutions through which state authority is exercised influence the level of economic development. In that respect, governance could be considered as a quasi-factor of production which affects the country's economic growth and development, an issue that lies in the heart of institutional economics. The effect of governance on economic development is mainly played out via two channels. Namely, the quality of democracy, distinguished in political rights and civil liberties, and the level of corruption, associated with the exercise of state authority. Good governance is in principle associated with a high quality of democracy and a low level of corruption. Both generate positive effects on the level of economic growth and development, mainly due to their impact on state effectiveness and private and public investment. At the same time, there also exists an inverse causality: the level of economic development affects positively the quality of democracy and negatively the level of corruption which in turn tend to improve the quality of democracy. These coexistent mechanisms are associated with crucial policy issues which are largely neglected by the traditional theory of economic growth.

This paper estimates the financial returns to higher education quality in the UK. To account for the selectivity of students to institution, we rely on a selection on observable assumption. We use several estimates including the Generalised Propensity Score (GPS) of Hirano and Imbens, which relies on a continuous measure of institutional quality. This highlights that the returns to quality are heterogeneous and mostly driven by high-quality institutions. Moving from an institution in the third quality quartile to a top quality institution is associated with a 7% increase in earnings.