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The 2007–2009 financial crisis initially appeared to have destroyed a huge amount of wealth in the United States. Housing prices dropped about 21% across the country and as much as 50% in some places, and the stock market dropped by nearly 50% as well. This chapter examines how the financial crisis differentially affected households at different parts of the income and wealth distributions. Our results show that all households lost about the same percentage of their wealth in that period. But because households in the top 10% of the wealth distribution owned many different kinds of assets, their wealth soon recovered. The bottom 80% of the wealth distribution had more of their wealth tied up in housing. We show that financial distress, indexed by foreclosures, being behind in mortgage payments, and changes in house prices were particularly concentrated in households in the bottom 80% of the wealth distribution. These households lost a large part of their wealth and have not yet recovered. Households that were most deeply affected were those who entered the housing market late and took out subprime loans. African American and Hispanic households were particularly susceptible as they bought houses late in the price bubble often with subprime loans.

In 2020, household incomes were severely hit by the lockdowns imposed across the world in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Using data from the last available wave of the euro-area harmonized Household Finance and Consumption Survey for 2016, this chapter documents European households’ financial resilience to this shock, based on pre-shock balance sheets, potential exposure to COVID-19, and in the absence of government interventions. The results highlight that there are large and similar shares of the population across European countries that are likely to suffer from the economic fallout of containment measures – albeit through different channels.

This chapter addresses the issue of the Global South external debt by mobilizing insights from Modern Monetary Theory, Ecological Economics, and Dependency Theory. It argues that the external debt problem of Southern governments is a reflection of their subordinate economic and monetary status. It shows why the argument of foreign currency shortage often used to explain the need for Southern governments to issue foreign currency debts remains superficial. In contrast to the usual focus on creditors, the chapter highlights the role played by foreign direct investment in the genesis of the chronic external indebtedness of most Southern countries. It argues then that the external debt of the South must be understood holistically not only as a manifestation of the unequal ecological exchange between the North and the South but also as an instrument that has contributed to reproducing and amplifying this pattern. Under these conditions, the cancellation or restructuring of the South's external debt stock and a few other unlikely concessions by the Northern countries will not be enough to abolish the “debt system.” This is an important lesson from the antiimperialist critique of the mid-1970s New International Economic Order (NIEO) agenda that current movements for Southern debt cancellation and Climate Justice would do well to remember.

This paper considers a parametric model for the joint distribution of income and wealth. The model is used to analyze income and wealth inequality in five OECD countries using comparable household-level survey data. We focus on the dependence parameter between the two variables and study whether accounting for wealth and income jointly reveals a different pattern of social inequality than the traditional “income only” approach. We find that cross-country variations in the dependence parameter effectively account only for a small fraction of cross-country differences in a bivariate measure of inequality. The index appears primarily driven by differences in inequality in the wealth distribution.

We study Canadian national and provincial family income inequality from 1991 to 1997. We use special cases of generalized entropy measures, the Theil measures of inequality, since they are decomposable into between-provinces inequality and within provinces inequality. We draw statistical inferences from our findings by using the bootstrapping technique. We find that Canadian provinces have experienced differential trends in family income inequality over this period, a pattern that is masked when analyzing solely national trends. Changes in between-province family income inequality are found to be insignificant, indicating that the observed rise in overall inequality over this period is due to factors within provinces. Changes in within-province family income inequality are found to be significant. We further analyze two-way decompositions by province and education, and by province and age, to learn about the role of human capital and the life cycle in determining changes in family inequality among and within Canadian provinces.

Do women exhibit greater financial risk aversion than men? We answer this question using attitudinal and behavioral specifications of risk aversion drawn from the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). To approximate attitudinal specification of risk aversion, we use individuals’ self-reported financial risk tolerance. We use individuals’ relative risk aversion, that is, the effect of wealth on the proportion of assets categorized as risky as behavioral specification of risk aversion. We find that while women display greater attitudinal risk aversion, gender difference in behavioral risk aversion depends upon individuals’ marital status and role in household finances. Single women exhibit greater behavioral risk aversion compared to single men. However, this gender difference does not exist when we compare behavioral risk aversion of married women and men in charge of household finances.

Behavioral economics poses a challenge for the welfare evaluation of choices, particularly those that involve risk. It demands that we recognize that the descriptive account of behavior toward those choices might not be the ones we were all taught, and still teach, and that subjective risk perceptions might not accord with expert assessments of probabilities. In addition to these challenges, we are faced with the need to jettison naive notions of revealed preferences, according to which every choice by a subject expresses her objective function, as behavioral evidence forces us to confront pervasive inconsistencies and noise in a typical individual’s choice data. A principled account of errant choice must be built into models used for identification and estimation. These challenges demand close attention to the methodological claims often used to justify policy interventions. They also require, we argue, closer attention by economists to relevant contributions from cognitive science. We propose that a quantitative application of the “intentional stance” of Dennett provides a coherent, attractive and general approach to behavioral welfare economics.

Examine tax-related decisions of married couples to determine whether decisions are made jointly or if one spouse dominates the decision. We also examine characteristics related to decision styles.

Questionnaires completed independently by both the husband and wife.

Nearly 40 percent of the couples make tax decisions jointly, while the remaining couples allow one spouse to dominate tax-related decisions. The results indicate that when one spouse dominates the decisions, it is most often the wife. We also find that couples are more likely to share tax-related decision responsibility jointly when the husband earns significantly more than the wife, when the couple has greater income as a family, and when they are a new couple.

Prior research has generally not recognized tax decisions by married couples as a joint decision or attempted to determine whether tax decisions are dominated by the husband or wife. This issue has implications for interpreting research results in light of prior research that has found that tax-related decisions vary significantly by gender. The finding that many couples make joint decisions suggests that an interesting avenue for future research would be to determine the nature of that joint decision making and whether it is collaborative, bargaining, or something else.

Prior research on tax-related decisions has not recognized that for approximately 40 percent of tax returns filed, the unit of study is not a single individual but a married couple.