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The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of high‐level‐executives joining the Board of another US company on the shareholder wealth of the firms in which these executives work.

The “event‐study” methodology is used first to estimate the shareholder effects and then, through multivariate regression analysis, establish a relationship of these effects with executive characteristics.

The paper documents that the abnormal return becomes more positive the closer the executive is to retirement and more negative as the number of other corporate Boards the executive already sits on increases. Unlike previous research, it is not found that prior performance of the employing company helps explain the cross‐sectional variation in the announcement day abnormal returns.

The result supports the concerns of shareholder activists that key executives joining the Boards of other companies do their home shareholders a disservice by being spread too thin. It supports the hypothesis that investors interpret a CEO joining the Board of another firm as value decreasing.

The paper provides a link between managerial labor and shareholder wealth. Important and high‐level‐executives, while attempting to enhance their own personal benefits by joining other Boards, can destroy shareholder value of the company for which they work.

The paper aims to improve students' job placements, higher education institutions invest considerable resources and their students spend considerable time in academic clubs. Yet, quantitative findings on the effect of students' academic club involvement on job placements are mixed. This paper aims to help resolve ambiguity regarding the effect of academic clubs on job placements.

The authors conducted two studies. The first developed an inductive theoretical model by interviewing recruiters and managers and extending status characteristics theory. The second study is an experiment that tested the first study's inductive model and increased the model's generalizability.

The results of both studies show that executive board membership, but not general membership, increases perceptions of applicants' emotional control and public speaking ability, and thereby increases applicants' chances of getting an interview.

Administrators should consider shifting resources away from academic clubs that only benefit a few students and toward programs that help more students develop transferable skills. Students should prioritize joining clubs in which students think students can become executive board members. Academic clubs should require general members to have responsibilities that help members develop transferable skills. Industry may need to make more competitive offers to hire executive board members.

The two studies contribute to research on academic clubs by suggesting that the results of previous academic club membership studies are mixed, because only executive board members are more likely to get interviews. The results also highlight the importance of applying status characteristics theory to future academic club research.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the board attributes that significantly increase firm risk. The study aims to find whether board size, percentage of non-executive directors, women on the board, a powerful chief executive officer, equity ownership amongst executive board directors and institutional investor ownership are associated with firm risk. This is the first study that examines which board attributes increase firm risk using a UK-based sample.

This empirical study collected secondary data from Bloomberg and Morningstar databases. The data sample is an unbalanced panel of 260 companies’ secondary data on FTSE 350 index in the UK, from 2005 to 2010. The data were statistically analysed using STATA.

The study establishes the board attributes that were significantly related to firm risk. The results show that a board which can increase firm risk is one that is small in size, has high equity ownership amongst executive board directors and has high institutional investor ownership.

The governance culture and regulatory system in the UK is different from other countries. As the data are a UK-based sample, the results can lack generalisability.

The results are useful for investors who invest in large firms, to have the knowledge about the board attributes that can increase firm risk. Regulators can also use the results to strengthen regulatory guidelines.

This study fills the gap in knowledge in UK governance literature on the board attributes that can increase firm risk.

This paper aims to investigate the intersection between corporate governance and management accounting information within the board meeting of an English further education college.

The empirical fieldwork uses an interventionist approach. Board members’ mental models of a management accounting boundary object are analysed.

The paper supports Parker (2007) and Cornforth and Edward’s (1999) observation that within a board meeting, collaborative “micro-management” type talk is considered to lie outside the acceptable remit of non-executive and executive board member interaction. Such an attitude can prevent an intertwining of management accounting information and other mental models of an organisation occurring. This can preclude management accounting information from rendering an organisation visible, in an expansive manner, within a boardroom.

Interventionist researchers working within the black box of the board are encouraged to design more radical and collaborative interventions than the interview/report format used here.

Non-executive directors might benefit from being offered the opportunity to interact with management accounting information outside the formal board meeting and committee structure.

A deeper understanding of how directors’ mental models, boardroom behaviours and attitudes influence their interaction with management accounting information is offered. Insight into the limitations of using management accounting information in the boardroom is developed.

The purpose of this study is to compare the use of performance information by board members and executives of a large Australian community service organization in order to ascertain what they focused on and how they worked together in effecting organizational governance.

Field based case study using stewardship theory.

While board members and executives worked closely together within a mutually agreed organizational space, there was a clear bifurcation of focus with the board concerned more with the financial performance and the executive more with service performance. Further differentiation of role with respect to financial performance was observed such that the board's attention was directed most to issues that presented the greatest risk to the organization. The study found that board members and executives “cut across” traditionally assigned roles, thus demonstrating a joint mode of organizational governance that was underpinned by organizational policies, processes and structures.

This paper provides rich empirical evidence in relation to matters that have been subject to high levels of theorisation; by answering recent calls from scholars for in-depth research on governance processes; and by identifying the common threads that link research on not-for-profit governance with stewardship theory and the extended concepts of accountability. It contributes to practice by providing a comprehensive explanation of a contemporary governance arrangement. It contributes to the public policy debate since a key issue currently under review in Australia, and New Zealand, to name just two jurisdictions, is the attribution of responsibilities by key decision makers in charities, in particular, the vexed question of management involvement in governance processes.

The paper provides rich empirical data about an issue of ongoing importance to third sector organizations.

This study seeks to explore how non-executive directors address governance problems on Dutch two-tier boards. Within this board model, challenges might be particularly difficult to address due to the formal separation of management boards' decision-management from supervisory boards' decision-control roles.

Semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire among non-executive directors provide unique insights into three major challenges in the boardrooms of two-tier boards in The Netherlands.

The study indicates that non-executive directors mainly experience challenges in three areas: the ability to ask management critical questions, information asymmetries between the management and supervisory boards and the management of the relationship between individual executive and non-executive directors. The qualitative in-depth analysis reveals the complexity of the contributing factors to problems in the boardroom and the range of process and social interventions non-executive directors use to address boardroom issues with management and the organization of the board.

While policy makers have been largely occupied with the “right” board composition, the results highlight the importance of adequately addressing operational challenges in the boardroom. The results emphasize the importance of a better understanding of board processes and the need of non-executive directors to carefully manage relationships in and around the boardroom.

Whereas most studies have focussed on regulatory initiatives to improve the functioning of boards (e.g. the independence of the board), this study explores how non-executive directors attempt to enhance the effectiveness of boards on which they serve.

The European Union (EU) has recently adopted gender quotas for corporate boards (CBQ), anticipating ripple effects on women’s careers in the companies concerned, as well as throughout the economy. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether CBQ has spurred ripple effects and discuss mechanisms hindering or facilitating women’s occupancy of top executive positions.

Norway was the first country in the world to introduce CBQ in 2003, with full effect from 2008. The policy requires company boards to be composed of 40% of each gender. Drawing on original data mapping boards and executive committees in Norway’s 200 largest companies, the authors analyze the association between CBQ and the gender composition of executive management almost 15 years after the full implementation. The data include both companies covered by the CBQ and large companies not covered.

The investigation does not find a positive association between CBQ and more women in executive positions. Thus, the ripple effect hypothesis of CBQ is not supported. CBQ may have contributed to an increased awareness of gender imbalances, yet these findings indicate that to achieve more gender balance in executive positions, scholars and practitioners may need to focus more on gendered conditions and processes in organizations and society throughout executive careers than on the gender composition of boards.

This paper provides empirical analyses of original data 15 years after the implementation of CBQ. The authors further contribute to scholarly debate by identifying and discussing possible mechanisms that explain how requiring more women on corporate boards may – or may not – have ripple effects on executive management.

The purpose of the paper is to explore the long-run impact of board governance and bank performance on executive remuneration. More specifically, the study addresses two objectives. First, the authors investigate the long-run relationship between pay and performance hold for the Indian banking industry. Second, the authors explore the moderating role of the board in explaining the relationship between executive pay and performance.

The study uses multivariate panel co-integration approaches, i.e. fully modified and dynamic ordinary least square, to explain the co-integrating relationship between executive pay, governance and performance of Indian banks. The analysis is conducted for the period from 2005 to 2018.

The results of co-integration tests reveal a long-run relationship between executive pay, board governance and bank performance. The long-run estimates produce evidence in favour of the dynamic agency theory, suggesting that the implications of asymmetric information can be mitigated by associating the current executive pay with the bank performance in the previous periods. The finding of this study reveals that improvements in the board quality serve as a monitoring tool to constrain excessive pay and moderate the executives’ pay. Furthermore, the interaction of performance and board governance negatively impacts pay, supporting a substitution approach. It implies that setting optimal pay packages for executives necessitates enhanced and efficient board governance practices.

The study recommends significant policy implications for regulators and the board of directors that executive pay significantly responds to the bank’s performance and good board governance practices in the long run.

This paper provides novel evidence of long-run pay-performance-governance relation using a panel co-integration approach.

In a review of the literature, supported by six case studies, executive development for senior managers in public and private organisations is explored in depth. The study looks at the roles and responsibilities of the chairman, CEO, executive and non‐executive directors, the required capabilities to achieve successful performance, and the related executive development activity implemented to support these. Methods of delivery, development needs analysis and evaluation are explored in case organisations to ascertain current practice. A detailed review of the leadership and governance literatures is included to highlight the breadth of knowledge required at director level. Key findings of the study include the importance of focusing executive development on capability enhancement, to ensure that it is supporting organisational priorities, and on its thorough customisation to the corporate context. Deficiencies in current corporate practice are also identified.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the influence of information and knowledge exchange and sharing between managers and non-executive directors is important in assessing the dynamic processes of accountability in boardrooms. By analysing information/knowledge at multiple levels, invoking the literature on implicit/tacit and explicit information/knowledge, the authors show that information asymmetry is a necessary condition for effective boards. The authors introduce a conceptual model of manager-non-executive director information asymmetry as an outcome of the interpretation of information/knowledge-sharing processes amongst board members. The model provides a more nuanced agenda of the management-board information asymmetry problem to enable a better understanding of the role of different types of information in practice.

The analysis of information/knowledge exchange, sharing and creation and the resultant conceptual model are based on the following elements: manager-non-executive director information/knowledge, management-board information/knowledge and board dynamics and reciprocal processes converting implicit/tacit into explicit information/knowledge.

The paper provides new insights into the dynamics of information/knowledge exchange, sharing and creation between managers and non-executive directors (individual level)/between management and boards (group level). The authors characterise this as a two-way process, back-and-forth between managers/executive directors and non-executive directors. The importance of relative/experienced “ignorance” of non-executive directors is revealed, which the authors term the “information asymmetry paradox”.

The authors set out key opportunities for developing a research agenda from the model based on prior research of knowledge conversion processes and how these may be applied in a boardroom setting.

The model may assist directors in better understanding their roles and the division of labour between managers and non-executive directors from an information/knowledge perspective.

The authors apply Ikujiro Nonaka’s knowledge conversion framework to consider the transitioning from individual implicit personal to explicit shared information/knowledge, to understand the subtle processes at play in boardrooms influencing information/knowledge exchange, sharing and creation between managers and non-executive directors.