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We examine a setting in which a vertically integrated provider (VIP) initially has a duty to deal with an independent rival at unregulated upstream and downstream prices. The duty to deal is subsequently terminated which enables the VIP to acquire the independent rival (or the expertise necessary to produce the rival's product) and then serve as a two-product monopolist in the downstream market. We find that the refusal to deal decreases rivalry but increases economic efficiency and is therefore presumptively “pro-competitive.” The paramount policy question concerns whether a refusal to deal that eliminates a rival and monopolizes the downstream market while increasing static efficiency should be considered a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. This analysis also has implications for policies governing the unbundling of next-generation telecommunications networks.

The purpose of this research is to identify five lessons of the Trinko decision and apply them to internet access issues.

The research identifies five lessons and then relates these lessons to access issues involving the internet.

Based on application of the lessons of Trinko, it is likely that access to the public internet will be maintained but it is uncertain as to what the nature of access requirements will be, if any, for private internets.

The research provides an economic analysis of the milestone legal decision in Trinko and applies the lessons of Trinko to access issues involving the internet.

The Minister of Transport, in exercise of his powers under section 96(10) of the Transport Act 1968 and of all other enabling powers, and after consultation with representative organisations in accordance with section 101(6) of the said Act of 1968, hereby makes the following Regulations:—

This paper is based on a talk given by Philip Ryley and John Virgo to the Association of Pension Lawyers at their annual conference in Bournemouth in November 1998. In it the authors provide an outline of some of the key legal issues that have arisen out of the pensions mis‐selling litigation.

The competition and regulatory economics literature has developed indicators that detect whether a vertically integrated provider (VIP) is engaging in market exclusion in the form of an anticompetitive price squeeze and non-price discrimination leading to sabotage of downstream competitors. Weisman integrates these indicators by developing a safe-harbor range within which a profit-maximizing VIP engages in neither form of market exclusion. Downstream retail competition that depends on the VIP’s inputs imposes upward pricing pressure on the downstream prices, with the amount of such pressure increasing as the downstream products become more homogeneous (closer substitutes). We analyze the implications of upward pricing pressure for antitrust evaluations of a duty to deal, regulatory policies mandating wholesale inputs for entrants, and vertical mergers. We find, for example, no basis to oppose a merger in which the VIP was previously required to supply inputs to rivals at unregulated prices.

Principal-agency theory was adapted from business and economics to explain the behavior of various government actors. Yet the idea of an agent and a principal is only depicted in a limited fashion when discussed in light of the realm of business and economics. Legal studies has grappled with the idea of agency well before political science or economics. I lay out the basic principles of both agency law and Congressional principal-agent theory. I then establish the groundwork for drawing important connections between agency law and principal-agency theory. I also analyze and attempt to ameliorate differences between these two theoretical approaches.

This paper focuses on two related questions at the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property law. First, under what circumstances must the holder of a patent or a copyright or the owner of a trade secret allow others to use that intellectual property? Second, under what circumstances can the holder of an intellectual property right use that right to make it difficult for another party to succeed in a related market? These questions have vexed antitrust and intellectual property scholars alike ever since the Federal Circuit ruled in 2000 that patent holders “may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust laws,” a ruling that directly contradicted the Ninth Circuit ruling that antitrust liability could be imposed for almost identical conduct, depending on the motivations of the patent holder. The various proceedings in United States v. Microsoft only added fuel to the firestorm of controversy.After briefly retracing the jurisprudential path to see how this situation arose, we propose a solution that primarily involves a variation on the real property concept of adverse possession for the intellectual property space along with a slight extension of the Essential Facilities Doctrine for industries that exhibit network effects. We examine, both for firms with and without market power, how our proposal would resolve the situations presented by large fixed asset purchases, the introduction of entirely new products, and operating systems with network effects. We also demonstrate how our proposal could be applied in the European antitrust enforcement context.

Identifies the specific laws which operate to prevent contamination of food in the United Kingdom and the duties of local authority food enforcement officers, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Department of Health in administering that law. Discusses the importance of the need for co‐operation and rapid exchanges of information within the UK and in Europe; recommends the need for traders to act positively in crisis situations.

Over the past two decades, the growing number of women entering the police profession has challenged the historic male dominance of the occupation. Research from the USA and the UK has examined whether men and women police differ in their assessments of working conditions, occupational opportunities, and other aspects of police work. To date, however, no attempt has been made to conduct a quantitative study of gender across socio‐political contexts or to assess the applicability of models constructed in those two countries to Caribbean nations. This study employs survey data from a sample of police constables and their immediate supervisors in three Caribbean nations. The survey queried 1,237 constables and supervisors. A total of 11 per cent of the respondents were women. Constables were asked about various aspects of policing, working conditions, and the nature of their duties. The questions were based on 24 constructs evaluated in the US and UK literatures. Few differences between genders emerged from comparisons within nations, although such differences have been documented in the USA and UK. These findings suggest that gender models used in developed nations do not necessarily explain differences in developing nations. Differences were observed across the three nations, however. Implications for future research on gender and policing are discussed.

Gives an account of Swedish industrial relations and discusses the decline of the classic Swedish harmony model. Analyses historically high unemployment figures. Makes a presentation of HRM as a profession in Sweden including the speciality of human resource costing and accounting. Uses Marxist, pluralist and rationalist models to explain the gap between theory and practical implementation of HRM. Discusses the HRM consequences of Sweden joining the EU and the future prospects for Sweden in a world economy.