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The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of transaction costs on economic welfare and development, and the role of information technology (IT) in reducing transaction costs.

The paper extends the static model of Romer, in which transaction costs reduce welfare by reducing the equilibrium number of intermediate goods, and estimate the welfare losses in the case of domestic transaction costs. The main analysis of the paper extends a dynamic model of Ciccone and Matsuyama to incorporate transaction costs. Also described are case studies of the use of IT in rural India.

In the static model, it is shown that domestic transaction costs have a substantial welfare impact when the number of goods is endogenous. In the dynamic model, it is shown that high transaction costs reduce the long‐run level of development, and may arrest development completely in the extreme case. Some preliminary, qualitative evidence from rural India is offered to illustrate how these reductions may occur through the use of IT.

The treatment of transaction costs in a dynamic model is novel, and the use of such a model provides a new theoretical underpinning for understanding the potential impacts of IT on development.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the likelihood of adoption of a recently designed Welfare Assessment System in agri‐food supply chains and the factors affecting the adoption decision. The application is carried out for pig and poultry chains.

This research consisted of two main components: interviews with retailers in pig and poultry supply chains in eight different EU countries to explore their perceptions towards the adoption possibilities of the welfare assessment system; and a conjoint analysis designed to evaluate the perceived adoption likelihood of the assessment system by different Standards Formulating Organisations (SFOs).

Stakeholders were found to be especially concerned about the costs of implementation of the system and how it could, or should, be merged with existing assurance schemes. Another conclusion of the study is that the presence of a strong third independent party supporting the implementation of the welfare assessment system would be the most important influence on the decision whether, or not, to adopt it.

This research evaluates the adoption possibilities of a novel Welfare Assessment System and presents the views of different supply chain stakeholders on an adoption of such a system. The main factors affecting the adoption decision are identified and analysed. Contrary to expectations, the costs of adoption of a new welfare assessment system were not considered to be the most important factor affecting the decision of supply chain stakeholders about the adoption of this new welfare system.

This paper aims to study the corresponding optimal service strategies and pricing in the styled non-preemptive M/M/1 service systems from different objectives, which consider both heterogeneous waiting costs of customers and service values in customer segmentation.

In this paper, the authors consider two service situations where customers cannot leave the service system (i.e. monopoly service system) and customers can leave the service system freely (i.e. non-monopoly service system), respectively. The authors study the following four different perspectives that are revenue, social welfare, social cost and utility of customers. The authors first build up a new model, then propose the related objective functions. Further, the authors optimize the corresponding functions and achieve the optimal results. Later, the authors propose the corresponding optimal strategies. Finally, the authors use a practical numerical case to verify the proposed results.

The results of this paper indicates that the service provider should adopt classification services to gain the maximum revenue, the maximum social welfare and the minimum social costs by charging a priority fee in above two service systems. However, the service provider should cancel customer classification and keep regular customer only to obtain maximum utility. In the monopoly service system, both the optimal proportion priority customers and the revenue decrease with the increasing of the service rate, while in a non-monopoly service system, both of them are increasing with the service rate improving.

This paper first considers both heterogeneity of service values and waiting costs in queuing system, then the author set up a new model based on this assumption. Moreover, the authors draw the corresponding management insights based on the optimal results, which were unavailable before.

This study seeks to find the dollar value of social costs of gambling. The authors use data from a survey of 99 members of Gamblers Anonymous (GA) groups in southern Nevada. The GA members were asked many questions about their behavior while they were active gamblers, such as how often they missed work because of gambling, how much they borrowed because of gambling, how much they stole because of gambling and their experiences with the judicial system and welfare systems because of gambling. Societal costs of each behavior were calculated and annualized. It was determined that each of the compulsive gamblers imposed social costs of $19,711 on others in southern Nevada. Of these costs, $1,428 (7.2%) were governmental costs, while $6,616 (33.6%) represented economic losses for southern Nevada. Using estimates of the numbers of pathological and problem gamblers in Nevada, it was determined that the overall social costs of compulsive and problem gambling in southern Nevada ranged from $314 million to $545 million per year.

This paper analyzes real and welfare effects of a permanent change in inflation rate, focusing on macroprudential policy’ role and its interaction with monetary policy.

While investigating disinflation costs, the authors simulate a medium-scale dynamic general equilibrium model with borrowing constraints, credit frictions and macroprudential authority.

Providing discussions on different policy scenarios in a context where still it is expected high inflation, there are three key contributions. First, when macroprudential authority actively operates to improve financial stability, losses caused by disinflation are limited. Second, a Taylor rule directly responding to financial variables might entail a trade-off between price and financial stability objectives, by increasing disinflation costs. Third, disinflation is welfare improving for savers, while costly for borrowers and banks. Indeed, while savers benefit from policies reducing price stickiness distortion, borrowers are worried about credit frictions, coming from collateral constraint.

The paper suggests threefold policy implications: the macroprudential authority should actively intervene during a disinflation process to minimize costs and financial instability deriving from it; policymakers should implement a disinflationary policy stabilizing also output; the central bank and the macroprudential regulator should pursue financial and price stability goals, separately.

This paper is the first attempt to study effects of a permanent inflation target reduction in focusing on the macroprudential policy’ role.

The study aims to address a critical gap in existing healthcare payment schemes and care service pricing by recognizing the influential role of patients' decisions on self-management efforts. These decisions not only impact health outcomes but also shape the demand for care, subsequently influencing care costs. Despite the significance of this interplay, current payment schemes often overlook these dynamics. The research focuses on investigating the implications of a novel behavior-based payment scheme, designed to align incentives and establish a direct connection between patients' decisions and care costs. The primary objective is to comprehensively understand whether and how this innovative payment scheme structure influences key stakeholders, including patients, care providers, insurers and overall social welfare.

In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical model to incorporate the performance of self-management with the demand for healthcare service, compare the patient's effort decision for self-management and provider's price decision for healthcare service under a behavior-based scheme with that under two implemented widely payment schemes, that is, co-payment scheme and co-insurance scheme.

Our findings confirm that the behavior-based scheme incentives patient self-management more than current schemes while reducing their possibility of seeking healthcare service, which indirectly induces the provider to lower the price of the service. The stakeholders' utility under various payment schemes is sensitive to the cost of treatment and the perceived health utility of patients. Especially, patient health awareness is not always benefited provider profit, as it motivates patient self-management while diminishing the demand for care.

We provide a novel framework for characterizing behavior-based payment schemes. Our results confirm the need for modification of the current payment scheme to incentivize patient self-management.

The study examines the relationship between the consequential social cost of market power (i.e. welfare performance of banks) and cost efficiency using data covering the period 2009 to 2017 from the Ghanaian banking industry.

The study adopts the ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effect (FE) panel regression and the quantile regression (QR) approaches to control for heterogeneity and provide increased room for policy relevance. The two-stage least squares instrumental variables (2SLS-IV) regression is used to ensure the robustness of the findings against the problem of possible reverse causality.

The results indicate a positive relationship between banks' welfare performance and cost efficiency, which suggests that greater cost efficiency hedges welfare losses. In other words, welfare gains and cost-efficient banks are not mutually exclusive. Also, the results show evidence that the sensitivity of welfare gain to cost efficiency depends on the knowledge of local market dynamics. Further, the findings from the QR estimation suggest that, but for welfare loss at low (Q.25) to the median (Q.50) quantiles, cost efficiency is a necessary and sufficient condition to hedge the welfare losses.

The results demonstrate that financial consumer protection cannot be achieved without cost efficiency in the presence of both foreign banks and high market knowledge. Therefore, our paper suggests an integrated cost efficiency policy approach that has the complementary effect of a robust information sharing mechanism and incentives to hedge against welfare losses in the banking sector of emerging economies. Moreover, if welfare gain is synonymous with cost-efficient banks, then the presence of a quiet life is typical of financial consumer protection.

This study provides insight into the importance of cost efficiency to the public policy of financial consumer protection in an era of foreign banks' dominance. From the review of prior literature, this paper is the first to apply the QR estimation technique to examine the effect of cost efficiency throughout the conditional distribution of bank welfare performance rather than just the conditional mean effect of cost efficiency.