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Using harmonized wealth data and a novel decomposition approach in this literature, we show that cohort effects exist in the income profiles of asset and debt portfolios for a sample of European countries, the United States, and Canada. We find that the association between household wealth portfolios at the intensive margin (the level of assets) and household characteristics is different from that found at the extensive margin (the decision to own). Characteristics explain most of the cross-country differences in asset and debt levels, except for housing wealth, which displays large unexplained differences for both the under-50 and over-50 populations. However, there are cohort differences in the drivers of wealth levels. We observe that younger households’ levels of wealth, given participation, may be more responsive to the institutional setting than mature households. Our findings have important implications, indicating a scope for policies which can promote or redirect investment in housing for both cohorts and which promote optimal portfolio allocation for mature households.

We test the hypothesis that credit quality deteriorates during credit booms. The test case is a pronounced cycle in connection with a banking crisis, ranked among the most extreme in international studies. A unique data set allows us to rate household borrowers during the cycle, and aggregate the ratings to the macroeconomic level. The post-crisis period is also studied to find changes in credit quality.

The method reveals significant variation in average ratings of household borrowers during the crisis cycle and its aftermath. We find that ‘point-in-time’ ratings, calculated with realised data, do not indicate deterioration in average credit quality during the credit boom. In contrast, ‘through-the-cycle’ ratings, constructed by using data that is cleaned from cyclical variation, behave in accordance with the hypothesis. By all measures used, a significant improvement in the average quality of borrowers is found during the post-crisis period.

This chapter aims to critically access the Tier 1 (Investor) visa’s effect on the conceptualisation of the British Migration system. The scheme offers an exclusive route to temporary residency in the UK in return for a £2 million investment in Britain. It is contended that the government have consistently underestimated the continual detrimental effects of offering such a scheme due to their overarching pursuit for economic gain. As such, the scheme has imparted social disadvantage, highlighting the prevalence of inequality and the existence of a hierarchy of desired migrants. Furthermore, it is asserted that the investor scheme is facilitating threats to the public’s safety, exemplified in the recent Salisbury Novichok attacks. However fundamentally, this chapter will seek to illustrate that the Tier 1 (Investor) visa has commodified the UK’s migration system, bestowing investors with a ‘golden ticket’ and in turn disregarding the needs of the UK’s citizens.

In his autobiography, Chen Shui-bian (1999, p. 40) condemned the Koumintang's (KMT's) corruption and praised the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for being free from money politics and corruption. The DPP fought the 1992 Legislative Yuan election campaign effectively on an anticorruption platform and used the same strategy in subsequent elections. If Chen Shui-bian had criticized the KMT for its involvement with “black gold” politics and had won the 2000 presidential election on his anticorruption platform, why was he and his family found guilty of corruption after his second term of office? The short answer is that even though he had promised to curb corruption, President Chen himself had succumbed to corruption after assuming office. In June 2002, Keesing's Contemporary Archives cited a poll in Taiwan that indicated that more respondents had perceived the DPP to be more corrupt than the KMT (Copper, 2006, p. 14).

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to explore to what extent global disparities in the wealth and poverty of nations can be explained by the evolved human diversity measured by the average intelligence of nations (national IQ).

Design/methodology/approach – It is hypothesized that nations with a higher average intelligence are able to produce better living conditions for their members than nations with a lower average intelligence. The hypothesis is tested by empirical evidence of national IQs measuring the average intelligence of nations and by indicators of per capita income, poverty, and human development measuring the wealth of nations from different perspectives. The study covers 187 contemporary countries.

Findings – The results of correlation analysis support the hypothesis. The correlation between national IQ and per capita income is 0.506, between national IQ and Population below $2 a day % it is −0.733, and between national IQ and human development it is 0.830. Regression analysis was used to illustrate the relationship between national IQ and income and human development at the level of single countries.

Practical implications – Because significant parts of global disparities in the wealth and poverty of nations can be traced to evolved human diversity measured by national IQ, human chances to remove or even to decrease those disparities are quite limited. We should learn to accept the inevitable social consequences of the evolved human diversity.

Originality/value – This study provides for social scientists a new perspective to explore the problems of global inequalities in human conditions.

This paper uses data from the 1979 and 1997 National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth to estimate the changing returns to cognitive and non-cognitive skills with respect to college completion, and quantifies the extent to which gender differences in these skills are driving the college gender gap. The use of two distinct college graduation cohorts allows a dynamic analysis of the widening female advantage in college graduation. I decompose the increase in the college gender gap into three pertinent categories of measurable attributes: family background, cognitive skills, and non-cognitive skills (captured by school suspensions, behavioral problems, and legal infractions). A second decomposition is applied to the change in the gap between the two periods. The results show that roughly half of the observed college graduation gender gap in the NLSY97 is due to female advantages in observable characteristics, and roughly half is “unexplained”: due to gender differences in the coefficients. With respect to the change in the gap, approximately 29% of the difference in differences is the “explained” component, attributed to changes in the relative characteristics of men and women. In particular, declining non-cognitive skills in men are associated with about 14% of the increase in the gender gap.

In an effort to explain the growth stagnation that hampered the United States in the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, mainstream economists unwittingly and incompletely reinvented the concept of unproductive labor that is rooted in classical and Marxian economics. The price to pay for having ignored this concept had been unexplained economic events, inappropriate policy, and relative national economic decline. The mainstream economists' attempt to adopt this concept came at a cost to their theoretical core. The abandonment of the concept came at a cost to the real economy represented by the financial crisis of 2008.

This paper analyzes the age pay gap in Italy (22%), particularly as it is of interest in an aging society and as it may affect social cohesion. Instead of the traditional approach for model selection, we use a machine-learning approach (post double robust Least Absolute Shrinkage Operator [LASSO]). This approach allows us to reduce Omitted Variable Bias (OVB), given data restrictions, and to obtain a robust estimate of the conditional age pay gap. We then decompose the conditional gap and analyze the impact of four further potential sources of heterogeneity (workers', sectors', and occupations' permanent heterogeneity as well as sample selection bias). The results suggest that age discrimination in pay is only perceived but not real in Italy for both men and women.

It is not easy to get a long perspective on the distribution of wealth in Sweden because there is no single data source that gives a consistent view for a long period of time. The early estimates of the distribution of wealth were based on the concept of tax-assessed wealth which is the basis of the wealth tax. This definition has the disadvantage of not including assets that were not taxed, and no or very unreliable data were given for the majority of the tax payers who were below the taxation threshold. Furthermore, this variable was defined for individuals and for jointly taxed individuals, but no economically meaningful household concept was available. Register data have since then improved, in particular after the late 1990s when data became available directly from banks, brokers, and insurance companies without the filtering of the tax payers. The problem with the household definition remains, but in SESIM we have made corrections to get a useful definition (see Chapter 3). A relatively large survey (HEK) run by Statistics Sweden which combines survey information about the household with register data on assets estimates the median household wealth to 156000 SEK in 1999 and 197000 SEK in 2003.² The latter estimate is in the 1999 price level.³ These estimates apply to all households independent of age. As will be shown below, the level of wealth depends very much on age.