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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the time‐inconsistency problem between inflation and unemployment rate series for Turkey.

The validity of the Barro‐Gordon model's implications is tested by using state‐space form and a Kalman filter. In order to investigate the long‐run effects of the time‐inconsistency problem, unit root and co‐integration tests are applied. First, a Hodrick‐Prescott filter is used to test the short‐run effects. Then the modified Barro‐Gordon model's constraint is applied to the detrended inflation and unemployment rate.

The results of this study suggest that both inflation and unemployment series are not stationary and they include the unit root, but that first differences of the two series are stationary. The co‐integration test results also do not support the Barro‐Gordon model's implications for the long‐run behavior of inflation and unemployment: the two variables are not cointegrated.

The results of this study suggest that the time‐inconsistency problem for Turkey can be valid in the short‐run, but sufficient proof cannot be found to support the Barro‐ Gordon model's implications for the long‐run.

Models fiscal policy interactions between fiscal authorities and private investors in the foreign exchange market in a game‐theoretic framework. Using a two‐period game, I consider the credible and noncredible announcements of the domestic fiscal authority with respect to the stance of its future fiscal policy. Each country faces a trade‐off between its current account and budget deficit objectives and time‐inconsistency arises due to lack of a sufficient number of policy instruments. For this game I derive explicitly the time consistent and precommitment policies for the domestic fiscal authority and explain that precommitment is welfare improving relative to the time‐consistent policy. In a two‐country framework, both precommitment with respect to the private sector and co‐operation between the two policymakers tend to improve welfare.

This study aims to explore the factors whereby some international organizations (IOs) are more effective than others in international mediation and proposes three types of hypotheses through combining quantitative and qualitative analysis. First, IOs with greater institutional capabilities for gathering, exchanging and disseminating conflict-related information are more likely to mediate effectively. IO bias is another factor of influence in this regard. Second, IOs with greater institutional capabilities for deploying field missions and guaranteeing agreement are more likely to mediate effectively and maintain durable peace. Third, IOs with higher amounts of leverage are more likely to mediate effectively.

The study establishes two data sets: one on interstate conflict; the other on intrastate conflict, thus to cover as many research samples as possible and avoid sampling bias.

Results of the statistical analysis indicate that no matter interstate or intrastate conflict, IOs with higher institutional capabilities for diplomatic interventions are more likely to bring conflict parties to an agreement and thereafter maintain short-term peace. IOs with higher institutional capabilities for economic sanctions are similarly effective. Furthermore, IOs with greater institutional capabilities for field mission deployment mediate more effectively, whether in facilitating peace agreements or maintaining short-term and long-term peace after the agreement. IO bias and preference, however, have no significant impact on mediation effectiveness.

This study has made no in-depth explorations of such existing and important research areas as different third-party comparisons of the mediation effect.

This paper attempts to make some contributions to the topic of mediation effectiveness through applying a bargaining model to the research and performing a statistical analysis based on both an interstate conflict data set and an intrastate conflict data set.

This paper provides an in-depth causal analysis and thoroughgoing comparison of the effectiveness of IOs in both interstate conflicts and intrastate conflicts.

The purpose of this paper is to propose reforms that would establish a credible framework of rules to constrain and guide emergency lending by the Federal Reserve and by fiscal authorities during a future financial crisis.

The authors propose a set of five overarching rules, informed by history, empirical evidence and theory, which would serve as the foundation on which detailed legislation should be constructed.

The authors find that the current framework governing emergency lending – including reforms to Federal Reserve lending enacted after the recent crisis – is inadequate and not credible, and that their proposed framework would constitute a credible balancing of costs and benefits.

Adequate assistance to financial institutions would be provided in systemic crises but would be limited in its form, and by the process that would govern its provision.

This framework would serve as a basis for establishing effective rules that would be credible, and that would properly balance the moral-hazard costs of emergency lending against the gains from avoiding systemic collapse of the financial system.

The purpose of this paper is to make an empirical analysis concerning time-inconsistency problem (TIP) based on a sample of 12 countries for the period from 1993 to 2011.

The existence of TIP only makes sense if there is a trade-off between inflation and unemployment and when there is a causal relationship indicating that with more inflation, unemployment is reduced (as suggested by the Phillips curve). Hence, TIP is observed by testing the existence of cointegration between inflation rate and unemployment rate series and analyzing the sign of the estimated coefficient of the cointegration vector.

The findings indicate that the large majority of countries in the sample have policies that are consistent with long-term goals. Furthermore, it is possible to conjecture that the traditional argument that developing countries have weak institutions and thus present a fertile ground for TIP or that the adoption of inflation targeting (IT) can avoid TIP is not necessarily true.

This study sheds light on four important issues. First, has the change in the mindset of the monetary policy management from the 1990s eliminated TIP? Second, is TIP a sickness only for developing countries? Third, is IT associated with TIP? Fourth, has the TIP increased around the world due to the subprime crisis? In short, this paper is an advance on the empirical literature on TIP and it is a very important overview for observing the present day conduct of the monetary policy through the international experience.

Financial sustainability requires governments to run sufficiently large primary surpluses going forward to cover the cost of servicing its debt budgets to balance in the long run. In democracies, politicians who strive for reelection often tend to systematically violate this tenet. This paper discusses two types of “anchors” that may be used to cope with this problem by limiting the room for new and excessive public debt. First, we analyze national constitutional safeguards on the basis of the “debt brake” in Switzerland and Germany. Second, we discuss international institutions to maintain financial discipline, referring to the Maastricht-criteria. These anchors are designed to allow policymakers to commit to policies that provide long term financial stability and sustainability of public finances. However, as the recent crises have shown, the problem of time inconsistency in policy making remains, especially when anchors are weak. Therefore, the paper discusses the circumstances under which institutional anchors may help to restrict politician behavior to promote sustainability of public finances. We conclude by indentifying three conditions required for the proper functioning of collective anchors in the context of public finances.

The development of blockchain and cryptocurrency may alleviate the economic strain associated with recession. Economic recessions tend to be aggregate-demand driven, meaning that they are caused by fluctuations in the supply of or demand for money. Holding monetary policy as solution assumes that stability must arise from outside of the economic system. Under a policy regime that allows innovations in blockchain to develop, blockchain technology may promote a money supply that is responsive to changes in demand to hold money. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that cryptocurrencies present an opportunity to profitably implement rules that promote macroeconomic stability. In particular, cryptocurrency that is asset-backed may provide a means for cheaply attaining liquidity during a crisis.

The role of cryptocurrency in promoting macroeconomic equilibrium is approached through the lens of monetary theory. Moves away from macroeconomic equilibrium necessitate either a change in the average price of money or a change in the quantity of money, or a change in portfolio demand for money. Cryptocurrency promotes an increase, however this requires the alignment of policy regulating the use of cryptocurrency, reduction in taxes placed on the use of cryptocurrency and cryptocurrency protocol.

Cryptocurrency is unlikely to become legal tender, but it may alleviate macroeconomic fluctuations as a near money that provides liquidity and whose supply is sensitive to changes in demand to hold money and money-like substitutes. This role might be inhibited if policy stifles the development of cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology.

New financial innovations like cryptocurrencies can be analyzed applying the equation of exchange in light of the mechanics of money creation under conditions of disequilibrium. Monetary disequilibrium may be promoted by policy that causes bottlenecks in financial markets.

Theory of monetary disequilibrium has broad implications for the development and regulation of financial markets. This theory has not been applied to the development of cryptocurrency markets.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss literature and empirical evidence on regulatory independence especially in telecommunications and to suggest reforms of this institution.

The paper comprises a survey of the literature plus new empirical evidence on de facto independence.

The study finds that independence has a positive and significant, but modest, impact on network penetration, once de facto issues and endogeneity are taken into account.

De facto independence can only be superficially approached with quantitative methods and the instruments used to correct for endogeneity are far from perfect.

Regulatory agencies may find ways to improve their effectiveness.

The paper provides ideas on how to solve the dilemma between expertise and accountability in the particular field of telecommunications regulation.

The paper provides data about the vulnerability of independent regulation in telecommunications in Latin America until 2010.