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Independent regulators: theory, evidence and reform proposals

Francesc Trillas (Based at the Department of Applied Economics, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain)
Miguel A. Montoya (Director of Graduate Studies at TEC de Monterrey (Campus de Guadalajara), Guadalajara, Mexico)

info

ISSN: 1463-6697

Article publication date: 3 May 2013

656

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to discuss literature and empirical evidence on regulatory independence especially in telecommunications and to suggest reforms of this institution.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper comprises a survey of the literature plus new empirical evidence on de facto independence.

Findings

The study finds that independence has a positive and significant, but modest, impact on network penetration, once de facto issues and endogeneity are taken into account.

Research limitations/implications

De facto independence can only be superficially approached with quantitative methods and the instruments used to correct for endogeneity are far from perfect.

Practical implications

Regulatory agencies may find ways to improve their effectiveness.

Social implications

The paper provides ideas on how to solve the dilemma between expertise and accountability in the particular field of telecommunications regulation.

Originality/value

The paper provides data about the vulnerability of independent regulation in telecommunications in Latin America until 2010.

Keywords

Citation

Trillas, F. and Montoya, M.A. (2013), "Independent regulators: theory, evidence and reform proposals", info, Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 39-53. https://doi.org/10.1108/14636691311327115

Publisher

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Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2013, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

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