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The purpose of this paper is to propose reforms that would establish a credible framework of rules to constrain and guide emergency lending by the Federal Reserve and by fiscal authorities during a future financial crisis.

The authors propose a set of five overarching rules, informed by history, empirical evidence and theory, which would serve as the foundation on which detailed legislation should be constructed.

The authors find that the current framework governing emergency lending – including reforms to Federal Reserve lending enacted after the recent crisis – is inadequate and not credible, and that their proposed framework would constitute a credible balancing of costs and benefits.

Adequate assistance to financial institutions would be provided in systemic crises but would be limited in its form, and by the process that would govern its provision.

This framework would serve as a basis for establishing effective rules that would be credible, and that would properly balance the moral-hazard costs of emergency lending against the gains from avoiding systemic collapse of the financial system.

This study contributes to a growing body of literature on the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) by examining how lender incentives affected prioritization of large borrowers. In addition, this study separately examines incentives for commercial banks and credit unions during the program.

Using 2020 PPP loan data, the authors create a proxy for lender loan prioritization by comparing the skewness statistics of large and small loan distributions. A regression model is used to examine lender reporting incentives and loan prioritization.

Results show that larger borrowers were prioritized in receiving PPP loans earlier. Lenders with financial reporting concerns and commercial banks favored large borrowers to a greater extent.

This study may inform social planners and regulators about the benefits and costs of delegating emergency funding loan decisions to financial institutions.

The authors believe this paper is the first to examine financial institution reporting incentives in relationship to PPP lending practices. It adds novelty by examining lender incentives, while prior research has focused heavily on the economic consequences of the program and how borrower–lender relationships affected loan practices during the program.

This paper extends a recent study on financial dollarization of Broda and Levy Yeyati (2003) by introducing a lending of last resort intervention contingent both on banks’ portfolio currency composition and on banks’ monitoring effort. We show that when the lender of last resort commitment to intervene is matched with some operational discretion, according to a “constructive ambiguity” approach, then the provision of emergency liquidity may be crucial to enable distressed, but well-behaved banks, to survive and finance “high quality” investment projects.

The 2000–2006 housing market bubble conformed to a classic boom–bust scenario that triggered the most serious and costly financial crisis since the Great Depression. The 2008 subprime mortgage collapse leveraged a financial system that privatizes profits and socializes risks. Several factors converge to set up the subprime mortgage market as an easy target for industry insiders to exploit. Enabling legislation expanded the potential pool of borrowers eligible for subprime mortgages and structured incentives to lenders willing to assume the risks. The securitization of subprime mortgages transformed bundles of high-risk loans into mortgage-backed securities that were in demand by domestic and foreign investors. Pressure to edge out competition produced high-risk loans marketed to unqualified borrowers. The final piece in the setup of the subprime lending crisis was a move from an origination model to a distributive model by many financial institutions in the business of lending. We find that the diffusion and totality of these business practices produced a criminogenic opportunity structure for industry insiders to profit at the expense of homebuyers and later investors.

This chapter analyses the causes and effects of the financial crisis that commenced in 2008, and it examines the dramatic government rescues and reforms. The outcomes of this, the most severe collapse to befall the United States and the global economy for three-quarters of a century, are still unfolding. Banks, homeowners and industries stood to benefit from government intervention, particularly the huge infusion of taxpayer funds, but their future is uncertain. Instead of extending vital credit, banks simply kept the capital to cover other firm needs (including bonuses for executives). Industry in the prevailing slack economy was not actively seeking investment opportunities and credit expansion. The property and job markets languished behind securities market recovery. It all has been disheartening and scary – rage against those in charge fuelled gloom and cynicism. Immense private debt was a precursor, but public debt is the legacy we must resolve in the future.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the events leading up to the Great Recession, the US Federal Reserve’s response to what it perceived to be a short-term liquidity problem, and the programs it put in place to address liquidity needs from 2007 through the third quarter of 2008.

These programs were designed to channel liquidity to some of the largest institutions, most of which were primary dealers. We describe these programs, examine available evidence regarding their effectiveness and detail which institutions received the largest amounts under each program.

We argue that increasing financial fragility and potential insolvencies in several major institutions were evident prior to the crisis. While it is inherently difficult to disentangle issues of illiquidity from issues of insolvency, failure to recognize and address those insolvency problems delayed necessary adjustments, undermined confidence in the financial system and may have exacerbated the crisis.

Disentangling issues of illiquidity from issues of insolvency is inherently difficult and so it is not possible to specify a definitive counterfactual scenario. Nonetheless, failure to recognize and address the insolvency problems in several major institutions until more than a year after the crisis had begun delayed the necessary adjustment and undermined confidence in the financial system.

This paper is among the first to analyze data showing the amounts of lending and the distribution of these loans across institutions under the Fed’s special liquidity facilities during the first 18 months of the financial crisis.

Systemic banking crises can have devastating effects on the economies of developing or industrialized countries. This paper reviews the factors that weaken banking systems and make them more susceptible to crises. It is the first of two papers examining root causes of banking crises and time-consistent policies for resolving them.

IN our last number we presented reports from five libraries in bombed areas, and the interest created by these reports, particularly overseas, suggested a continuation of the series. In this number, therefore, we publish reports from a number of other places that have suffered from enemy action. Bristol is again reported upon by Mr. Ross, and his statement suggests the heaviness and the ruthlessness of the enemy attack on the city. Everything we learn serves to indicate that the enemy is prepared to drop his bombs anywhere, whether there be a military objective below him or not.—Editor, L.R.

In recent years Lehman Brothers, one of the five largest investment banks in the United States, had grown increasingly reliant on its fixed income trading and underwriting division, which served as the primary engine for its strong profit growth. The bank had also significantly increased its leverage over the same timeframe, going from a debt-to-equity ratio of 23.7x in 2003 to 35.2x in 2007. As leverage increased, the ongoing erosion of the mortgage-backed industry began to impact Lehman significantly and its stock price plummeted. Unfortunately, public outcry over taxpayer assumption of $29 billion in potential Bear losses made repeating such a move politically untenable. The surreal scene of potential buyers traipsing into an investment bank's headquarters over the weekend to consider various merger or spin-out scenarios repeated itself once again. This time, the Fed refused to back the failing bank's liabilities, attempting instead to play last-minute suitors Bank of America, HSBC, Nomura Securities, and Barclay's off each other, jawboning them by arguing that failing to step up to save Lehman would cause devastating counterparty runs on their own capital positions. The Fed's desperate attempts to arrange its second rescue of a major U.S. investment bank in six months failed when it refused to backstop losses from Lehman's toxic mortgage holdings. Complicating matters was Lehman's reliance on short-term repo loans to finance its balance sheet. Unfortunately, such loans required constant renewal by counterparties, who had grown increasingly nervous that Lehman would lose the ability to make good on its trades. With this sentiment swirling around Wall Street, Lehman was forced to announce the largest Chapter 11 filing in U.S. history, listing assets of $639 billion and liabilities of $768 billion. The second domino had fallen. It would not be the last.

This case covers the period from the sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan to the conversion into bank holding companies by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, including the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America. The case explains the new global paradigm for the investment banking industry, including increased regulation, fewer competitors, lower leverage, reduced proprietary trading, and-potentially-reduced profits.