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This study aims to explore the factors whereby some international organizations (IOs) are more effective than others in international mediation and proposes three types of hypotheses through combining quantitative and qualitative analysis. First, IOs with greater institutional capabilities for gathering, exchanging and disseminating conflict-related information are more likely to mediate effectively. IO bias is another factor of influence in this regard. Second, IOs with greater institutional capabilities for deploying field missions and guaranteeing agreement are more likely to mediate effectively and maintain durable peace. Third, IOs with higher amounts of leverage are more likely to mediate effectively.

The study establishes two data sets: one on interstate conflict; the other on intrastate conflict, thus to cover as many research samples as possible and avoid sampling bias.

Results of the statistical analysis indicate that no matter interstate or intrastate conflict, IOs with higher institutional capabilities for diplomatic interventions are more likely to bring conflict parties to an agreement and thereafter maintain short-term peace. IOs with higher institutional capabilities for economic sanctions are similarly effective. Furthermore, IOs with greater institutional capabilities for field mission deployment mediate more effectively, whether in facilitating peace agreements or maintaining short-term and long-term peace after the agreement. IO bias and preference, however, have no significant impact on mediation effectiveness.

This study has made no in-depth explorations of such existing and important research areas as different third-party comparisons of the mediation effect.

This paper attempts to make some contributions to the topic of mediation effectiveness through applying a bargaining model to the research and performing a statistical analysis based on both an interstate conflict data set and an intrastate conflict data set.

This paper provides an in-depth causal analysis and thoroughgoing comparison of the effectiveness of IOs in both interstate conflicts and intrastate conflicts.

The authors suggest that there has been a militarisation of the Third World since the Second World War. This militarisation and consequent hostilities are a representation of the power structure of the present world system. While there may be a reduction in the direct hostilities between the superpowers this is made up for and played out in regional conflicts between Third World nations. Such conflicts are provisioned by military supplies from the west.

This study delves into the transformation of UAE-Israel relations, which transitioned from a long-term rivalry to a formal peace agreement in 2020. It aims to uncover the multifaceted elements that influenced both nations’ pursuit of bilateral negotiations, with a special emphasis on the role of unofficial collaboration.

Employing a case study approach, the research traces the evolution of the UAE-Israel ties, mapping their progression from covert collaborations to public accords. This exploration is set against a backdrop of political, economic, and societal factors that have historically characterized the broader Israel-Arab conflict. Real-world dynamics and theoretical constructs are analyzed in tandem to derive comprehensive insights.

Key drivers for the transformation of UAE-Israel relations included the threat from Iran, internal disturbances, economic stresses, and the strategic advantages of discreet diplomacy. Exogenous catalysts like the Covid-19 pandemic and Israel's annexation plans in 2019-2020 played pivotal roles, capitalizing on pre-existing covert collaborations and shared regional interests. Constructive strategies, notably inducements, effectively reshaped their adversarial relationship. The resultant U.S.-mediated agreement conferred strategic, security, economic, and diplomatic benefits to both parties. Importantly, the potency of conengagement conflict management strategy, especially when bolstered by exogenous factors and growing mutual interest, emerged as a game-changer in terminating longstanding rivalries.

This study offers a unique perspective on Israel-UAE relations, emphasizing the significance of covert engagements, inducements, and the innovative conengagement strategy in conflict resolution. By examining a relationship devoid of direct armed conflict, the research underscores the interplay of economic, political, and societal factors in reshaping rivalries. This case study serves as a testament to the potential for transformative change in enduring disputes when the right conditions and strategies align, supplementing conventional perspectives and offering valuable implications for policy and mediation initiatives in the Middle East.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate interstate warfare and its association with foreign direct investment (FDI) and multinational enterprise (MNE) strategy by integrating insights from international business (IB) and international political economy (IPE) literature.

This paper identifies economic and regulatory mediators for the relationship between war and FDI, laying the groundwork to evaluate strategies the MNE would undertake in the event of war in the host country.

The effects of war on MNE strategy can be separated into short‐term and long‐term effects. Specifically, the MNE may be influenced by war in its: initial investment decision; factors of significant importance for running the company's local operations; and critical factors for future foreign investments.

Studies using actual firm‐level data can look at whether MNEs from non‐warring states conduct business as usual elsewhere or leverage war in the host country to their advantage. Further investigation is also needed to determine the power that MNEs in the home country have over foreign policy to assert their own strategies in a particular host market.

This paper has implications for managers of MNEs in warring host countries or contemplating the expansion of their operations overseas to a war zone with regard to the likely impact of war on firm operations.

Current paradigms of IB, in failing to account for the macro‐level and contingent nature of warfare, leave a gap in the business literature: specifically, how the international political context affects firms' activities, strategies, and decision‐making processes. This paper attempts to incorporate warfare, together with firm‐specific, industry‐specific, and other country‐specific determinants to inform the question: what determines the international success or failure, and in turn the long‐run competitiveness, of firms in turbulent times?

The purpuse of this study is to answer the following two questions. Do conflict management efforts mitigate the recurrence and severity of civil conflict? If so, how? Do some conflict management strategies fare better than others in these tasks? This study theorizes about the connection between the costliness of a conflict management strategy – with respect to both the disputants and third parties – and civil conflict outcomes. This theory produces two contradictory predictions: that more costly strategies either increase or decrease violence. This study not only adjudicates between these two possibilities but also incorporates the role of timing. The early use of more costly strategies, for example, may encourage disputants to reduce violence in civil conflicts.

To evaluate the predications that the authors derive from their theoretical argument, the authors quantitatively analyze the effect of conflict management strategies’ relative cost on various measures of civil conflict recurrence and severity. The authors first identify the set of international–civil militarized conflicts (I-CMCs) during the period 1946–2010. I-CMCs contain two dimensions – interstate and intrastate – making them the most complex and dangerous form of militarized conflict. To each I-CMC, the authors then link all third-party attempts to manage the I-CMC’s civil conflict dimension. Finally, after developing quantitative indicators, a series of regression equations explore the relationships of primary interest.

Two main findings emerge. First, when third parties use a relatively more costly conflict management strategy to manage a civil conflict (e.g. a peace operation or military intervention, as opposed to mediation), the severity of the conflict increases, while conflict recurrence rates remain unchanged. Second, this study uncovers a trade-off. The early use of a relatively more costly management strategy lowers a civil conflict’s severity in the short-term. It also, however, increases the likelihood – and speed with which – civil conflict recurs. The timing of certain conflict management strategies matters.

Scholars typically isolate conflict management strategies in number (i.e. consider efforts as independent of one another, even those within the same conflict) and kind (i.e. examine mediation but not peace operations). This study, in contrast, includes the following: the full menu of conflict management strategies available to third parties – negotiation, mediation, adjudication/arbitration, peace operations, sanctions and military intervention – over a lengthy time period (1946–2010); theorizes about the relative merits of these strategies; and considers the timing of certain conflict management efforts. In so doing, it highlights a policy trade-off and proposes promising areas for future research.

The current study is an extension of the PF model research program that began after the Great Depression in the early 1930s. The purpose of the study is to introduce political dimensions to the PF defense-growth model and to assess the impact of political and conflict variables on EG. The study theorizes that excluding political factors from the PF defense-growth model hampers any realistic explanation of the problems of EG; that the influences of economic and military variables and their externalities effects vary across different political contexts; that political factors are at least as important as economic factors in determining the outcome of EG; that intrastate and interstate conflicts have differential effects on EG (both types of conflicts have negative effects on EG; however, intrastate conflicts have more damaging effects on growth than do interstate conflicts); and that the impact of conflicts on EG differs across regions.

During the past two decades, both West Africa and Central Africa have suffered a large number of intertwined wars. In both regions, these ‘webs of war’ have included interstate conflicts and rivalry, as well as wars over the control of many of the involved states. Existing perspectives tend to reduce these intertwined wars to a series of parallel civil wars within each of the various states. They see states as operating at the regional level, whereas the armed opposition to those states operates only at the national level. This chapter argues that many armed, non-state groups in West Africa and Central Africa should be seen as regional actors, and thus that conventional two-level analysis does not catch the complexity of conflict in those regions. Although major violence continues in Central Africa, it has largely been contained in West Africa. This needs to be seen in relation to the level of institutionalization of security and military cooperation in the two regions. In both regions, regional organizations carried out military operations that were highly controversial among their member-states. In West Africa, a series of interventions strengthened both regional cooperation and cooperation with external partners, whereas in Central Africa this was not the case. In West Africa, peace support operations have increasingly been carried out within a regional perspective. Not so in Central Africa. The chapter concludes with an examination of efforts to build a capacity for peace support operations within the African Union, based on subregional organizations but with strong involvement by external actors.

The purpose of this paper is to explore to what extent the economic interdependence can affect the likelihood of conflict between States. Specially, over the past few decades, there has been a huge interest in the relationship between economic interdependence and political conflict. Liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the possibility of war by increasing the weight of trading over the alternative of aggression; interdependent states would rather trade than invade; realists dismiss the liberal argument, arguing that high interdependence increases rather than decreases the probability of war. In anarchy, states must constantly worry about their security.

This paper highlights the content and level of economic interdependence between China and the USA since the beginning of China’s economic reform in 1979 and examines the impact of economic interdependence between them on their relationship toward Taiwan since 1995 and the probability of conflict.

Economic interdependence is proved to significantly decrease the onset of conflict between the two parties. This can be shown by comparing the number of armed conflicts during the pre-interdependence period to the number of armed conflicts after the economic interdependence there was an overage of 0.79 militarized interstate disputes (MIDs)/year, compared to 0.26 MIDs/year following China’s economic reforms; also, the length of the hostilities was longer during the pre-interdependence period (with an average of 11.13 months versus 5.33 months).

This means that economic interdependence does not completely prevent the outbreak of international conflicts, but it also plays a major role in influencing the conflict in terms of the conflict’s intensity, the use of armed force and the number of conflicts that occur between the economic interdependence states.

Although political conflict and war are as old as humanity itself, in the twentieth century, it peaked. In recent years, most of the conflicts were intrastate conflict rather than interstate conflict. A new element of terrorism has been associated with the conflict. These conflicts are not only resulting from internal political disturbances, it is also intermingled with ethnicity, resources, migration, and above all extreme poverty.

This article calls for closer attention to the Middle East in the wider debate on the purported rise of new modes of armed conflict following the end of the Cold War, particularly in relation to the notion of ‘regional conflict formations’ (RCFs). In so doing, it presents and analyses three main paradoxes. First, though the contemporary Middle East had its own share of intrastate conflicts that generally grew into regional constellations, a look at the region's post-colonial history suggests that such trends are not as novel as has often been claimed. Second, the striking longevity of regionally entwined conflict in the Middle East calls into question the common and generalizing argument that it was the end of the Cold War, together with the alleged disengagement of the superpowers, that constituted the radical shifts – including the rise of RCFs – that signalled the demise of old forms of politics and conflict involving weak states. Third, Middle Eastern states, mostly authoritarian in outlook, have over recent decades become stronger despite prevailing conditions of regionalized conflict; indeed, as tentatively suggested in this article, to some extent because of those factors.