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Moral hazard is a concept that is central to risk and insurance management. It refers to change in economic behavior when individuals are protected or insured against certain risks and losses whose costs are borne by another party. It asserts that the presence of an insurance contract increases the probability of a claim and the size of a claim. Through the US Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, this study seeks to examine the validity and relevance of moral hazard in health care reform and determine how welfare losses or inefficiencies could be mitigated.

This study is divided into three sections. The first contrasts conventional moral hazard from an emerging or alternative theory. The second analyzes moral hazard in terms of the evolution, organization, management, and marketing of health insurance in the USA. The third explains why and how salient reform measures under the ACA might induce health care consumption and production in ways that could either promote or restrict personal health and safety as well as social welfare maximization.

Insurance generally induces health care (over) consumption. However, not every additional consumption, with or without adverse selection, can be considered wasteful or risky, even if it might cost insurers more in the short run. Moral hazard can generate welfare and equity gains. These gains might vary depending on which ACA provisions, insured population, covered illnesses, treatments, and services, as well as health outcomes are taken into account, and because of the relative ambiguities surrounding definitions of “health.” Actuarial risk models can nonetheless benefit from incorporating welfare and equity gains into their basic assumptions and estimations.

This is the first study which examines the ACA in the context of the new or alternative theory of moral hazard. It suggests that containing inefficient moral hazard, and encouraging its desirable counterpart, are prime challenges in any health care reform initiative, especially as it adapts to the changing demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the insured population and regulatory landscape of health insurance in the USA.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between leverage and firm performance using small business data from France by estimating the effects of leverage on both average firm performance and the variance of firm performance.

Focusing on French small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which tend to be dependent on bank loans, the authors examine the relationship between leverage and firm performance. This study was based on a unique panel data set of more than 2,157 manufacturing SMEs covering the years 2007-2015. The authors estimate the effects of leverage on both average firm performance and the variance of firm performance.

Focusing on the average effects of leverage, the authors find that highly leveraged firms suffer from poor performance. In addition, the variance in firm performance is higher if firms are highly leveraged. Results also underline that leveraged firms are better performers when they have sufficient collateral assets.

The study, however, has also some limitations. The first one is that the findings were obtained for only one industry sector, so attempts should be made to study the issue, as it applies to other sectors as well. Second is the context where the study was conducted. This study has been conducted based on data gathered from SMEs in France within a specific socioeconomic context (2007-2008 global financial crisis), which may also limit the generalizability of the results for different contexts with different socioeconomic situations. It would also be useful, to have a better explanation for the performance of SMEs, to add to the model more financial variables or other types of variables such as those related to managerial skills or to the macro-economic environment. Finally, further research could examine the joint impact of both leverage and ownership structure on firm’s performance as a large number of French firms are family firms. The limitations of this study, however, can in fact be an opportunity for future researchers to conduct studies addressing those limitations.

This research has some implications for small business lending. SME owners and managers may, on the one hand, be encouraged by the fact that collateral assets can reduce agency costs, thereby positively affecting firm performance. On the other hand, high leverage can facilitate firm growth if firms have collateral assets. This implies that policymakers interested in stimulating SMEs should develop more suitable collaterals for high-risk SMEs with low asset tangibility.

The results also have implications for financial institutions. To prevent unexpected and extensive bankruptcies, banks might classify firms with negative cash flows as borrower in danger of bankruptcy. However, the results show that highly leveraged firms with good investment opportunities and high collateral assets reduce the probability of bankruptcy. This implies that banks need to evaluate the credit risk of very highly leveraged small businesses more carefully.

It should be noted that the case of France remains marginal in terms of the conducted studies.

This study aims to reveal whether social capital has an effect on the housing price index in Turkey, which is a developing country. The research was carried out by using the data on the basis of 81 provinces of Turkey in a 12-year period covering the years 2007–2018.

The data were subjected to panel data regression analysis and the related models were tested using the Driscoll-Kraay (1998) Estimator.

According to the results of the analysis, it was understood that there is a negative and significant relationship between social capital (SC1) and the housing price index. The results were corroborated by susceptibility testing. As the level of social capital rises in the provinces in Turkey, the manipulative and opportunistic behavior tendencies of individual and corporate house sellers decrease. These results support the principal–agent theory and theory of moral hazard, which constitute the theoretical background of the study.

No study has been found in the literature on the effect of social capital on housing prices. This situation constitutes the main motivation source of the study and shows its originality.

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) has caused financial stress and limited their lending agility, resulting in more non-performing loans (NPLs) and lower performance during the II wave of the coronavirus crisis. Therefore, it is essential to identify the risky factors influencing the financial performance of Indian banks spanning 2018–2022.

Our sample consists of a balanced panel dataset of 75 scheduled commercial banks from three different ownership groups, including public, private and foreign banks, that were actively engaged in their operations during 2018–2022. Factor identification is performed via a fixed-effects model (FEM) that solves the issue of heterogeneity across different with banks over time. Additionally, to ensure the robustness of our findings, we also identify the risky drivers of the financial performance of Indian banks using an alternative measure, the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model.

Empirical evidence indicates that default risk, solvency risk and COVAR reduce financial performance in India. However, high liquidity, Z-score and the COVID-19 crisis enhance the financial performance of Indian banks. Unsystematic risk and systemic risk factors play an important role in determining the prognosis of COVID-19. The study supports the “bad-management,” “moral hazard” and “tail risk spillover of a single bank to the system” hypotheses. Public sector banks (PSBs) have considerable potential to achieve financial performance while controlling unsystematic risk and exogenous shocks relative to their peer group. Finally, robustness check estimates confirm the coefficients of the main model.

This study contributes to the knowledge in the banking literature by identifying risk factors that may affect financial performance during a crisis nexus and providing information about preventive measures. These insights are valuable to bankers, academics, managers and regulators for policy formulation. The findings of this paper provide important insights by considering all the risk factors that may be responsible for reducing the probability of financial performance in the banking system of an emerging market economy.

The empirical analysis has been done with a fresh perspective to consider unsystematic risk, systemic risk and exogenous risk (COVID-19) with the financial performance of Indian banks. Furthermore, none of the existing banking literature explicitly explores the drivers of the I and II waves of COVID-19 while considering COVID-19 as a dependent variable. Therefore, the aim of the present study is to make efforts in this direction.

Business malpractice in supply chains raises the food safety risks for downstream buyers, including consumers. This paper aims to analyse the multiplicity of behavioural factors influencing producers' motivation to break the food safety norms intentionally.

The paper reviews existing disciplinary approaches for the analysis of behavioural risks. Based on this review, an analytical framework is developed which provides a base for an interdisciplinary institutional analysis of behavioural risks in food chains.

The reviewed approaches on behavioural risk share the view that deviance is the result of multi‐goal and (potentially) opportunistic decision making of bounded rational individuals. The analytical framework presented in this paper integrates these approaches.

The analytical framework provides a rough categorisation of behavioural drivers. It neither details the context‐dependent subcomponents that determine the utility outcome within each category nor the methods that should be used to analyse them.

A behavioural economic analysis based on the framework means opening up the black box of the regulatees' action situation by incorporating the subjectively perceived material incentives in addition to immaterial motivations such as reputation effects, social norms and community pressure into the analysis. Based on an understanding of producers' motivation, proper institutional solutions can be implemented to enhance producers' compliance with food safety norms.

The risk analysis of small business propositions is characterized by uncertainty and asymmetric information, producing problems of moral hazard and adverse selection for the banks and liquidity constraints for entrepreneurs. Decision making is based on information supplied and the application of different criteria. Concerns the relative importance of different criteria and whether the right criteria are being used to assess small firm ventures by banking institutions, and reports the results of research carried out into the importance of different criteria used in risk assessment by bank officers. Finds a high degree of variability in the approach by different bank officers and a bias towards financial information. The findings have marketing implications. Risk assessment cannot be divorced from the nature of the relationship with the small business customer. Investment in improving techniques of risk assessment increases profitability for the bank and improves marketing opportunities through the development of a long‐term working relationship.

This chapter contains a model of strategic delegation from owners to managers in a Cournot duopoly where firms compete under incomplete information on the rival marginal costs and the relations between owners and managers are characterised by moral hazard It is shown that despite incomplete information the owners are able to use strategically the delegation of the output decision by making the managers' incentive schemes observable. Strategic delegation enhances the equilibrium level of the managers' effort, decreasing all firms' marginal costs and so increasing expected output. When moral hazard results in under-provision of effort, strategic delegation has a counter-balancing effect on the loss of productivity due to agency costs. On the other hand, collusive agreements are shown to weaken the disciplinary role on managers of product market competition. In the linear demand case is also shown that the equilibrium industry output in each state of nature is lower with strategic delegation than otherwise, so that the equilibrium price is distorted toward the monopoly price. Therefore, the expected output increase is all due to the better states of nature becoming more likely. However, at difference from what happens with strategic delegation under complete information in the output setting game, in this model consumers may not benefit from strategic delegation, since consumer's surplus is convex in output.

Within developing countries, particularly in Africa, there is an emerging literature which highlights the unique obstacles faced by women entrepreneurs who start and develop their own businesses (De Vita, Mari, & Poggesi, 2014; Jamali, 2009; Minniti & Naude, 2010; Naude & Havenga, 2005; Nziku & Struthers, 2018). A key objective of this chapter is to critically appraise some of the conceptual approaches adopted in this literature. In so doing, the authors revisit a seminal paper first developed by Granovetter (1973) which suggested that female entrepreneurs, instead of being disadvantaged by the so-called ‘weak ties’ that bind their business networks, actually enjoy compensating benefits which Granovetter referred to as the strength of weak ties (SWT). Building on the conceptual work of Nziku and Struthers (2018) which developed an innovative taxonomy for analysing the SWT concept within a Principal-Agent (P-A) paradigm, the chapter will set out new insights which challenge some of the assumptions of the extant entrepreneurship literature. In particular, that women are inherently more risk averse in their business decision making than men. The theoretical context for this will be derived from a behavioural economics methodology first developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). They introduced the concept of loss aversion as a more realistic approach to attitudes towards risk on the part of entrepreneurs than risk aversion. The chapter contends that the loss aversion perspective may be more appropriate to the decision-making frame adopted by female entrepreneurs, especially in the context of Africa as well as in other developing regions of the world. The chapter will therefore suggest that such an approach can yield fresh insights on the topic of female entrepreneurship which the extant literature heretofore has not addressed, though this will have to be subsequently tested empirically.

The global financial turmoil of 2008 spilled over into the British Isles offshore jurisdictions of Guernsey and the Isle of Man resulting in the collapse of two local subsidiaries of major Icelandic banking groups and consequent depositors' losses. The purpose of this paper is to contrast the sharply differing reactions of the insular authorities and critically evaluate Guernsey's recently enacted deposit protection scheme.

The paper outlines the nature of the Guernsey jurisdiction, its offshore development and policy issues in deposit protection. Legislation establishing Guernsey's deposit protection scheme is described and critically evaluated.

Guernsey's scheme is a rushed legislative reaction dominated by finance centre reputational concerns. The legislation is clear and comprehensive but the long‐term robustness of its funding model is unclear.

The analysis contained in this paper highlights the ramifications of international bank instability in small offshore jurisdictions and the regulatory problems this poses. Discussion of the legislative basis of the deposit protection scheme clarifies its nature and limitations as an investor protection technique, which is timely given the status of deposit protection as a key theme in the UK Government's initiated Foot Review of nine offshore jurisdictions.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of capital adequacy ratio (CAR) prescribed in Basel III on the risk-taking behaviour of Islamic and conventional commercial banks in Malaysia. It also investigates the claim that the risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs) managers is identically influenced by CAR.

Secondary data for all CBs operating in the Malaysian banking sector are gathered from FitchConnect database for the 2011–2017 period. Both dynamic ordinary least squares and generalised method of moments techniques are used to estimate a panel data of 43 commercial banks, namely, 17 IBs and 26 CBs.

The findings of this study lend support to the favourable influence of CAR set in Basel III accord on risk-taking behaviour of both types of banks. CBs appeared to be remarkably better off in terms of capital buffers. Evidence is established on the identicality of the risk-taking behaviour of IBs and CBs managers under CAR influence.

Even though a high CAR is observed to hamper risk-taking of banks, the findings may serve as a signal to regulators to be mindful of the implications of holding a high CAR. Similarly, managers may capitalise on the findings in terms of strategising for efficient use of the considerable capital buffers. Shareholders are also concerned about managers’ use of the considerable capital buffers.

This study is among a few studies that endeavoured to provide empirical evidence on the claim that IBs mimic the conduct of CBs in light of the influence of CAR prescribed in Basel III on risk-taking behaviour, particularly banks operating within the same banking environment.