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The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the relation between tax reporting and financial reporting, their influence on transparency, and empirical implications.

I reexamine the conflicting results in Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) and Lennox, Lisowsky, and Pittman (2013). Frank et al. (2009) conclude that firms can manage book income upward and taxable income downward in the same period, implying a positive relation between aggressive book and tax reporting. Lennox et al. (2013) conclude the relation is negative and aggressive book reporting informs users that aggressive tax reporting is less likely. I identify four key differences in the research designs across the two studies, including measures of aggressive book reporting, measures of aggressive tax reporting, sample time periods, and empirical models. I systematically examine whether each of these differences is responsible for the conflicting results by altering the key difference while holding other factors as constant as possible. I find the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting is driven by the measure of aggressive book reporting, as the relation is positive for some subsets of firms and negative for others. Firms accused of financial statement fraud have a negative relation while nonfraud firms exhibit a positive relation. Using discretionary accruals, I also look for, but do not find a “pivot point” in the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting. I provide a better understanding of the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting by identifying research design choices that are responsible for prior results. I show that measures of both discretionary accruals and financial statement fraud are necessary to gain a more complete picture of the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting.

To better detect potential audit issues, since 2010, the Internal Revenue Service has required firms to file a separate schedule individually disclosing each of their uncertain tax positions (UTPs). This study uses an experiment to examine how this increase in detection risk from the newly created IRS schedule influences both a firm’s tax reporting and financial reporting concurrently. We find that corporate tax professionals were more likely to recommend an UTP when their firm had a strong UTP reporting quality, regardless of the detection risk level of the reporting environment. However, we find an interaction effect for the recording of the tax reserve. In a low detection risk environment, corporate tax professionals recorded a higher (lower) tax reserve when their firm had a weak (strong) UTP reporting quality. However, in a high detection risk environment, corporate tax professionals recorded a lower (higher) tax reserve when their firm had a weak (strong) UTP reporting quality. Overall, the results provide insight into the dual nature of UTP reporting and the determinants that influence each reporting behavior.

This chapter investigates the effect of moral reasoning of tax professionals on the aggressiveness of their reporting recommendations. The findings of the study indicate moral reasoning influences the aggressiveness of tax reporting decisions separate from the influence of client pressure. As the level of moral reasoning increases, the aggressiveness of the reporting position is found to0 decrease. Contrary to prior research, client pressure is not related to tax reporting aggressiveness. Failure to observe this relationship may signal a shift in behavior resulting from the intense public and regulatory scrutiny at the time of data collection which was in the immediate aftermath of the Enron scandal.

This study examines the influence of peers in the tax compliance setting using a social learning theory approach to investigate the effect of observing a peer's likelihood of reporting income. We also examine the role that gender plays in these decisions. We ask participants to estimate the likelihood of reporting income and to make a binary compliance decision in a setting where they are able to observe what they believe is another's response to a hypothetical tax reporting scenario. Participants who viewed the decision of a noncompliant peer were less likely to report honestly than those who viewed the decision of a compliant peer. This finding provides further evidence of a potential effect for peer influence. Consistent with prior literature, we find that women are more likely to comply than men, but do not find an interactive effect with peer observation. A supplemental experiment indicated that participants who believed their responses would be seen by a peer were less likely to report honestly than participants who believed their responses would remain private. This result, although counter-intuitive, is consistent with Wenzel's (2005a) description of a self–other discrepancy and conformance to a misperceived social norm.

This study examines the impact of expanded geographical disclosures on nonprofessional investor judgments. Public country-by-country reporting (CBCR) is a way to increase corporate transparency, enhancing tax fairness and accountability (European Commission, 2016). Public disclosure would make large multinational companies share information about profits, taxes paid, and number of employees on a per-country basis. However, it is unclear whether nonprofessional investors would even use CBCR and how they would interpret the information. Adding to the policy debate on whether publicly available country-by-country information will be properly used, this study employs an experimental design to investigate the effect of disclosure availability and content on nonprofessional investor judgments. We find that participants receiving an expanded disclosure are able to more accurately assess the state of the social contract between the organization and society, imposing sanctions if necessary. Exploring CBCR provides timely evidence to regulators, standard setters, and tax fairness campaigners on the impact of expanded geographical disclosures as a means of increasing transparency and improving competitiveness.

This study uses a survey instrument to ask Americans living abroad about the impact of tax rules explicitly designed for these individuals. We analyze how individuals are affected by foreign tax reporting laws and how they perceive and evaluate the rules’ consequences. A common belief is that many of the foreign reporting provisions were enacted in order to eliminate or reduce tax evasion. The current political climate has increased lawmakers’ focus on tax issues related to foreign income and accounts, which lead to several new rules and regulations, such as the provisions in the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), as well as an increased emphasis on the enforcement of existing laws.

Our results indicate that Americans living abroad experience FATCA negatively impacting their lives. Additionally, the respondents’ perceptions are consistent with the sentiment that their government is not concerned about the impact of the FATCA on its citizens living abroad.

We examine whether variations in the most fundamental aspects of state corporate income tax regimes affect state economic activity as measured by personal income, gross state product, and total non-farm employment. We focus on a variety of statutory components of state corporate income taxes that apply broadly in most U.S. states and for most multi-state corporate taxpayers. Our econometric strategy consists of a series of fixed effects panel regressions using state-level data from 1996 through 2010. Our results reveal important interaction effects of tax rates and policies, suggesting that policy makers should avoid making decisions about tax rates in isolation. The results demonstrate a relatively consistent negative economic response to the combination of high tax rates with throwback rules and heavy sales factor weights. Combined reporting has no discernible effect on personal income, GSP, or employment after controlling for tax rates, apportionment, and throwback rules. In an effort to gauge the relative impacts of tax policies on the location of economic activity, we also estimate alternative models in which each state’s economic activity is measured as a share of the national economic activity in each year. Statistically significant effects for tax rates, apportionment formulas, and throwback rules in the shares models suggest that at least some of their impact involves the movement of activity across state lines, thereby leaving open the possibility of a zero-sum game among the states.

Krull (2004) finds that US multinational corporations (MNCs) increase amounts designated as permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) to maximize reported after-tax earnings and meet earnings targets. We extend this research by examining the relationship between executive equity compensation and the opportunistic use of PRE by US MNCs, and the market reaction to earnings management using PRE designations. Firms use equity compensation to incentivize executives to strive for maximum shareholder wealth. One unintended consequence is that executives may engage in earnings management activities to increase their equity compensation. In this study, we examine whether the equity incentives of management are associated with an increased use of PRE. We predict and find strong evidence that the changes in PRE are positively associated with the portion of top managers' compensation that is tied to stock performance. In addition, we find this relationship to be strongest for firms that meet or beat forecasts, but only with the use of PRE to inflate income, suggesting that equity compensation incentivizes managers to opportunistically use PRE, especially to meet analyst forecasts.

Further, we provide evidence that investors react negatively to beating analysts' forecasts with the use of PRE, suggesting that investors find this behavior opportunistic and not fully convincing. This chapter makes an important contribution to what we know about the joint effects of tax policy, generally accepted accounting principles, and incentive compensation on the earnings reporting process.

The cost of compliance is an essential variable to consider when administering a tax system. One recent study estimates that the yearly federal tax compliance burden in the US exceeds $431 billion dollars, and this cost does not include the potential greatest cost of all – changes in taxpayer behavior that reduces economic efficiency (Laffer, Winegarden, & Childs, 2011). One example of such behavior is the renunciation of US citizenship due to the impact of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) reporting requirements. Using this context, our study examines how FATCA compliance costs can affect taxpayer behavior in a manner that reduces economic efficiency. We collected responses from 197 experienced US taxpayers living in the US. Our study finds that when tax compliance costs are high, taxpayers may be more likely to renounce their citizenship to avoid FATCA reporting requirements. We further learn that tax compliance costs may increase the likelihood of citizenship renunciation even in the presence of a minimal US tax burden. Supplemental mediation analysis demonstrates that one's perceived fairness of compliance does not mediate the effect of high compliance costs on a taxpayer's renunciation decision; however, one's perceived fairness of compliance and fear of sanctions, collectively, partially explain the effect of tax burden on the renunciation decision. In addition, we find that ethics, the perceived probability of detection, and average income level affect the decision to renounce citizenship. Our findings suggest broader impacts of tax policy and provide a foundation for future research to further explore domestic and foreign tax compliance behaviors.