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There is increasing international concern about the escalation of fraud and, in particular, financial statement fraud. Detecting financial statement fraud and proving such fraud remains an elusive goal. Red flagging is an early warning system that has been used by auditors to determine the probability of financial statement fraud. The purpose of this research project was to survey investors and lenders in South Africa on their use of red flags and to obtain their opinions on the relative importance of individual red flags. A questionnaire was sent to banks that are registered with the Registrar of Banks (representative of lenders) and to portfolio managers registered with the Financial Services Board (representative of investors). The research findings indicate that lenders and investors in South Africa appear to be aware of the benefits of red flagging as an early warning system. A structured approach (questionnaires/checklists) in using them is to be lacking at present. Respondents rated all red flags in the questionnaire as being important. No distinction was discernable among the different categories that were based on the nature of red flags.

We examine whether the fraud firms are engaged in real earnings management and accrual earnings management prior to the fraud year in the Malaysian context.

Our sample comprises of 65 financial statement fraud and 65 non-fraud firms over a period of eight years from 2001 to 2008.

Using the abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO) and abnormal production costs as the proxies for real earnings management, we find that financial statement fraud firms engage in manipulating production costs during preceding two years of the fraud event. However, our results show that financial fraud firms engage in manipulating CFO prior to the fraud event. Additionally, we find that financial statement fraud firms prefer to manipulate earnings using accruals relative to real earnings prior to the fraud year.

Our results demonstrate that real earnings management is more aggressive in financial statement fraud firms compared to the non-fraud firms in the four years prior to fraud.

This study aims to examine the relationship between the presence of a Malay director on the board and financial statement fraud in Malaysia. Further, the authors investigate whether financial statement fraud firms improve their governance mechanisms compared to non-fraud firms subsequent to the fraud year.

The authors use hand-collected data comprising 76 financial statement fraud and 76 non-fraud firms over a period of eight years from 2001 to 2008.

Using a univariate and logistic regression model, the results demonstrate a significant positive relationship between the proportion of Malay directors on the board and the financial statement fraud. The authors also find that fraud firms significantly increase the proportion of independent directors on their boards, increase the frequency of board and audit committee meetings and reduce duality subsequent to the detection of financial statement fraud compared to the non-fraud firms.

The findings of the study are useful to policy-makers, regulators, firms and investors.

This paper examines the role of professional associations, governmental agencies, and international accounting and auditing bodies in promulgating standards to deter and detect fraud, domestically and abroad. Specifically, it focuses on the role played by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA), the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), the US Government Accounting Office (GAO), and other national and foreign professional associations, in promulgating auditing standards and procedures to prevent fraud in financial statements and other white‐collar crimes. It also examines several fraud cases and the impact of management and employee fraud on the various business sectors such as insurance, banking, health care, and manufacturing, as well as the role of management, the boards of directors, the audit committees, auditors, and fraud examiners and their liability in the fraud prevention and investigation.

This paper aims to explore the effectiveness of fraud prevention and detection techniques, including data analytics, machine learning and data mining, and to understand how widespread the use of data analytics is across different sectors and to identify and understand the potential barriers to implementing these techniques to detect and prevent fraud.

A survey was administered to 73 Irish businesses to determine to what extent traditional approach, data mining or text mining are being used to prevent or detect fraudulent financial reporting, and to determine the perception level of their effectiveness.

The study suggests that whilst data analytics is widely used by businesses in Ireland there is an under-utilisation of data analytics as an effective tool in the fight against fraud. The study suggests there are barriers that may be preventing companies from implementing advanced data analytics to detect financial statement fraud and identifies how those barriers may be overcome.

In contrast to the majority of literature on big data analytics and auditing, which lacks empirical insight into the diffusion, effectiveness and obstacles of data analytics, this explanatory study contributes by providing useful insights from the field on big data analytics. While the extant auditing literature generally addresses the avenues of big data utilisation in auditing domain, our study explores particularly the use big data analytics as a fraud prevention and detection techniques.

The purpose of this study was to determine the influence of the elements of the fraud diamond theory in detecting financial statement fraud among non-financial firms in Kenya. Secondary data used to calculate ratios and figures representing the study variables was collected using a checklist for each of the targeted firms listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange in Kenya for the 2013-2017 period.

Secondary data used to calculate ratios and figures representing the study variables was collected using a checklist for each of the targeted firms listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange in Kenya for the 2013-2017 period. Convenience sampling technique was used to come up with a sample size of 35 out of the targeted population of 45 non-financial firms listed in Kenya (78% representation). This sample size was representative enough of the targeted population.

The results strongly supported that all the four elements of the fraud diamond triangle influenced financial statement fraud in Kenya. However, using three parameters, namely R², predicted sign and standard error, to compare the applicability of either the Yoon et al. (2006) or the modified Jones (1991), our study findings are mixed. It is therefore imperative that a new model should be developed in detecting earnings management in the Kenyan context. Note that including other variables will to a greater extent increase the explanatory power in detecting earnings management practiced by non-financial firms listed in Kenya.

Use of secondary information in the study was one limitation. Certain financial information was missing from some of the targeted firms’ official websites and the Nairobi Securities Exchange research handbooks. The researcher ensured that only non-financial firms whose audited financial statements were easily accessible were included in the study. Firms whose records were not readily available were excluded from the survey.

Practically, this study enables regulatory authorities in Kenya to understand the extent with which each element of the fraud diamond theory could be relied on in detecting financial statement fraud. Moreover, it will advise them on the areas to lay more emphasis when attempting to detect financial statement fraud using this model.

The main value of this study is the determination of the key elements of the fraud diamond theory, which have influence on financial statement fraud among non-financial firms listed in Kenya.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the possibility of rating the credit worthiness of a firm’s quarterly financial report using a dynamic anomaly detection method.

The study uses a data set containing financial statements from Quarter 1 – 2001 to Quarter 4 – 2016 of 937 Vietnamese listed firms. In sum, 24 fundamental financial indices are chosen as control variables. The study employs the Mahalanobis distance to measure the proximity of each data point from the centroid of the distribution to point out the extent of the anomaly.

The finding shows that the model is capable of ranking quarterly financial reports in terms of credit worthiness. The execution of the model on all observations also revealed that most financial statements of Vietnamese listed firms are trustworthy, while almost a quarter of them are highly anomalous and questionable.

The study faces several limitations, including the availability of genuine accounting data from stock exchanges, the strong assumptions of a simple statistical distribution, the restricted timeframe of financial data and the sensitivity of the thresholds for anomaly levels.

The study opens an avenue for ordinary users of financial information to process the data and question the validity of the numbers presented by listed firms. Furthermore, if fraud information is available, similar research can be conducted to examine the tendency for companies with anomalous financial reports to commit fraud.

This is the first paper of its kind that attempts to build an anomaly detection model for Vietnamese listed companies.

This paper builds on the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) Report, which examined US Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). The purpose of this paper is to provide valuable insights into the characteristics and realities of financial statement fraud in the post‐Enron regulatory environment.

This paper analyses a sample of AAERs from 2002 to 2005. It also provides case studies of an additional five high‐profile case studies from that period.

This paper finds evidence of changes in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement activities since the COSO Report. Specifically, it is found that enforcement activities have increased substantially post‐Enron and the companies subject to AAERs are, on average, much larger, more profitable and the frauds are more substantial than those exhibited in the COSO Report. These findings suggest that the SEC has become more aggressive at pursuing larger companies for financial statement fraud in the post‐Enron environment.

This paper relies on AAERs as the source of analysis of financial statement fraud, its findings must be viewed in light of the limitations of using these documents. Specifically, the prevailing prosecutions agenda of the US SEC may be reflected in these results.

The study findings are of great practical relevance to accounting regulators and practitioners as they provide valuable insights into the nature and characteristics of financial statement fraud.

The paper provides empirical evidence concerning the changing face of financial statement fraud enforcement and provides a more in‐depth comparison of fraud than possible with most previous studies that have tended to focus on quantitative measures. This is possible because the present investigation utilises qualitative data from AAERs to supplement quantitative findings. Its originality is also due to the use of institutional theory which is not commonly applied in the corporate governance field.

PT Garuda Indonesia (GIAA) Persero Tbk is the one only pride airline of Indonesian sovereignty. Although the bird achieved abundant international awards and certifications, the bird is dying and needs a remedy immediately. The frequent annual turnover of board executives did not make impact to the financial performance; this seems to be tip of the iceberg, peculiar with the number of restatement over the past decade. Therefore, this paper aims to address the issue through the function of five red flags model which known as Altman Z-score, Sprigate S-score, Grover G-score, Beneish M-score and Dechow F-score.

This is exploratory study of univariate analysis using financial distress and fraudulent financial statement approach, while the type of data is secondary taken from Indonesia Stock Exchange during 12 years observation from 2007 to 2018.

Altman, Springate and Grover produce strong indication of GIAA’s financial distress; all models score the same distress indication by 14 times. All distress models agreed that only 2011 and 2012 classify to the safe zone when GIAA performed the corporate actions. Beneish scores fraud indication by eight times. Dechow scores slightly higher by nine times. The number of fraud predictions in this research are in line with the number of restatement, which proves the assumption that restatement can be used as a signal of the financial statement fraud. When GIAA categorized in safe zone, both Beneish and Dechow score no to fraud, this indicates the fraud occurence during health period is lower.

The motivation behind the financial statement fraud is not discuss through this research but from the primary theory of the fraud triangle. Financial distress possesses strong relationship with pressure factor; therefore, exit from financial crisis is one of the best solution to mitigate the financial statement fraud.

The average of Beneish score is −2,26, slightly above the manipulator threshold which is −2,22. This must be marked as an ample conjecture of GIAA’s fraud inclination and been a highlight for the auditor both internal and external when performing control testing, attestation and other assurance services.

All models in this study can apply to any other corporate issues, especially for evaluating the government company who has loosen the public trust recently in Indonesia such as PT Asuransi Jiwasraya and PT Asabri. Moreover, the pandemic COVID-19 has brought the world to the new unprecedented risk, especially the economic turmoil which lead the possibilities of corporate distress and fraud. By applying these scores, public might have tools as pre-elemenary assessment to serve a decision where to put trust in a company.

This paper reveals a combination from various models of financial distress and financial statement fraud in order to generate the financial solutions named « DDCC » Debt Restructuring, Debt Conversion, Capex Management and Cost Cutting.

This study examines the relation between the likelihood of financial statement fraud and certain corporate governance requirements of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act and the new rules of the NYSE and the NASDAQ stock markets. Results based upon a logit regression analysis on a sample of 111 fraud firms and 111 matched no‐fraud firms indicate that fraud likelihood is lower when audit committee is comprised solely of independent directors and when audit committee members have smaller number of directorships with other companies. Board of director independence, audit committee expertise and nominating committee independence are not significant variables in reducing fraud likelihood. The study also investigates several other corporate governance variables and finds that fraud likelihood is lower when audit committee has longer tenure and chief executive officer is not chairman of the board. These results highlight two new significant aspects of audit committee: the directorships of its members with other firms and the committee members' tenure. The results have direct implications for further improvement of corporate governance.