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This study sought to examine the extent to which outsourced contracts, buyer-supplier trust and supplier opportunistic behavior explain supplier performance in Ugandan Public Procuring and Disposing Entities (PDEs). This study was prompted by reports of long lead times, failure to match specifications, late deliveries, poor quality of services delivered, contract violations, and increased supplier cheating. Cross sectional data from 116 central government PDEs concerning outsourced contracts was collected using a self-administered questionnaire. Hierarchical regression was used to indicate what happens to a model that was developed as part of this research as different predictor variables are introduced. The findings revealed that outsourced contracts, buyer-supplier trust, and supplier opportunistic behavior are significant predictors of supplier performance. The study has both managerial and policy implications which are discussed in this paper.

Little is known about how subsidies enhance both collaborative and opportunistic behaviours within subsidized industry–university partnerships, and how partners' behaviours influence the intellectual capital dynamics within subsidized industry–university. Based on these theoretical foundations, this study expects to understand intellectual capital’s (IC's) contribution as a dynamic or systemic process (inputs?outputs?outcomes) within subsided university–industry partnerships. Especially to contribute to these ongoing academic debates, this paper analyses how collaborative and opportunistic behaviours within industry–university partnerships influence the intellectual capital dynamics (inputs, outputs and outcomes) of the subsidized projects.

By combining two sources of information about 683 Mexican subsidized industry–university partnerships from 2009 to 2016, this study adopted the structural equation modelling (SEM) to analyse the effect of collaborative vs opportunistic behaviours in intellectual capital dynamics within subsidized projects.

Our results show three tendencies about the bright/dark side of subsidies within the Mexican industry–university partnerships. The first tendency shows how collaborative behaviours positively influence intellectual capital dynamics within subsidized industry–university partnerships. The second tendency shows how opportunistic behaviours influence intellectual capital impacts (performance) and return to society (job creation). The third tendency shows how initial inputs of subsidized projects generate some expected socio-economic returns that pursued the subsidies (mediation effect of intellectual capital outputs).

This research has three limitations that provide a future research agenda. The main limitations were associated with our sources of information. The first limitation, we did not match subsidized partnerships (focus group) and non-subsidized partnerships (control group). A qualitative analysis should help understand the effect of subsidies on intellectual capital and partnerships' behaviours. The second limitation, our measures of collaborative/opportunistic behaviours as well as intellectual capital dynamics should be improved by balancing traditional and new metrics in future research. The third limitation is that in emerging economies, the quality of institutions could influence the submission/selection of subsidies and generate negative externalities. Future research should control by geographical dispersion and co-location of subsidies.

For enterprise managers, this study offers insights into IC dynamics and behaviours within subsidized industry–university partnerships. The bright side of collaboration behaviours is related to IC's positive impacts on performance and socio-economic returns. The dark side is the IC appropriation behind opportunistic behaviours. Enterprise managers should recognize the relevance of IC management to capture value and reduce costs associated with opportunistic behaviours. For the university community, this study offers potential trends adopted by industry–university partnerships to reinforce universities' innovative transformation processes. Specifically, these trends are related to the legitimization of the university's role in society and contribution to regional development through industry–university partnerships' outcomes. Therefore, university managers should recognize the IC benefits/challenges behind industry–university partnerships.

For policymakers, the study indirectly shows the role of subsidies for generating/reinforcing intellectual capital outcomes within subsidized industry–university partnerships. The bright side allows evaluating the cost-benefit of this government intervention and the returns to priority industries. The dark side allows for understanding the need for implementing mechanisms to control opportunistic behaviours within subsidized partnerships. Accordingly, policymakers should understand the IC opportunity-costs related to industry–university partnerships for achieving the subsidies' aims.

This study contributes to three ongoing academic debates in innovation and management fields. The first debate about how intellectual capital dynamic is stimulated and transferred through the collaborative behaviour within industry–university partnerships in emerging economies. The second debate is about the “dark side” of partnerships stimulated by public programmes in emerging economies. The third debate is about the effectiveness of subsidies on intellectual capital activities/outcomes.

This study aims to get a deeper understanding of one of the antecedents of opportunistic behavior in strategic supplier relationships at the individual level of analysis. The authors specifically focus on self-justification, which could be seen as a mechanism that relaxes the moral scruples of purchasing professionals and, hence, facilitates actual opportunistic behavior.

The critical incident technique was deployed to interview purchasing professionals in the Netherlands about their personal opportunistic behavior in strategic supplier relationships. This resulted in rich autobiographical accounts of 29 critical incidents of opportunistic behavior. The data were analyzed through the lens of the self-justification theory.

The study identified a set of self-justification strategies underlying opportunistic purchasing behavior in strategic supplier relationships. Opportunistic professionals tended to deploy six strategies: acknowledgement, denial, rationalization, attributional egotism, sense of entitlement and ego aggrandizement.

This study is limited to Dutch industrial purchasers and was exploratory by nature. Future research could extend the perspective to other sectors, cultures and professional roles.

The study draws attention to radically new interventions at the individual level of analysis. To understand and minimize opportunistic behavior in strategic supplier relationships, organizations should acknowledge and address the important issue of self-justifications of purchasing professionals.

In contrast to the existing literature at the firm level of analysis, this study sheds new light on the antecedents of buyer opportunism from an alternative theoretical perspective at the individual level of analysis. The authors do not draw on the narrow perspective of personality psychology, but rather focus on the role of self-justification as an antecedent of buyer opportunism in strategic supplier relationships.

Retailers are increasingly forced to enter negotiations with new suppliers and have less time to develop trusting relationships prior to awarding sourcing contract. Such supplier negotiations are often guided by self‐interest‐seeking behavior. However, not all exchange partners behave opportunistically when given the opportunity and little is known about how and when opportunism actually occurs. This research seeks to develop a multidimensional perspective of exchange partners' Machiavellianism that reveals different types of opportunistic motivations in exchange relationships and to extend knowledge of socialization as a safeguard by investigating the efficacy of signaling trustworthiness as a means of reducing the risk of opportunistic behavior in exchanges with partners with different moral standards about opportunism.

The data consist of a sample of 259 purchasing professionals who are members of the Institute of Supply Chain Management and report on their negotiation behavior. Moderated regression analysis is used to analyze the research model.

The results show that opportunistic behavior originates from a multidimensional set of moral convictions held by an exchange partner. Interestingly, signaling a trusting relationship only reduces opportunistic behavior that is due to deceit, but is not effective against cynicism or flattery.

To date, retail managers have addressed potential partner opportunism by designing contractual agreements or by implementing structural and social safeguards. Little is known about how these approaches address partner‐specific causes of opportunism. The study demonstrates the extent to which trust, a popular socialization mechanism in retailing, moderates the degree to which an exchange partner's moral conviction leads to opportunism.

Drawing on the principal-agent theoretical perspective, we assert that sellers’ opportunism is acknowledged as an essential component that could determine the quality of the relationship between buyers (principals) and sellers (agents). The primary aim of this research is to investigate the influence of seller behavior vs outcome-based reputation and seller’s perceived freedom on opportunistic behavior in the Chinese e-commerce platform context.

The data collected from 436 e-commerce platform sellers were analyzed and interpreted using structural equation modeling.

The results indicate that both behavior-based and outcome-based reputations positively impact sellers’ perceived freedom but negatively impact their opportunism. Additionally, while perceived freedom of objectives reduces opportunism, freedom of action increases it. The study also highlights the significant moderating roles of prevention mechanisms and ethical ideology.

This study extends the principal-agent perspective by integrating the seller’s reputation as a potential source of preventing sellers from behaving opportunistically on e-commerce platforms.

The temporalities of opportunism – a term that generally means “self‐interest seeking with guile” – have not been adequately examined in the literature. This article suggests that opportunism is a variegated phenomenon that can be better appreciated by exploring the role of its temporal dimension. Adopting this temporal approach, the article proposes a framework of partner opportunism in strategic alliances that incorporates the two fundamental dimensions of time and risk. It then discusses four types of partner opportunism in this comprehensive time‐risk framework. Finally, the article indicates directions for further research.

This study focused on establishing the mediating role of opportunistic behavior in the relationship between institutional pressures and procurement cycle time (PCT) in Uganda’s central government (CG) procuring and disposing entities (PDEs). The study also sought to establish the relationship between institutional pressures and PCT, between institutional pressures and opportunity behavior and between opportunistic behavior and PCT. This study was carried out because most PDEs had failed to perform well in terms of PCT, and beneficiaries had often complained of the lengthy PCT.

The unit of analysis was 126 CG PDEs within Uganda while the unit of inquiry was three employees per PDE, namely, giving a total of 378 respondents. Using a quantitative cross-sectional survey, the study realized a response rate of 88% for the unit of analysis and 71.7% for unit of inquiry. Data were analyzed using SmartPLS 4 with focus on ascertaining regression and mediation results.

The findings show that institutional pressures negatively and significantly predict both institutional pressures and PCT (ß = –0.569**; ß = –0.688**, respectively). Also, institutional pressures and opportunistic behavior are significant predictors of PCT, predicting 60.6% change in PCT. Furthermore, opportunity behavior partially moderates the relationship between institutional pressures and PCT.

For Uganda’s CG PDEs to reduce procurement delays and to procure within PCT, they should put more emphasis on institutional pressures and curtailing opportunistic behavior. The study recommends further amendment of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (PPDA) Act 2003 to reduce delays.

There is need for further amendment of the PPDA Act 2003 to reduce delays, especially those attributed to approvals by contracts committee and the minimum bidding period for competitive bidding.

The study explores PCT and its antecedents whose understanding is critical in exploring avenues of reducing PCT and boosting service delivery to the beneficiaries.

The PPDA Act (2003) was amended in 2014, but still the time spent in the procurement processes has remained long, hence delaying or denying citizens service delivery. This is a matter of concern to the country at large and may spill into political unrests, and yet, there is scant literature exploring PCT and its antecedents. This makes the present study one of the pioneer empirical studies on PCT, with emphasis on Uganda. This study provides a framework for examining PCT in a context where scholarly explanation of PCT is still limited.

The main aim of this paper is to explore the influence mechanisms of perceived organizational politics (POP) on employee performance (EP). Drawing on the job demands-resources theory (JD-R), this paper investigates opportunistic silence (OS) as a mediating factor and job level as a moderating effect in the POP-OS-performance relationship.

This study’s data were collected from 203 employees working in Indian high-power distance organizations (HPDOs), such as the military, police and security forces. Mediation and moderation analysis were conducted using PLS-SEM, and the moderated mediation index was calculated using Hayes PROCESS Macro.

The results indicate that OS fully mediates the POP-performance relationship – specifically, POP as a job demand activates OS, which acts as an energy/resource depleting mechanism and further deteriorates task performance. Interestingly, the overall negative influence of POP and OS on EP was stronger for employees at lower job levels than those at senior job levels.

This paper offers a unique set of findings that enrich the understanding of factors responsible for employees’ performance in the highly political environments of HPDOs. By using the lens of JD-R theory, this paper draws attention towards the tendency of employees to indulge in self-serving behaviours like OS in politically charged contexts which is detrimental to their performance and may also undermine overall organization’s productivity. Furthermore, this paper also highlights the conditional effects exerted by job level in the unique nexus of POP, OS and EP.

In construction projects, engineering variations are very common and create breeding grounds for opportunistic claims. This study investigates the complementary effect between an inspection mechanism and a reputation system in deterring opportunistic claims, considering an employer with limited inspection accuracy and a contractor, which can be either reputation-concerned or opportunistic.

This paper applies a signaling game to investigate the complementary effect between the employer's inspection and a reputation system in deterring the contractor's possible opportunistic claim, considering the information-flow influence of claiming prices.

This study finds that in the exogenous-inspection-accuracy case, the employer does not always inspect the claim. A more stringent reputation system complements a less accurate inspection only when the inspection cost is lower than a threshold, but may decline the employer's surplus or social welfare. In the optimal-inspection-accuracy case, the employer always inspects the claim. However, only a sufficiently stringent reputation system can guarantee the effectiveness of an optimal inspection in curbing opportunistic claims. A more stringent reputation system has a value-stepping effect on the employer's surplus but may unexpectedly impair social welfare, whereas a higher inspection cost efficiency always reduces social welfare.

This article contributes to the project management literature by combing the signaling game theory with the reputation theory and thus embeds the problem of inspection mechanism design into a broader socio-economic framework.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse how collaborative/opportunistic behaviours within subsidised university-industry partnerships are influencing the design/implementation of strategic knowledge management practices in emerging economies.

The proposed conceptual model was analysed with a retrospective multiple case study approach integrated by four subsidised entrepreneurial universities-industry partnerships of the Incentive Programme for Innovation from 2009 to 2014 in Mexico.

Entrepreneurial universities and industrial organisations confirm insights about dual collaborative-opportunistic behaviour within subsidised partnerships. The main effects of behaviours represent an increment in the knowledge management costs during the monitoring stages. The ex ante collaboration agreement anticipated and protected intellectual capabilities.

This research contributes to the ongoing discussion about public administrations’ opportunistic behaviours in emerging economies (Tripsas et al., 1995), the effectiveness of the innovation and entrepreneurial programmes (Guerrero and Urbano, 2019b), and the link between dual behaviours (collaborative and opportunistic) and knowledge management practices (de Wit-de Vries et al., 2018).

New questions emerged about the effectiveness of subsidies as new modes of knowledge generation among entrepreneurial universities and industrial organisations, as well as the need for implementing strategic knowledge management practices in the public administration.

For policymakers, the study presents insights about the effectiveness of public resources. Policymakers should understand challenges and re-define/re-incentivize the productive value chain as well as implement mechanisms to control opportunistic behaviours on potential subsidised firms.

The paper contributes to the academic debate about how entrepreneurial universities and industrial organisations are strategically managing their knowledge when participating in subsidised partnerships in emerging economies.