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This paper is an interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, whose work is inspiration for this special issue.

Public radio interview methodology was used.

This paper provides autobiographical reflections by Spivak.

The paper provides a glimpse into Spivak’s reflections on her life and work and its impact on her practice.

This is an excerpt of a previously published interview, included here by permission, and adds value to the special issue with insights from the author of “Can the Subaltern Speak?”.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a sense of the perspectives that guide the collection of articles.

This paper provides an introductory essay regarding the contributions and critics associated with Spivak’s work.

In addition, the contents lay out brief descriptions of the articles included in the collection.

The notion of revisiting “Can the subaltern speak?” provides authors with innovative and provocative ideas to guide their submissions.

Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.

The finance literature has not documented the feeling, the shock and the pain that ordinary people had to go through during the 2008 global financial crisis especially in the United States where it all began. In an effort to shed new light on the global financial crisis, it has become important to present a view of the financial crisis from the lens of those who were affected by the crisis, those who were responsible for the crisis, those who could have prevented the crisis, as well as the views of other observers. The views or quotes in this chapter are concise, useful and thought provoking. They create an opportunity to help reconsider the events of 2008 from a fresh perspective, so that a lot more can be done by everyone, including banks, governments and citizens, to prevent a repeat of those events in the future of finance. Finally, most of the views or quotes reported in this chapter have within them some important lessons and wisdom to guide us on what to do before another future crisis comes.

Social movements are sites of knowledge production. Green criminologists are interested in activism both as an informal response to environmental harms/crimes and in their explorations of the possibility of activist green criminology. In this chapter, the author calls attention to a related issue – the significance of knowledge produced in social movements. Drawing on her study of the resistance movements against hydropower in Turkey, the author discusses how movement knowledge can contribute to green criminology in relation to the (i) complexity of harm and victimisation; (ii) politics of knowledge in identifying harm; and (iii) limits of formal processes in preventing harm. The author concludes by highlighting the importance of recognising activists as subjects who produce knowledge, in academic engagement with activism.

There is a high failure rate of mergers and acquisitions. Most of them fail during the integration process. This article examines the organizational factors that negatively impact the integration process and suggests eight principles to make the integration more effective and successful. The factors discussed are based on empirical findings, literatures, and case studies. The major causes include improper managing and strategy, culture differences, delays in communication, and lack of clear vision. Therefore, the keys to successful integration process are a hands‐on leadership styles, a bias for action, involvement of the entire staff, continuous focus on customers, and most of all, open and honest communication with employees.

As a company that has continuously achieved business innovation, Apple in the United States has successfully applied strategic knowledge creation to produce a series of products that integrate various digital devices as well as diverse contents and applications, such as the iPod, iPhone, and iPad, based on a corporate vision of a digital hub concept. At the same time, the redefining of corporate boundaries that expanded Apple’s business in a horizontal direction from the Macintosh PC business to the delivery of music, smartphones, and tablets is also an indication of the evolution of a corporate vision involving Apple’s strategic transformation. This chapter presents the strategic and creative processes that enabled practitioners, including the late Steve Jobs, to demonstrate “strategic innovation capability” by “holistic leadership” at every level of management at Apple and successfully achieve a business ecosystem strategy through “creative collaboration” across diverse boundaries within and outside the company.

Multiple stakeholders in the financial reporting process have articulated concerns over the rules-based orientation that U.S. accounting standards have adopted. Many argue that a more principles-based approach to standards setting, typified by international accounting standards, would improve the quality of financial reporting and strengthen the auditor's position when dealing with client pressure, thereby enabling a focus on transparency and fairness of financial reports. In early 2009, the U.S. appeared poised to transition U.S. accounting standards to international accounting standards. The transition decision was made after the recommendations of the SEC Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting (i.e., SEC Pozen Committee) publicly expressed strong support in its final report (SEC, 2008a). The SEC in turn issued its “Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers on November 14, 2008” (SEC, 2008b) outlining the transition procedures. However, with Shapiro taking over as chairperson of the SEC, this move now appears less likely pending a stronger review of how principles-based international standards may impact the strength of financial regulatory oversight – a potential delay met with disdain by the pro principles-based European regulatory community (Doran, 2009). While transition to international standards continues to progress, little research examining whether principles-based standards affect auditor decision-making has been conducted. The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of principles- vs. rules-based standards on auditors' willingness to allow preparers leeway in reporting practices and to consider how auditors' decision behavior is influenced by potential client pressure and/or opposing pressure from the SEC. Based on a sample of 114 experienced auditors, the results show that auditors are more willing to allow clients to manage earnings under rules-based standards; and, these results are persistent even under external pressure. Results also indicate that more experienced auditors are less willing to allow clients who exert high pressure to report earnings aggressively, while SEC pressure has more affect on less experienced auditors. These results provide important insights to the FASB, SEC, and IASB as they weigh arguments underlying the principles- vs. rules-based debate.

Directors help determine the strategic direction of a corporation and are responsible for ensuring the institution has a good system of internal control. Banking institutions without a strategic direction emphasizing sound lending practices that promote the long-run financial health and viability of the institution will be sued more frequently than peer institutions. Institutions that do not have a good system of internal control will also be sued more frequently. Hence, legal expense is a bank corporate governance measure. We compare the performance of bank legal expense and a widely cited corporate governance index in a regression framework to determine which better predicts bank performance. The regressions indicate legal expense is a much better predictor, hence a better measure of bank corporate governance. Regulators should require legal expense reporting and rank institutions by the ratio of legal expense to assets to help identify institutions with weak governance. Seven case studies illustrate the role of legal expense in corporate governance.