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Purpose: This chapter discusses the need for climate change risk mitigation and why it is not the responsibility of Central Banks to mitigate climate change risk.

Methodology: This chapter uses critical discourse analysis to explain why central banks should not have the responsibility for climate change risk mitigation.

Findings: This chapter argues that the responsibility for managing climate change risk should lie with elected officials, other groups and institutions but not Central Banks. Elected officials, or politicians, should be held responsible to deal with the consequence of climate change events. Also, international organizations and everybody can take responsibility for climate change while the Central Bank can provide assistance – but Central Banks should not lead the climate policy making or mitigation agenda.

Implication: The policy implication is that the responsibility for climate change risk mitigation should be shifted to politicians who are elected officials of the people. Also, international climate change organizations or groups can take responsibility for mitigating the climate change risk of member countries. Finally, citizens in a country or region should have equal responsibility for climate change. Climate information should be provided to every citizen to help them prepare for future climatic conditions.

Originality: This chapter propagates the idea that Central Banks should take a lead role in dealing with the problems of climate change. This chapter is the first chapter to contest a Central Bank-led climate change risk mitigation agenda.

This chapter’s goal is to define the kind of seeds to be planted for moving forward in the safe and stable drive toward a leading central banking role directed at achieving a sustained Islamic banking and finance development within the global financial system. The system witnessed the input of Islamic banking with its fruitful contribution as a feasible banking structure in both implementing agreed reforms and shaping the next steps directed toward crisis prevention and crisis resolution.

The adopted approach is based upon scientific conceptual basis as well as the practical experience related to the central banking role and Islamic banking evolution. This chapter will define the strategic role of Central Banks and highlight the conceptual basis governing the leading role of central banks as well as the practical basis derived from our central banking and Islamic banking experience.

In light of the conceptual and practical basis for enabling an efficient and effective role of Central Banks as a regulatory body in shaping the future of the Islamic Financial System. Legal, institutional and managerial strategic determinants for this role have been defined.

The analytical work of this chapter crystallises in a pioneering initiative the main determining factors governing the role of central banks as the main regulatory body for Islamic banking, and how this role could be effective in affecting the future role to be played by the Islamic banks in the global financial system. Also, to this end, the integrated required role by central banks, public policies, multilateral institutions and Islamic banks are illustrated.

Energy and cooperative hard work and commitment from all players, including the regulators of Islamic banks supported by public policies, international and multilateral institutions and members of the Islamic banking family is thought to be the main determining factor for transforming the Islamic banking family into one that will make the Islamic people and all humanity – through the global financial system – live with more stability, welfare and happiness.

The authors aim to look at the conditions under which central bank easing – and specifically the purchase of private sector securities – can/should contribute to growth, rather than fiscal policy and also ask when can the central bank’s purchase of private sector securities help supplant traditional monetary policy.

After surveying the existing literature, the authors use simple correlation of central bank private asset (stocks, bonds, etc.), interest rates, gross domestic product (GDP) growth, inflation and the extent of the functioning of domestic banking sectors (among others) to classify countries in which these purchases promote pro-growth investment.

Under the typical conditions for unconventional monetary policy, central bank purchases of private companies’ securities can promote growth in some places (like Bulgaria, the Ukraine, Georgia and Greece at the time of our writing) while hurting it in others (like in parts of Latin America and Africa in the mid-2010s). The authors find how such purchases effectively “bypass” dysfunctional banking systems and central/government local bodies fiscal spending, making the central bank the “funder of last resort” in many middle and lower income countries.

This paper tells specific central banks to ramp up – or reduce – their purchases of private sector securities. The authors identify exact jurisdictions where such “helicopter money” has led to investment in the past economic growth.

All previous work on conventional and unconventional monetary policy has looked at the way monetary policy affects investment and growth through the banking system and holding companies’ reactions constant. The authors do the opposite – looking at how companies respond, holding banking system responses constant. No one has ever looked at these private purchases (taken from a special IMF database), much less tried to argue that central banks can sometimes target investment growth much better than fiscal policy. No one has ever considered them as a funder (rather than lender) of last resort.

The paper explores the precarious balance between modernizing monetary systems by means of digital currencies (either issued by the central bank itself or independently) and safeguarding financial stability as also ensured by tangible payment (and saving) instruments like paper money.

Which aspects of modern payment systems could contribute to improve the way of functioning of today's globalized economy? And, which might even threaten the above-mentioned instable equilibrium? This survey paper aims, precisely, at giving some preliminary answers to a complex – therefore, ongoing – debate at scientific as well as banking and political levels.

The coexistence of State's money (i.e. “legal tender”) and cryptocurrencies can have a disciplining effect on central banks. Nevertheless, there are still high risks connected to the introduction of central bank digital currency, which should be by far not considered to be a perfect substitute of current cash. At the same time, cryptocurrencies issued by central banks might be exposed to the drawbacks of cryptocurrencies without benefiting from correspondingly strong advantages. A well-governed two-tier system to be achieved through innovation in payment infrastructures might be, in turn, more preferable. Regulated competition by new players combined with “traditional” deposits and central bank elements remains essential, although central banks should embrace the technologies underlying cryptocurrencies, because risk payment service providers could move to other currency areas considered to be more appealing for buyers and sellers.

We do not see specific limitations besides the fact that the following is for sure a broad field of scientific research to be covered, which is at the same time at the origin of ongoing developments and findings. Originality and implications of the paper are, instead, not only represented by its conclusions (which highlight the role of traditional payment instruments and stress why the concept of “money” still has to have specific features) but also by its approach of recent literature's review combined with equally strong logical-analytical insights.

In the light of these considerations, even the role of traditional payment systems like paper money is by far not outdated or cannot be – at this point, at least – replaced by central bank digital currencies (whose features based on dematerialization despite being issued and guaranteed by a public authority are very different).

No matter which form it might assume is what differentiates economic from barter transactions. This conclusion is by far not tautological or self-evident since the notion of money has historically been a great object of scientific discussion. In the light of increasingly modern payment instruments, there is no question that money and the effectiveness of related monetary policies have to be also explored from a social perspective according to different monetary scenarios, ranging from central bank digital currencies to private currencies and cash restrictions/abolition.

The originality/value of the following article is represented by the fact that it (1) refers to some of the most relevant and recent contributions to this research field, (2) moves from payment systems in general to their newest trends like cryptocurrencies, cash restrictions (or, even, abolition proposals) and monetary policy while (3) combining all elements to reach a common picture. The paper aims at being a comprehensive contribution dealing with "money" in its broadest but also newest sense.

The purpose of this study is to propose a centralized Shariah governance framework (CSGF) for the Islamic banks and Shariah governance in Bangladesh as such, the existence and practices of the Shariah governance framework (SGF) are decentralized and diversified.

The paper implements a qualitative case study approach to develop a CSGF for the Islamic banks in Bangladesh. The data has been collected from 17 respondents through semi-structured interviews with a combination of regulators, Shariah supervisory board members, Shariah department executives and Shariah experts from the central bank and Islamic banks in Bangladesh.

This study proposes a CSGF which is comprising two-tier Shariah supervisory boards (SSBs), i.e. institutional SSB and centralized Shariah supervisory board (CSSB) under the central bank to monitor the overall functions of SG. The study recommends the setting up of four departments under the central bank to enhance the functions of CSSB. Besides, the central bank can introduce Shariah rating, external Shariah audit and external Shariah review through Islamic rating agencies and Islamic Chartered Accountant Firms for transparency and quality compliance which are more desired from the public and other stakeholders.

The study significantly contributed to the national and global regulatory bodies by providing a structural CSGF for the Islamic banks to perform their functions and activities smoothly.

The study outlines a CSGF for the Islamic banks in Bangladesh as the existing practices are diversified and decentralized. Therefore, this framework would be helpful for the central bank and Islamic banks in Bangladesh to promote unique practices of the SGF.

This is the first research that provides a structure of CSGF for Islamic banks in Bangladesh, while the central bank of Malaysia developed the first SGF. There is no study concerning the demographic figure of CSGF of Islamic banks in the entire literature.

This paper aims to achieve two goals: first, to evaluate the existing interest-free monetary policy tools in the major Islamic financial hubs of Malaysia, Pakistan and Bahrain and; second, to suggest how monetary policy tools in Turkey can be used in other countries.

This study follows a qualitative research method based on literature review, comparison, evaluation and design.

The policy rate cannot be used due to Shariah concerns. The reserve requirement depends on qard, and the reserves should be kept separately in the central bank. In terms of ijarah sukuk, Shariah concerns should be taken into account and a new structure, as displayed in Figure 3, should be followed. Government investment certificates can be used as an interest-free monetary policy tool. A genuine mudarabah interbank investments can also be used. Wadiah acceptance with no habitual gift can be used as well, and Tawarruq and central bank notes are not preferable due to Shariah concerns as well. Having said that, a Turkey-based tawarruq platform can be structured for others to use instead of applying to London.

This paper’s unique suggestion is to develop an interbank taqaruz market and a taqaruz method with the central bank. It is also unique for Turkey in the subject.

This paper aims to investigate Jordan’s framework specifics of the anti-money laundering (AML) policy and factors related to the Central Bank instructions on money laundering.

A questionnaire has been distributed to a random data sample of 100 branch bank managers and supervisors who have a sufficient experience in this issue, and a t-test statistical technique has been used.

The results revealed that commercial banks of Jordan are committed to the instruction of the central bank, and they are highly qualified in all investigated measures.

This study supports the Central Bank of Jordan’s efforts in combating money laundering, which encourage all commercial banks of one country to follow the same adopted regulations to identify and report transactions of suspicious behaviour: investigate capability of the tellers and customer account representatives to report such activities, use AML software, filter customer’s data classify available information according to levels of suspicion or based on the uncertain customers without being subject to the institutional secrecy jurisdiction and to work under cooperative management.

It has been recommended to utilize more advanced technology, intensify training and ensure for more knowing clients’ knowledge. The importance of this paper is to insure the following: first, the banking system is obliged to recognize and report suspicious money laundering transactions, regarding up to date the FATFA equivalence status of other countries; second, increase the awareness and ensure the central bank efforts’ success; third, assure the adequacy of different issues such as the internal control system tools; devices or tools availability; and sufficient employees’ qualifications in facing launderers attempts; fourth, to be sure that suspected transactions are checked against any commercial bank records; finally, to be sure that commercial banks are giving enough considerations to all the AML proactive actions such as the regulations of checking while opening an account, accepting money on deposit, giving loans, issuing a debit card, traveller’s check and collecting enough information about new clients.

The role of money and monetary policy of the central bank in pursuing macroeconomic stability has significantly changed over the period since the end of World War II. Globalization, liberalization, integration, and transition processes generally shaped the crucial milestones of the macroeconomic development and substantial features of economic policy and its framework in Europe. Policy-driven changes together with variety of exogenous shocks significantly affected the key features of macroeconomic environment on the European continent that fashioned the framework and design of monetary policies.

This chapter examines the key basis of the central bank’s monetary policy on its way to pursue and preserve the internal and external stability of the purchasing power of money. Substantial elements of the monetary policy like objectives and strategies are not only generally introduced but also critically discussed according to their accuracy, suitability, and reliability in the changing macroeconomic conditions. Brief overview of the Eurozone common monetary policy milestones and the past Eastern bloc countries’ experience with a variety of exchange rate regimes provides interesting empirical evidence on origins and implications of vital changes in the monetary policy conduction in Europe and the Eurozone.

The chapter evaluates how the demise of cryptocurrencies as a medium of exchange may result from the issue of digital money by central banks. To evaluate the likelihood that central bank digital money would cause the demise of cryptocurrencies, the research employs discourse analysis and literature review. In this chapter, I demonstrate how the issuing of a digital currency by a central bank might result in the demise of private digital currencies like bitcoin. I contend that central banks will make use of their monetary authority and the confidence that people have in currency guaranteed by the government. This might provide considerable motivation for central banks to launch their own digital money. The creation of a digital currency by a central bank has the potential to reduce confidence in cryptocurrencies, which might eventually cause them to collapse. The chapter is the first to argue that fiat digital money should prevail over private digital currency.